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Abstract 
 
 This thesis contributes to the scholarship on policy diffusion in general, and on 
environmental policy diffusion in particular, by unpicking the drivers of 
different diffusion mechanisms. Its overarching aim is to investigate the 
motivational dynamics influencing environmental policymaking at the fuzzy, 
understudied, pre-legislative stage. The thesis comprises four standalone 
papers: The first paper (Chapter 2) examines policymakers’ motivations to 
engage with the climate change mitigation agenda based on a case study of 
Israeli climate change mitigation policy. It suggests that Israel’s engagement 
with the climate change mitigation agenda, displaying an evident pattern of 
diffusion by emulating developed countries, is significantly motivated by 
considerations of internal, rather than external, legitimacy, contrary to 
expectations. The second paper (Chapter 3) makes theoretical advancements in 
recognising issue attributes as explanatory factors for the different mechanisms 
of policy diffusion, addressing an acknowledged gap in the literature. The third 
paper (Chapter 4) is an empirical application of the issue attributes model 
introduced in Chapter 3; the concept is applied to three diffusion processes of 
environmental issues in Israel: climate change, air pollution, and waste, 
analysing the differences in the attributes of these three issues, and 
subsequently, the differences in diffusion mechanisms in practice. The fourth 
paper (Chapter 5) investigates GLOBE International, a previously unstudied 
network of legislators committed to advancing climate change legislation. Its 
main findings show that GLOBE facilitates a mechanism of policy and political 
learning, but perhaps more interestingly, generates network-enabled emotional 
energy and esprit de corps among its members, which has helped to motivate 
and sustain climate action by legislators. The thesis takes a qualitative, micro-
level approach, utilising data from 64 interviews with policy actors from 21 
countries, as well supporting textual sources, thus contributing to the 
qualitative knowledge base needed to support analytical aggregations on policy 
diffusion processes. 
 
Acknowledgments  
It is quite remarkable how a very lonely journey of writing a PhD, is actually 
an amazingly collaborative effort of tremendously supportive minds and hearts. 
Thank you all for walking with me during these past few years, and please 
forgive me for all my faults, PhD- and non-PhD related alike.  
To my superb supervisors, Dr Richard Perkins and Dr Michael Mason: thank 
you for your brilliant guidance and genuine care and support. From day one I 
knew I was in very good hands, and have continued feeling that way all along 
the way. Thank you for watering the better ideas in my mind and weeding out 
the bad ones, for the freedom and encouragement to pursue my truth, allowing 
me to make mistakes, while ensuring I do not make huge ones. To my professor 
and friend Ofira Ayalon, for encouraging me to continue studying, and helping 
me make my baby steps in the world of policy research. To my PhD examiners, 
Dr Robert Falkner and Prof. Dave Huitema, whose constructive and sensitive 
feedback contributed to this work.   
To my friends and colleagues at the Grantham Institute, my home in the last 
few years - a remarkable collection of brilliant, lovely people who provided an 
incentive to not work home in my pyjamas. Special thanks to Sam Fankhauser, 
an absolutely inspiring man to work with, who gave me the fantastic 
opportunity to join the Climate Legislation Study. Thank you for your ideas, 
advice, constructive criticism, smiles, lunches, coffees, and late night 
conversations: Alina, Amelia, Antony, Baran, Bob, Caterina, Chris, Dimitri, 
Ginny, Hélia, Isabella, Jo, Jonathan, Maria, Matthew, Murray, Paola, Philip, 
Simon, Stuart, and Swenja. I acknowledge with gratitude financial support 
from the London School of Economics and from the Anglo-Israeli Association, 
which made this adventure, well, slightly less adventurous.  
To the participants in the research, who endured my questions and wonderings, 
opened up even when I asked difficult and confronting questions, and provided 
candid reflections on how policy is made - and could be made even better. To 
the hardworking guardians of the environment in Israel, promoting justice, 
health, and plain common sense, in an environment that often resists those. To 
legislators from the GLOBE network worldwide, writing our way out of the 
climate crisis into law books. To Terry Townshend, my dear trusted friend, and 
a world-saver in his own right, one bird at a time.  
To my friends, my chosen family – Jayaraj, Sri, Inbal, Avi, Tal, Zohar, Batya, 
Joana, Kat, INSEAD J06 families. I am lucky and utterly grateful to have all of 
you in my life. Your open hearts, sharp minds, and welcoming homes provided 
me with love, encouragement and support that kept me going and going. To 
John, for every bit of the journey; I might have submitted this thesis two years 
ago if it wasn’t for you. I wouldn’t have it any other way. Thank you to those 
who contributed healing and enriching practices, making the journey easier 
and more meaningful and joyful: Jon for the mindfulness meditation; Ian, 
Adamo, Vicci, and all my gorgeous blues-dancing partners, for keeping my feet 
and my heart grooving; Hari, for reminding me to stretch and relax; Hanya, for 
the needles and the smiles. 
To my much-loved parents Galia and Yigal: for giving me wings and convincing 
me I could fly as high or as far as I’d like to; for teaching me what it means to 
really love and be loved. To my brother Yuval, an inspiring, justice-seeking, 
emotionally-intelligent man: for your love and support through these last years.  
Finishing a PhD is a little bit like having a baby, a creation which you carry in 
you, alone, for a long time, and finally release to the world, knowing it will 
never be entirely yours again (not to mention the hardships of delivery). So this 
last ‘child’ of mine is dedicated to my three flesh and blood children: Amitai, 
Ayelet and Ofer, extraordinary people in their own right, whose smiles, love 
and innate curiosity made coming home every day worthwhile. I wish you, that 
as you pursue your dreams (and battle your demons) you will always be 
surrounded by as much love and care as I have been. I can only dare hope that 
this tiny contribution to scholarship will go towards making your lives better.  
Finally, Udi, my love - you and I have defined and redefined what love and 
partnership are. You have been a rock for me ever since we met and a proper 
solid diamond these last few years. Your unquestioning emotional and practical 
support, kindness, and love have been nothing short of amazing. In so many 
ways, this work is yours too.  
Table of contents 
 
Declaration .................................................................................................................. 2 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................... 4 
Table of contents ......................................................................................................... 6 
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................. 9 
1.1 Questions and journeys – a personal story of research motivations ............... 9 
1.2 Mapping the gaps in existing scholarship ...................................................... 11 
1.3 Research questions ......................................................................................... 18 
1.4 Approach/methods .......................................................................................... 19 
1.5 Thesis structure .............................................................................................. 23 
1.6 Concluding remarks ....................................................................................... 27 
References ................................................................................................................. 29 
Chapter 2: Why bother? Motivations for engaging with climate change mitigation 
policies in low emitting countries ............................................................................. 33 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 33 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 33 
2.2 Literature ........................................................................................................ 38 
2.2.1 Seeking legitimacy via a process of policy diffusion ............................... 39 
2.2.2 Domestic Interests and climate change co-benefits ................................ 43 
2.2.3 Environmental norms .............................................................................. 44 
2.3 Climate change policymaking in Israel – background ................................... 45 
2.4 Methodology .................................................................................................... 48 
2.5 Motivations for climate change mitigation policies – empirical evidence ..... 53 
2.5.1 Emulation and external legitimacy ......................................................... 54 
2.5.2 Internal legitimacy .................................................................................. 55 
2.5.3 Domestic motivations .............................................................................. 57 
2.5.4 Normative motivations ............................................................................ 59 
2.6 Concluding remarks ....................................................................................... 60 
References ................................................................................................................. 62 
Annex – summary of document analysis .................................................................. 70 
Chapter 3: Can issue attributes explain different mechanisms of policy diffusion? 
An exploratory framework ........................................................................................ 71 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 71 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 71 
3.2 Overview of the literature .............................................................................. 75 
3.2.1 Policy diffusion mechanisms ................................................................... 75 
3.2.2 Attributes, motivations, and actions ....................................................... 80 
3.3 Linking issue attributes to diffusion mechanisms – an exploratory model .. 85 
3.3.1 Conceptual model .................................................................................... 85 
3.3.2 Salience .................................................................................................... 88 
3.3.3 Complexity ............................................................................................... 91 
3.3.4 Fragility ................................................................................................... 93 
3.3.5 Opportunities and threats ....................................................................... 94 
3.3.6 Geographical scope .................................................................................. 96 
3.4 Concluding remarks ....................................................................................... 98 
References ............................................................................................................... 101 
Chapter 4: Can issue attributes explain different mechanisms of policy diffusion? 
Evidence from three environmental issues ............................................................ 108 
Abstract ................................................................................................................... 108 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 109 
4.2 An overview of the literature........................................................................ 112 
4.2.1 Policy diffusion ...................................................................................... 112 
4.2.2 Issue attributes ...................................................................................... 114 
4.3 Methodology .................................................................................................. 118 
4.4 Case studies .................................................................................................. 128 
4.4.1 Israel as an environmental policy adopter ............................................ 128 
4.4.2 Packaging waste .................................................................................... 130 
4.4.3 Air pollution ........................................................................................... 136 
4.4.4 Climate change ...................................................................................... 140 
4.5 Discussion ..................................................................................................... 147 
4.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 152 
References ............................................................................................................... 156 
Annex – Illustrative quotes for coding frame ......................................................... 163 
Chapter 5: ‘A very human business’ – trans-governmental networking initiatives 
and domestic climate action .................................................................................... 171 
Abstract ................................................................................................................... 171 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 171 
5.2 GLOBE as an inter-parliamentary network ................................................ 175 
5.3 Understanding networking initiatives ......................................................... 178 
5.3.1 Conventional explanations and their shortcomings ............................. 178 
5.3.2 Bringing emotions into networking initiatives ..................................... 181 
5.4 Research design and methods ...................................................................... 186 
5.5 Evidence from participants .......................................................................... 190 
5.5.1 A network for learning and resources? ................................................. 190 
5.5.2 Unity, esprit de corps, and inspiration .................................................. 198 
5.6 Discussion and conclusions .......................................................................... 204 
References ............................................................................................................... 209 
Annex I- Media mentions of GLOBE & the climate legislation study, 2014-2015 214 
Chapter 6: Thesis conclusion and reflections on contributions .............................. 218 
6.1 Key contributions of the research ................................................................ 218 
6.1.1 Theoretical contributions ...................................................................... 218 
6.1.2 Empirical contributions ......................................................................... 220 
6.1.3 Methodological contributions ................................................................ 221 
6.2 Key limitations and suggestions for future research ................................... 223 
6.2.1 Limitations ............................................................................................ 223 
6.2.2 Directions for additional research ......................................................... 224 
6.3 Potential policy lessons................................................................................. 225 
6.4 Concluding note ............................................................................................ 226 
References ............................................................................................................... 227 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Questions and journeys – a personal story 
of research motivations 
This thesis was born in the same way that knowledge has always advanced 
throughout history: from curiosity in the face of an unsolved puzzle, with a 
pinch of luck and coincidence. Between 2009 and 2011 I worked for an Israeli 
environmental think-tank. My team was involved with the formulation of 
Israel’s Packaging Waste Law and advised the government on the formulation 
of a national greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation plan. In both of these processes, 
there was a demand from policymakers to situate the policymaking process in 
relation to what other countries were already doing: gathering information, 
benchmarking, and plainly copying. Witnessing this up-close was intriguing. 
Israel boasts the title of ‘start-up nation’ as it has the highest number of start-
ups per capita; entrepreneurship is a defining cultural feature. In many other 
domains, especially with regard to the Palestinian issue, Israel isn’t concerned 
with international public opinion. Why then, were policymakers so eager to look 
up to other countries when formulating environmental policies? 
One of things that piqued my curiosity, in particular, was why Israel would 
dedicate resources to formulating a national climate change plan in spite of 
having negligible GHG emissions and no commitment to reduce them according 
to the Kyoto Protocol. At the same time, it was not investing any resources in 
climate adaptation despite the fact that it is a coastal, arid, desert-bordering 
country which, at the time, relied heavily on imported fossil fuels. In the face of 
soaring energy demands, a national energy efficiency plan lay untouched in the 
drawers of the Ministry of National Infrastructure. It was only under the 
auspices of the national GHG mitigation plan that it was acknowledged and 
budgeted for. 
Another interesting puzzle was how the same policy officials in the same small 
Ministry of Environmental Protection appeared to be acting differently with 
regard to various policy issues. In some instances they seemed to be 
systematically gathering information and evaluating alternatives based on 
professional and intrinsic considerations; in other situations, it appeared that 
decision-making was driven by other considerations. Was it a question of 
accumulated expertise, of political agendas, or did the issues themselves 
possess any traits which could explain this variance? In the cases observed, 
there seemed to be a policy diffusion process, yet the international policy 
diffusion literature accounted only very sparsely for differences between 
different policy issues, as explanatory factor for diffusion processes. 
In London I joined a research team working on the Global Climate Legislation 
Study, a review of international climate legislation, produced at the Grantham 
Research Institute in collaboration with GLOBE International, an inter-
parliamentary institute (IPI) for legislators, concerned primarily with climate 
change. Witnessing the encounters among legislators in international 
conferences, it was clear that a fascinating dynamic was at work. Delegates 
were conversing with each other frankly and eagerly, even when it was 
uncomfortable. During one of the sessions in a large international summit, a 
senior legislator from an oil-rich country spoke at the plenary, stating that 
GLOBE was the only forum in which he could speak from heart, where he felt 
his country wasn’t seen as an evil-doer. This, and other moments that I 
witnessed over several years, prompted me to investigate the network – as a 
researcher rather than an observer. The global environmental governance 
literature recorded transnational networks and institutions as platform for 
learning and for resource acquisition. Yet it did not capture the buzz that 
seemed to happening at those events. 
Initially, I assumed that my research would focus on different policy diffusion 
mechanisms: the Israeli climate policy plan appeared to be an obvious quest for 
legitimacy in the eyes of other valued countries; GLOBE seemed like a platform 
which could entertain various diffusion mechanisms – learning, competition, 
and emulation. However, as the research project unfolded, more complex and 
interesting narratives emerged in both cases. Interestingly, both of these 
revealed that alongside the (expected) diffusion processes, emotional factors 
were coming into play. In the Israeli case, data revealed that questions of 
identity-forming in relation to other countries was a key motivation to engage 
with climate action. In the case of GLOBE, evidence suggested that the 
network served not only as a platform for exchange of knowledge and resources, 
but also stimulated feelings and aspirations which facilitated subsequent 
climate action. 
As new themes emerged, the core question remained: what motivational 
dynamics operate on policymakers when they interact with their counterparts’ 
previous policy experiences.  
1.2 Mapping the gaps in existing scholarship  
This thesis is mainly rooted in political science, but also draws from scholarly 
work in international relations, geography and sociology. It is grounded in a 
large body of work on policy diffusion, while drawing from other literatures. 
Turning to a broader notion, the scholarly discourse on policymakers’ 
motivations is largely absent in other ways, especially with regard to climate 
change action. Scholarly attention is often focused on reasons to engage in 
climate action, ranging from scientific evidence and normative prescriptions to 
economic incentives (e.g. Stern, 2006; Anenberg et al., 2012; GCEC, 2014; 
Stern, 2015). Equally, a wide discourse analyses the barriers which prevent or 
slow down climate action (e.g. Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007; 
Semenza et al., 2008; Gifford, 2011). However, there is little evidence on why 
countries actually do engage in climate action. A number of potential 
explanations are available: established global environmental norms (e.g. 
Falkner, 2012; Bernstein, 2013), domestic interests framed as co-benefits to 
climate mitigation, the green growth narrative (e.g. Bowen & Fankhauser, 
2011; M. Jacobs, 2013), or a quest for political capital (such as legitimacy) from 
other valued actors in the international arena (e.g. Radaelli, 2000; Elkins & 
Simmons, 2005; Braun & Gilardi, 2006). However, these are not addressed 
systematically within a single framework. Chapter 2 maps these motivational 
themes and applied them to Israel’s climate change mitigation policies. 
Some of these key motivations are informed by- and respond to 
interdependencies among states, leading to processes of policy diffusion. The 
scholarship on policy diffusion has reached a broad consensus on its definition – 
as a process in which policies in one policy unit are influenced by policies in 
other policy units (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007; 
Shipan & Volden, 2012; Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2013) as well as on its 
main mechanisms: learning, emulation, competition, and coercion (Meseguer, 
2005; Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006; Dobbin et al., 
2007; Shipan & Volden, 2008). Significant advances have also been made 
regarding the conditionality of these mechanisms on various factors (Taylor, 
Lewis, Jacobsmeier, & DiSarro, Clark, 1985; Mooney & Lee, 1995; Strang & 
Soule, 1998; Shipan & Volden, 2008; Boushey, 2010; 2010; Taylor, Lewis, 
Jacobsmeier, & DiSarro, 2012). 
Attention has also been drawn to the conditionality of policy diffusion on the 
attributes of the policy innovation itself. This has been flagged by scholars as 
holding potentially substantive explanatory power (Karch, 2007b; Fulwider, 
2011; Jordan & Huitema, 2014, p. 724). Building on the model of diffusion of 
innovation (Rogers, 1995), various attributes have been suggested to influence 
policy diffusion processes. Table 1 below summarises the literature on issue 
attributes and policy attributes within the diffusion literature. 
Table 1: Summary of existing scholarship on attributes within the policy diffusion literature 
Paper Geography Method Policy issues covered Attributes Issue / policy Explained variable 
Walker (1969) USA Quantitative Fair employment practices; 
civil rights; labour 
legislation 
(Addressing the general 
concept) 
Issue Rate of policy diffusion 
Gray (1973) USA Quantitative Education; welfare; civil 
rights 
(Addressing the general 
concept) 
Issue Rate of diffusion 
Brief, Delbecq, 
Filley, and Huber 
(1976) 
USA Quantitative Citizen participation 
programmes 
Policy attributes: fragility, 
complexity, relative 
advantage, legitimacy, 
redistribution, 
communicability, 
compatibility, legitimacy. 
Issue (problem) attributes: 
perceived severity 
Issue and policy Probability of adoption 
Eyestone (1977) USA Quantitative Fair employment practices (Addressing the general 
concept) 
Policy Patterns of diffusion 
Clark (1985) USA Quantitative Educational accountability; 
lobby regulation; 
redistributive state 
revenue-sharing 
Symbolic, administrative 
complexity, redistributive 
(suggesting it is conflictual)  
Policy Programme scope 
Savage (1985) USA Quantitative Car safety policies; 
education reform 
Fragility Policy Rate of diffusion 
Bennett (1991a) UK & 
Canada  
Qualitative Freedom of information (Addressing the general 
concept) 
Policy Different motivations, leading 
to diffusion mechanisms  
Paper Geography Method Policy issues covered Attributes Issue / policy Explained variable 
Rogers (1995, 
2003) 
Global Quantitative Various policies Relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, 
trialability, observability 
Policy  Rate of diffusion 
Mooney and Lee 
(1995, 1999) 
USA Quantitative Abortion policies; death 
penalty 
Complexity, salience, 
conflictual nature 
Issue  Rate/pattern of diffusion 
Hays (1996) USA Quantitative Child abuse reporting; 
crime victim compensation 
law; public campaign 
funding laws 
Fragility (controversy); 
necessity for anticipated 
remedy 
Policy Patterns of 
diffusion/reinvention 
Bennett (1997) OECD 
countries 
Qualitative Bureaucratic accountability 
policies 
(Addressing the general 
concept) 
Policy Mechanisms of policy transfer 
(lesson drawing; legitimacy; 
harmonisation) 
Tews, Busch, and 
Jörgens (2001) 
OECD + 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
Quantitative Environmental policies Potential of conflict, 
international organisations, 
technical complexity  
Policy Probability and rate of 
diffusion 
 
Motivations addressed:  
policymakers will mimic what 
others are doing because of 
uncertainty and legitimacy 
(not linked to attributes) 
Kern, Jörgens, and 
Jänicke (2001) 
OECD Qualitative Environmental policies Visibility, technological 
availability of solutions, 
redistributive (suggesting it 
is conflictual) 
Issue Likelihood of policy transfer 
Paper Geography Method Policy issues covered Attributes Issue / policy Explained variable 
Daley and Garand 
(2005) 
USA Quantitative Waste policies Severity Issue Adoption and 
comprehensiveness of law 
Tews (2005) OECD + 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
Qualitative Environmental policies Problem structure, 
compatibility  
Issue and 
Policy 
Probability and rate of 
diffusion 
Karch (2007b) USA Mixed Various Uncertainty, level of conflict Policy Mechanisms of diffusion 
 
(Note: emulation defined 
differently in this paper)  
Nicholson-Crotty 
(2009) 
USA Mixed Various Salience, complexity Policy Rate of diffusion 
Boushey (2010) USA Quantitative Various  Salience, complexity, 
fragility, target of policy  
Policy Rate of diffusion 
Makse and Volden 
(2011) 
USA Quantitative Criminal justice policies Relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, 
trialability, observability 
Policy Rate of diffusion 
Fulwider (2011) USA Mixed Infertility insurance 
mandates 
Policy type (morality vs. 
regulatory policies) 
Policy Patterns of diffusion 
van der Heiden 
and Strebel (2012) 
Switzerland Qualitative Energy policy, locational 
policy 
Observability, 
competitiveness (degree to 
which policy decisions 
influence the economic well-
being of the entity)  
Issue Non-diffusion 
Paper Geography Method Policy issues covered Attributes Issue / policy Explained variable 
Taylor et al. (2012) USA Qualitative LGBTQ policies Complexity Issue Scope of adoption (what and 
who are protected) 
Boushey (2012) USA Quantitative Various Salience, complexity Issue Rate of diffusion 
D. M. Glick and 
Friedland (2014) 
USA Quantitative Various  Salience, complexity, 
geographical focus 
(state/local or state/federal) 
Issue Propensity to learn (policy 
researchers’ reporting) 
D. M. Glick (2014) USA Mixed General model  Complexity, ambiguity Issue Mechanism of learning 
Winburn, 
Winburn, and 
Niemeyer (2014) 
USA Quantitative School bullying Salience, complexity Issue Probability of adoption 
Butz, Fix, and 
Mitchell (2015) 
USA Quantitative Shooting in self-defence 
(‘Stand Your Ground’ laws) 
Fragility Policy Probability of adoption 
Mallinson (2015) USA Quantitative Various Salience, complexity Policy Rate of diffusion 
This literature compilation points to several gaps regarding concepts, scope, 
methods, and geographical reach. First, most studies take a comparative 
approach across states and across time, yet few engage in explicitly comparing 
different policy issues (or problems). Even fewer acknowledge the differences 
between policy issues as relevant to the question of why and how policies diffuse; 
rather, they focus on the attributes of the policies (solutions) themselves, thus 
overlooking a critical conceptual distinction between problems and solutions – or 
in John Kingdon’s (1984) words – between the problem stream and the policy 
stream, which are independent of each other. Second, existing literature is 
focused mainly on the likelihood and rate of diffusion, and less on the different 
mechanisms at work, bypassing the causal factors at the root of these 
differences. Third, Most of these studies are quantitative studies (note several 
exceptions above), which means that by design, they measure only what is 
measurable. There is a limited ability to capture policy diffusion processes where 
significant learning took place but which nevertheless did not mature into 
legislation, which underwent significant transfiguration during the process, or 
from which negative lessons have been drawn. Additionally, these accounts often 
fall short of offering deep insights into causal pathways that qualitative studies 
may be able to offer. Fourth, the literature is almost exclusively set in federal 
settings, predominantly in the United States, ignoring forces and potential 
political dynamics that apply to other political structures. 
One of the key elements that appear to play a role with regard to policy diffusion 
processes is what motivates policymakers to act. Scholarship addresses this 
question on different diffusion mechanisms, providing the following useful 
typology (Gilardi, 2003): Problem-dependent mechanisms – learning and 
competition – will be driven by a motivation to solve a given problem. Problem-
independent mechanisms – emulation and coercion – are driven by motivations 
which are external to the specific policy issue, for example a quest for legitimacy 
or peer approval. While there is an established link between motivations and 
diffusion mechanisms, and in addition, a link between attributes and 
motivations (Perry & Kraemer, 1978; Dutton & Jackson, 1987), the chain leading 
from attributes to motivations through to diffusion mechanisms has not been 
formalised. This gap is addressed in Chapter 3 which models this relationship. 
Chapter 4 provides an empirical application of the model with regard to three 
environmental case studies. 
Environmental policy diffusion processes have been facilitated by a plethora of 
transnational networks and institutions in the public and private sectors, which 
operate in the context of global environmental governance. These often serve as 
a platform for purposeful exchanges of knowledge on policies, politics, norms, 
and practices among actors. The role of these networks has typically been 
regarded as providing opportunities for learning platforms (Hoffmann, 2011; 
Legrand, 2012; Stone, 2013; H. Busch, 2015) or for resource-acquisition 
(Raustiala, 2002; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004). There are some notable gaps in this 
literature, mainly with regard to the ways that these networks achieve their 
governance purposes. Specifically, inter-parliamentary institutions (IPIs), the 
role they might play, and the ways in which operationalise their governance, are 
largely overlooked in the scholarship (albeit recognised briefly by Slaughter, 
2004). Chapter 5 addresses these gaps through an investigation of GLOBE 
International, a transnational legislator network. 
1.3 Research questions 
The overarching question of this doctoral thesis is concerned with the 
motivational forces at the root of policy diffusion processes. Specifically, it is 
concerned with the following questions: 
1. What are the different motivations which drive the spread of climate 
change policies and, specifically, how might these play out in low-
emitting countries? 
2. Do different policy issue attributes affect these motivational forces? 
3. Do different motivations affect the tendency for different diffusion 
mechanisms to occur?  
1.4 Approach/methods 
1.4.1 Research design 
As this thesis is primarily concerned with motivations, a largely unexplored 
theme within the policy diffusion literature, it required a flexible, qualitative 
research design, seeking to develop and expand themes rather than to quantify a 
known phenomenon. This addresses a gap in policy diffusion literature and 
responds to requests from scholars that: 
We should engage in more qualitative analysis of the type of 
communication and influence between policymakers of different countries 
which might explain why the pattern of adoption…is different 
(Bennett, 1997, p. 225) 
 
Taking an in-depth, qualitative approach offers an important addition to 
predominantly quantitative work on conditionality of policy diffusion in general. 
It is especially relevant in regards to the understudied pre-legislative stage of 
policymaking: 
Without clear and well-founded facts on the ground, often best provided 
by qualitative research, quantitative scholars have an insufficient 
understanding of the relevant politics to produce ultimately fruitful 
analyses…we are now at a point where qualitative research could 
nicely complement Quantitative analyses, such as with fuller 
assessments of what exactly policy makers seek to learn from others or 
how socialization comes about.  
(Graham et al., 2013, p. 695, emphasis by the author) 
 
In order to address individual motivations, it is necessary to have unmediated 
access to the individuals driven by these motivations. The chosen unit of analysis 
was therefore individual policymakers, whose motivations stand at the heart of 
the research questions. This level of analysis has received comparatively limited 
attention in the policy diffusion literature (notable exceptions include Weyland, 
2006a; Sugiyama, 2008a; Taylor & Tadlock, 2010). 
 
1.4.2 Data 
As the thesis is concerned with policymakers’ perceptions and motivations, the 
main data collection method was interviews, as they ‘yield rich insights into 
people’s biographies, experiences, opinions, values, aspirations, attitudes and 
feelings’ (May, 2001, p. 120). 
In total, interviews were conducted with 61 key policy actors, as detailed in 
Table 4 and 
Table 3below. For the Israeli case study (Chapters 2 and 4), the author 
conducted thirty-four interviews with Israeli-based policy officials (n=21) and 
other actors (n=13), identified based on their direct involvement in the 
formulation of one or more of the policies in question. Interviewees were 
approached primarily through the author’s network, as well as by cold-calling. 
For the GLOBE case study (Paper 5), 26 semi-structured interviews were 
undertaken in 2015 with 26 legislators, policy officials, and GLOBE secretariat. 
Seven additional interviews were conducted with members of the International 
Parliamentary Union (IPU), in to gain comparative insights on the dynamics of 
the networks. 
The Israeli interviews were all conducted in person, save one which was 
conducted via Skype. The GLOBE Interviews were conducted either in person or 
remotely via telephone or Skype, although two of the respondents sent in their 
answers to interview questions in writing. Interviews were transcribed in full, 
and in the Israeli case, translated from Hebrew according to need. 
Table 2 – Interviewees – Israeli case studies  
Category  Interviewees 
Elected officials1  1 
Policy officials (non-elected) 17 
Other actors 11 
Total  29 
                                               
1
 In order to protect the elected official’s anonymity, his/her quotes are cited as ‘PO’, as with 
policy officials, so as not to single her/him out.  
  
Table 3 – Interviewees – GLOBE case study 
Interviewees Number of 
interviews 
(countries 
represented) 
GLOBE staff 4 (n/a) 
Legislators from GLOBE network 20 (16) 
Policy officials from GLOBE network (e.g. legal 
counsels) 
2 (2) 
Legislators from other inter-parliamentary networks 
who are not members of GLOBE 
6 (6) 
Policy officials from other inter-parliamentary 
networks who are not members of GLOBE 
1 (1) 
Total 33 interviews (22 
countries) 
 
1.4.3 Analysis 
Data was coded by the author using thematic analysis, a narrative analysis 
approach in which a narrative typology is organised by themes based on 
occurrences in the data text. Illustrations are provided by case studies or 
vignettes, which is a useful approach in the case of comparative analysis of 
issues with common thematic elements (Riessman, 1993). An inductive-
deductive approach (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2008) was applied, which 
allowed developing new themes while corresponding to a pre-conceived coding 
frame based on a literature review. The thematic coding process was done in an 
iterative process, which included several steps: (1) identifying relevant quotes in 
the text; (2) coding the relevant segments (‘instances’) and (3) creating a coding 
framework. 
 
1.4.4 Inter-coder reliability 
In order to ensure the replicability of the coding frame, data was re-coded by 
another independent researcher (Krippendorff, 2004). In chapter 2, the coding 
process was repeated in full by a second independent researcher, who did not 
have access to the first coding framework. The coding framework was then 
refined and consolidated. Finally, a third researcher coded the material again, 
based on the finalised coding framework. Inter-coder reliability stood at 80 
percent between coders 1 and 2, and at approximately 70 per cent between the 
consolidated coding (1 and 2) and coder 3. In Chapter 4, two methods were 
applied: first, the author coded a sample of the interviews twice, two years apart. 
The compatibility of the coding was 96%. Second, a sample of the data was re-
coded by a colleague who was not exposed to the first coding, generating inter-
coder reliability of approximately 80 per cent. 
 
1.4.5 Positionality and bias 
“Recognition of one’s own biases and the ability to discount for them is of 
course important for social scientists… The interviewer ought necessarily 
to be quicker in recognizing and allowing for his biases whereas in some 
other situations more time is allowable for discounting them  
(Dexter, 1970, p. 80)  
 
As described in detail, the author had a personal knowledge and involvement both in 
the Israeli case studies, having been involved in the packaging waste law 
formulation and in the national GHG mitigation plan, and in the GLOBE case 
study, having attended GLOBE events in person, and being employed by the 
network secretariat for a few months. The clear distinction between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’, often coupled with assumptions than only ‘outsiders’ can generate 
‘objective’ observations, has long faded in social research (Mosley, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the challenges, as well as the opportunities that an ‘insider’ status 
has, need be acknowledged. The obvious up-side is access to data. Indeed, as 
described above, the author’s personal network allowed her to conduct 61 interviews, 
including 26 interviews with legislators from over 20 different countries. 
Incidentally, she was able to gain access to parliamentarians from countries that do 
not have formal diplomatic relations with her nation state. Additionally, having 
close knowledge of the subject matter, she was able to both ask interviewees about 
events that they had not brought up themselves, as well as being able to make 
informed assessments if their account was factually consistent. 
The challenges include a risk of confirmation bias, which is the partial seeking or 
the interpretation of evidence, in order to support the researcher’s preconceived 
hypotheses, or beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). Various measures were taken by the 
author to mitigate this risk. The first was acknowledging it exists, and 
suggesting alternative interpretations to the data wherever possible. The second 
is phrasing the questions in an open ended rather than in a leading way. The 
third was employing other coders (see above). Working with a critical co-author 
on the GLOBE case study was also a means of mitigating confirmation bias. 
Another potential risk was respondent bias – where interviewees might seek to 
please the researcher by providing over-positive accounts and not addressing 
sensitive or negative issues. However, the open and candid accounts provided by 
many interviewees, which also included negative experiences, suggest that the 
existing working relationships generated, if anything, a sense of trust and 
willingness and not otherwise.  
1.5 Thesis structure  
This thesis provides a set of publishable-quality papers on a set of related topics, 
framed by an original introduction and conclusion. It comprises of four papers 
(Chapters 2 through 5). Following the requirements set forth by the Department 
of Geography and Environment at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, these include three single-authored papers (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) and 
one paper co-authored with Dr Richard Perkins (Chapter 5), who contributed 50 
per cent of the work. References and annexes are presented at the end of each 
chapter. The following provides a brief abstract of each of the four papers. 
 
Chapter 2 abstract: Why bother? Motivations for engaging with 
climate change mitigation policies in low emitting countries 
A large body of literature is concerned with reasons why addressing climate 
change is not only necessary but also beneficial, and analyses the barriers that 
prevent sufficient action. However, policymakers’ motivations to engage in 
climate change mitigation are often overlooked. Several motivational themes 
may explain why policymakers do act on climate change: established norms of 
environmental responsibility, considerations of domestic self-interest, and a 
quest for legitimacy, achieved by emulation-based policy diffusion. While the 
literature addresses each of those separately, and offers insights on interactions 
between domestic and international forces, it often does not systematically 
analyse policymakers’ motivations, but rather makes broad assumptions about 
them. This paper contributes to filling this gap by examining the interplay 
between different motivations in the context of Israel’s climate change policy. 
Given its miniscule greenhouse emissions, lack of international climate 
commitments, and often-contested international political status, it might be 
expected that considerations of external legitimacy would explain its 
engagement with the climate agenda. Using data from 34 interviews conducted 
with policy actors, supported by textual analysis of parliamentary committee 
protocols and media articles, this paper examines this proposition further. It 
reveals that a combination of motivational factors play a role in the formulation 
of climate policy, of which a quest for external legitimacy is not dominant; 
rather, considerations of internal legitimacy and identity-building seem to have 
played a role, in addition to motivations of promoting domestic co-benefits. 
 
Chapter 3 abstract: Can issue attributes explain different 
mechanisms of policy diffusion? An exploratory framework 
Policy diffusion scholarship has made significant advances on what determines 
policy diffusion. Drawing on a literature concerned with the diffusion of 
innovations, scholars have offered valuable insights on how attributes of 
different policies affect the likelihood and rate of policy diffusion. This paper 
advances the literature on attributes and policy diffusion by offering several 
important contributions. It proposes a conceptual model, suggesting that 
different attributes of the policy issues have an influence on policymakers’ 
motivations, which in turn affect the propensity for certain diffusion mechanisms 
to arise. The conceptual model is then applied to examine five issue attributes 
(salience, complexity, fragility, perception as opportunity or threat, and 
geographical scope), and their effect on two diffusion mechanisms – learning and 
emulation – forming specific hypotheses regarding the relative likelihood of the 
process being dominated by the different mechanisms. Four perceived attributes 
are hypothesised to increase the propensity for learning-based diffusion: high 
salience, high complexity, high fragility, and the perception of an issue as an 
opportunity. The propensity for emulation is hypothesised to be increased if the 
issue is perceived as a threat or has an international (rather than domestic) 
orientation. The paper offers a theoretical contribution by acknowledging issue 
attributes as explanatory factors for different mechanisms of policy diffusion, 
addressing an acknowledged gap in the literature. The conceptual model allows 
for future exploration of different attributes and diffusion mechanisms. 
Additionally, it refines the muddled conceptual line between attributes of issues 
(problems) and of policies (solutions). Finally, it offers potential theoretical and 
policy implications for this model. 
 
Chapter 4 abstract: Can issue attributes explain different 
mechanisms of policy diffusion? Evidence from three 
environmental issues 
Recent developments in the policy diffusion literature explore how different 
factors may condition the patterns and nature of policy diffusion. While 
attributes of the policies (solutions) have been suggested to affect the dynamics 
of diffusion, and especially the variance in rate of diffusion, the explanatory 
nature of the issues (problems, e.g. education or air pollution) remains largely 
unpacked. Recently, Nachmany (2016c)2 developed a conceptual model 
suggesting that various attributes of policy issues influence policymakers’ 
motivations, which in turn affect the likelihood of certain diffusion mechanisms. 
This paper offers a first empirical application of this model. Based on 34 
interviews with policy officials and other policy actors in Israel, the model is 
                                               
2
 Chapter 3 in this thesis 
applied to the processes of diffusion in three environmental policy issues: climate 
change, air pollution, and waste. Through the analysis of the differences in the 
attributes of these three issues, and variance in diffusion mechanisms in 
practice, the paper lends support to Nachmany’s conceptual model, as well as to 
some of her specific hypotheses. Its micro-level approach provides empirical 
evidence not only on correlational, but also on the causal, pathways tying issue 
attributes to specific diffusion mechanisms. Particularly, there is evidence that 
salience and complexity, and to a lesser degree, fragility, influence the 
propensity for learning-based diffusion to occur, and that international 
orientation increases the propensity for emulation-based diffusion to occur. 
There is insufficient evidence regarding the hypotheses on perceived threat and 
opportunity. Other contributions offered by the paper include advancing the 
understanding of policy diffusion processes in the pre-legislative stage, which is 
hard to capture in most quantitative studies, as well as advancing the literature 
on policy diffusion in non-federal settings. 
 
Chapter 5 abstract: ‘A very human business’ – trans-
governmental networking initiatives and domestic climate 
action 
The past two decades have witnessed a proliferation of networking initiatives, in 
both the private and public spheres, aimed at addressing climate change. 
Previous work has suggested that these initiatives largely achieve their 
governance functions through learning and the provision of resources. Our 
particular contribution in the present paper is to advance the current 
understanding of networking initiatives by suggesting that they may also 
perform emotional roles which are important in motivating domestic action on 
climate change. In order to illustrate our argument, we examine GLOBE 
International, an inter-parliamentary institution focused on supporting the 
development of domestic legislation in the area of sustainable development. 
Based on interviews with 26 legislators, we provide evidence that GLOBE 
functions as a network for learning – particularly political learning. Yet of equal, 
if not greater, significance is that involvement in the networking initiative has 
fostered a sense of common purpose, feelings of unity, inspiration, and an ‘esprit 
de corps’ amongst participants. In doing so, it has given rise to emotional energy, 
which has helped to motivate and sustain climate action by legislators. 
 
1.6 Concluding remarks 
This thesis makes several conceptual, empirical and methodological 
contributions that respond to the gaps in the literature. These contributions, 
which briefly follow, as well as limitations and suggestion for future research, 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.  
Notably, those include unpacking of the link between issues and mechanisms, 
and linking literatures on learning and resource acquisition in scholarship 
through network dynamics to literature on solidarity, emotional energy and 
inspiration. Empirically, it advances the understanding on why policy diffusion 
takes place and what are they key motivational themes behind it. This is 
investigated particularly with regard to Israel, which remains little studied in 
the literature in general, and from an environmental perspective in particular. 
The thesis offers a contribution with regard to conditions in which learning- and 
emulation-based diffusion is more likely to occur. This is investigated with 
regard to five attributes of the policy issues – namely salience, complexity, 
fragility, perception as opportunity/threat, and international-orientation. Lastly, 
the thesis advances understanding on networking initiatives and the role of 
emotions in particular, providing unique insight on a previously unstudied IPI.  
Methodologically, the thesis employs a qualitative research design, which has 
the potential to offer deeper insights into causal pathways leading to policy 
diffusion processes. It takes a micro-level approach, contributing to the 
surprisingly limited research which has involved actors directly involved in the 
process. The thesis utilizes unique data sets, including over 60 elite interviews, 
owing to the author’s personal network. Finally, it advances policy diffusion 
research in understudied non-federal and non-US/European settings.  
Research Chapters 2 through 5 follow.  
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Chapter 2: Why bother? Motivations for 
engaging with climate change mitigation 
policies in low emitting countries3 
 
Abstract 
A large body of literature is concerned with reasons why addressing climate 
change is not only necessary but also beneficial, and analyses the barriers that 
prevent sufficient action. However, policymakers’ motivations to engage in climate 
change mitigation are often overlooked. Several motivational themes may explain 
why policymakers do act on climate change: established norms of environmental 
responsibility, considerations of domestic self-interest, and a quest for legitimacy, 
achieved by emulation-based policy diffusion. While the literature addresses each 
of those separately, and offers insights on interactions between domestic and 
international forces, it often does not systematically analyse policymakers’ 
motivations, but rather makes broad assumptions about them. This paper 
contributes to filling this gap by examining the interplay between different 
motivations in the context of Israel’s climate change policy. Given its miniscule 
greenhouse emissions, lack of international climate commitments, and often-
contested international political status, it might be expected that considerations of 
external legitimacy would explain its engagement with the climate agenda. Using 
data from 34 interviews conducted with policy actors, supported by textual 
analysis of parliamentary committee protocols and media articles, this paper 
examines this proposition further. It reveals that a combination of motivational 
factors play a role in the formulation of climate policy, of which a quest for 
external legitimacy is not dominant; rather, considerations of internal legitimacy 
and identity-building seem to have played a role, in addition to motivations of 
promoting domestic co-benefits. 
2.1 Introduction 
Why do policymakers act on climate change mitigation? Scholarship leaves this 
question largely unanswered, replaced by a discourse constructed around why 
they should, or why they do not. A large body of literature points to the reasons 
why addressing climate change would be beneficial (e.g. Stern, 2006; Anenberg 
et al., 2012; GCEC, 2014; Stern, 2015) and analyses the barriers which hold 
                                               
3 The author is grateful for remarks received from the participants of the PERG workshop at 
the University of Exeter, April 2013, and the participants of the 9th Annual Graduate 
Conference in Political Science and International Relations at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, December 2013.  
countries back from acting (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007; 
Semenza et al., 2008; Gifford, 2011). Unfortunately, mere necessity does not 
always lead to policy action, and barriers and motivations are not mirror images 
of each other: the absence of barriers does not imply a motivation to act. 
Nevertheless, sufficient examples of climate legislation worldwide (Nachmany et 
al., 2015) shows that countries do act on climate change. One potential 
explanation for this is that global environmentalism has successfully established 
norms of environmental responsibility (Falkner, 2012); recognising their 
responsibility even beyond national borders, and facilitated by a genuine 
understanding of the climate-related risks that lie ahead, policymakers truly 
want to mitigate climate change. This reasoning is largely hindered by two 
significant characteristics of climate change: One is that climate change is a 
‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968), reducing the motivation to act locally to 
contribute to its solution. The other is that it is a ‘tragedy of the horizon’ 
(Carney, 2015), as its implications go beyond the political cycle, business cycle, 
and the mandated terms of technocratic authorities, thus reducing motivations 
to act in the short term. 
A second plausible explanation is that interdependencies among countries shape 
policymaking via processes of policy diffusion. By emulating ‘appropriate’ policy 
agendas or instruments, and adhering to internationally-accepted norms, 
countries gain political capital which impacts their position on other matters, 
from economic relationships to the legitimacy of their governance in general 
(Radaelli, 2000; Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Braun & Gilardi, 2006). At times, this 
might result in ‘label diffusion’ – the adoption of a policy framework without a 
real application of its content (Mossberger, 2000; Radaelli, 2005; Goldfinch, 
2006). The international nature of global climate politics lends support to this 
notion. Legitimacy may also be geared internally, contributing to identity-
building by taking on practices of esteemed counterparts, albeit without 
expecting payoffs from those counterparts (Craik, 2005; Preuss, Haunschild, & 
Matten, 2009). 
A third possible explanation is that actions are motivated by co-benefits of 
addressing climate change, such as reducing air pollution or traffic congestion. A 
growing body of evidence on co-benefits suggests that tackling climate change is 
actually profitable, even without taking climate considerations into account (e.g. 
GCEC, 2014; Green, 2015). Specifically, inclusion of air quality co-benefits in the 
design and evaluation of climate policies has been suggested to enhance climate 
policy evaluations (Nemet, Holloway, & Meier, 2010). Porter’s hypothesis 
(notably, Porter & Van der Linde, 1995b) that environmental regulation 
stimulates innovation and efficiency paved the way to the ‘green growth’ 
narrative (Ekins, 2000; Bowen & Fankhauser, 2011; Jacobs, 2013) which has 
been paramount in this regard. Facilitated by evidence on enhanced innovation 
and competitiveness (Jänicke, 2012; Fankhauser et al., 2013), as well as positive 
impact on labour markets (Bowen, 2012), this narrative can be attractive to 
policymakers. As convincing as this narrative may be, there is a shortage of 
empirical evidence on its actual effect; recently, Bain et al. (2015) showed that 
co-benefits are a strong motivation for the public to support climate action, but 
there is still little evidence to show whether these considerations affect 
policymakers’ motivations. 
Literature widely acknowledges the co-existence and interaction between 
international diffusion forces and domestic policy choices. At times, these forces 
work together. For example, national democratisation processes, combined with 
high salience of environmental issues, have been shown to create conditions 
allowing international factors to promote the formation of national 
environmental ministries (Aklin & Urpelainen, 2014). The spread in uptake of 
voluntary corporate responsibility standards is associated with both domestic 
and international factors (Perkins & Neumayer, 2010). Fankhauser, Gennaioli, 
and Collins (2015a, 2015b), point to both domestic and international drivers 
influencing the passage of climate legislation worldwide. However, there are 
times when domestic and international forces pull in different directions. For 
example, in the case of corruption regulation, domestic policy entrepreneurs 
invoke global norms and values to overcome the resistance of local elites in 
advancing their preferred policy options (Schnell, 2015). Busch, Gupta, and 
Falkner (2012) demonstrate how international policy convergence pressures are 
countered by strong domestic forces in the cases of policies on genetically 
modified organisms and renewable electricity. 
In addition to not addressing motivations explicitly, there are several other gaps 
in existing literature: first, it focuses primarily on the national level, and less on 
decision-making by individual policymakers. Since ‘actors will typically be 
individuals when we are dealing with motivations and incentives’ (Grandori, 
2000, p. 20), this leads to a conceptual gap, as well as a methodological one. In 
addition, most existing scholarship targets – to borrow a term from Eckersley 
(2012, p. 26) – ‘the most responsible, the most capable, and the most vulnerable’ 
countries. There is a large group of not-so-polluting, not-so-vulnerable countries 
whose actions remain largely un-documented. 
This paper offers a contribution towards filling some of these gaps: it examines 
the motivations of individual policymakers to engage with the climate change 
mitigation agenda. It does so by telling the story of climate change mitigation 
policy in Israel between 2008 and 2013, a period which experienced a global 
surge in climate policymaking in the run-up to- and following the Copenhagen 
Conference of the Parties (COP 15). In 2010 Israel, a country which emits only a 
miniscule fraction of global greenhouse gases (GHG), formulated a national GHG 
mitigation plan according to the recommendations of a dedicated inter-
ministerial committee. Through this case study, it aims to map and identify the 
principal motivations of policymakers to engage in climate change mitigation, 
and to advance the understanding of how different motivations might interact. 
Israel is an illustrative case for a number of reasons: First, it is a very low-
emitting country in absolute terms,4 which significantly reduces the need to 
address its role in the global effort to mitigate emissions. While not bound to EU 
frameworks, eliminating the need to deal with top-down policy imperatives, its 
                                               
4 Approximately 0.2 per cent of global emissions in 2015 (Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, 2015). Its per capita emissions, however, exceed the EU average. 
OECD accession process exposed it to external pressures. Finally, although it is 
an arid, low-lying coastal country, the balance between mitigation and 
adaptation in its policymaking resembles a developed– more than a developing 
country. Thus, some of the findings may apply to other developed non-EU 
countries, such as Chile or New Zealand. Yanai, Koch, and Dayan (2010) identify 
Israel within a group of recently developed countries, such as Greece and Spain. 
Findings may also be relevant to other ‘advanced developing countries’ which 
had no commitments under the Kyoto protocol, such as South Africa, Mexico, or 
Argentina (Castro, 2010). 
At the same time, Israel is unique in its geo-political setting and international 
positioning, mainly with regard to the Palestinian issue, as well as in its clear 
agenda focus on security issues. This may lead to the intuitive conclusion that 
engaging with climate change is done for the primary purpose of seeking 
external legitimacy by aligning with external values and normative practices, 
demonstrating that it is, after all, one of the ‘good guys’. While there is evidence 
for this dynamic, other forces seem to be at play as the picture unfolds. There is 
evidence that domestic forces harness the theme of climate change in order to 
pursue other environmental issues which generate co-benefits. Additionally, 
evidence suggests that the process was considerably motivated by a quest for 
internal legitimacy and identity-building. There is very little evidence to suggest 
that climate policies in Israel were driven by global environmental norms. 
The case study contributes to increased understanding of the interplay between 
domestic and international forces, and may contribute to a deeper understanding 
of the passage of climate legislation. It uses a micro-level approach which aims to 
unpick motivations of individual policymakers. By shining a light on 
policymakers’ motivations, the paper makes a contribution towards a better 
understanding of the policymaking process and allows the examination of 
processes – even those with no measurable outcome in the form of a law or 
policy. The data utilised in this research includes 29 interviews conducted 
between 2012 and 2013 with Israeli policy officials and other actors closely 
involved in climate policymaking, as well as analysis of parliamentary protocols 
and media publications. The different sources allow for observations, of 
differences between explicit motivations and underlying motivations. This gap is 
particularly complex to pin down, both conceptually and methodologically, 
especially with regards to elected officials; however, limited conclusions can be 
drawn. Finally, this paper also contributes to the limited body of scholarship on 
Israeli climate policy, which is often framed within the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (Sowers, Vengosh, & Weinthal, 2011; Feitelson, Tamimi, & 
Rosenthal, 2012; Messerschmid, 2012; Mason, 2013; Nachmany, 2016). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section ‎2.2 briefly reviews theories of 
international policy diffusion, internal legitimacy-seeking and domestic policy-
shaping forces. Section ‎2.3 presents on overview of Israel’s climate policymaking. 
Section ‎2.4 describes the methodology of the study. Section 2.5 presents 
empirical evidence from the interviews and document analysis. The paper 
concludes with implications for scholarly and policy research. 
2.2 Literature 
Motivations are defined as the reasons for certain behaviours in certain 
situations (Middleton & Spanias, 1999, p. 66). They are a part of an individual’s 
goal structures and beliefs about what is important (Ames, 1992), and are 
triggers for action on unmet needs (Slater, 2007, p. 151).5 Scholarship on 
policymakers’ motivations emphasises credit-claiming from constituents and 
clientele groups for actions taken (Fiorina, 1977), or blame-avoidance for 
unpopular actions (Weaver, 1986). In examining policymakers’ motivations to 
engage with social policy reform, Sugiyama (2008) suggests that electoral 
                                               
5 As pointed out by Okereke (2007), there is often a confusion between motivations and 
drivers – the former generating movement, and the latter shaping the direction and force of 
that movement. In the context of climate policy, motivations could be achieving green 
growth, while drivers could be energy prices, institutional powers, or certain focusing events 
(for example, hosting a COP was found to drive increased legislation. See Fankhauser et al., 
2015a). 
concerns are one of three motivational groups, the other two being ideology and 
socialisation into communities which define social norms. All of these constitute 
a typology which broadly corresponds to the different motivational groups that 
we explore below for adopting climate change mitigation policies: a quest for 
external or internal legitimacy, domestic co-benefits, or normative motivations. 
To illustrate the difference between these motivational groups, one could borrow 
imagery from the world of fashion: you can wear a shirt that you saw esteemed 
colleagues wear because you are concerned with what they might think of you, or 
hope they will invite you to join them for a drink (external legitimacy). You can 
wear a shirt you saw on a top-model because wearing it will make you feel good 
about yourself, although you do not expect feedback, unfortunately, from the top-
model (internal legitimacy). You can wear a shirt because it will keep you warm 
(self-interest, co-benefits), and finally, you can wear a certain shirt because you 
think it is produced in a way which is aligned with your values (normative 
motivations). The next sections examine those in detail.  
2.2.1 Seeking legitimacy via a process of policy diffusion  
Policy diffusion is the process by which policy choices in one unit are influenced 
by policy choices in other units (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Simmons, Dobbin, & 
Garrett, 2006; Füglister, 2012; Gilardi, 2012). It has been instrumental in 
explaining the dissemination of environmental policies, and specifically climate 
policies (Hoberg, 1990; Busch & Jörgens, 2005; Busch, Jörgens, & Tews, 2005; 
Tews, 2005; Edge & McKeen-Edwards, 2008; Holzinger, Knill, & Somerer, 2008; 
Matisoff, 2008; Hall, 2011; Nakamura, Elder, & Mori, 2011; Saikawa, 2011). 
Global policy responses to mitigate climate change and adapt to its consequences 
have grown tenfold in the last 20 years (Nachmany et al., 2015), spreading 
among all economies. Four main mechanisms of policy diffusion are recognised in 
the literature: learning, competition, emulation, and coercion (Füglister, 2012; 
Gilardi, 2012; Falkner, 2015). Learning is the process by which policymakers 
gather information about practice in other policy units, and use that information 
to inform their own policymaking (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000; Dobbin, 
Simmons, & Garrett, 2007; Gilardi, 2010). Competition occurs when actions 
taken by one policy unit alter the payoffs for another; for example, countries will 
adopt regulatory schemes which will be more appealing to investors than their 
neighbours’ schemes (Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin et 
al., 2007).  Emulation occurs when policymakers adopt a certain policy solution 
because they believe it will provide political capital in the form of legitimacy or 
peer approval (Argyris & Schön, 1978; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Rose, 1991; 
Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Radaelli, 2000). In this sense, the policymaking process 
is independent of the policy problem, and policies 'spread irrespectively from 
their problem-solving capacity’ (Gilardi, 2003, p. 5). Emulation could result in 
symbolic imitation of practices (Evans & Davies, 1999; Gilardi, 2005), or even in 
‘policy label diffusion’ – where only the label or rhetoric of policy is copied, 
without its essential content (Mossberger, 2000). In these cases, adoptions are 
motivated by and serve purposes different to those stated (Goldfinch, 2006). 
Coercion happens when powerful actors impose their preferred policy choices on 
other actors (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin et al., 2007; Füglister, 2012).6 
It has been suggested that European institutions promote isomorphic policy 
solutions to deal with their limited legitimacy (Radaelli, 2000). Meyer and 
Rowan assert that isomorphism between similar institutions leads organisations 
to ‘incorporate elements which are legitimated externally, rather than in terms 
of efficiency’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 348). 
Legitimacy, which is often the goal sought in emulation-based diffusion, is ‘a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions‘ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy may provide 
additional external resources (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; 
Bitektine, 2011), or serve as a tool for consolidating organisational reputation 
(Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Legitimacy has been widely documented as a 
                                               
6
 Coercion is excluded from some widely accepted typologies of policy diffusion as it is more 
focused on vertical than horizontal dynamics (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). Nevertheless, as the 
definition of vertical power is a fuzzy one, similar observations can be made about other 
mechanisms. 
motivation for engaging with global environmental governance (Bernstein, 2004; 
Luft Mobus, 2005; Smith & Fischlein, 2010) and climate policy (Busch et al., 
2005; Paterson, 2010) specifically. 
When the motivation is engaging with the international community, by means of 
adapting to its norms, one would expect that policy actions would be strategically 
used as a stepping stone. In this case, we might expect to find discussions on how 
to communicate policy efforts externally in international forums beyond 
required. An example of this can be seen in Ethiopia’s ambitious emissions 
reduction commitments, which stand in contrast to its low emissions. We might 
also expect to see stakeholders from other areas of the executive branch, who will 
seek to be involved in this strategic action – for example, from the ministry of 
foreign affairs.  
Additionally, bringing attention to one topic (climate change) can potentially 
shift attention from other, more contested, topics. For example, the legitimacy of 
Israel’s actions is frequently questioned (albeit a softer challenge than 
questioning the legitimacy of its existence),7 mainly with regard to the 
occupation of, and conflict with, Palestine. To this end, one might expect external 
legitimacy to be a prime motivation for Israeli policymakers to engage with 
climate change policy. Similarities can be drawn with Taiwan, which faces 
broader questions of legitimacy; research suggests that Taiwanese climate 
policies reflect a tactical adaptation to the international concern with climate 
change, and are utilised for purposes of enhancing legitimacy and socialisation 
within the global community (Hsu, 2009). 
However, there is another type of legitimacy which is aimed at internal rather 
than external audiences: ‘Internal legitimacy refers to acceptance of norms by 
                                               
7 There are claims, albeit sparse, against Israel’s legitimacy as an entity, and only 160 of 192 
countries of the United Nations formally recognise it as a state. Claims against the 
legitimacy of a regime could have grave consequences: 
‘In our global era, states that rely only on coercion or individual payoffs are 
unstable. From apartheid South Africa to crony-ridden Indonesia, illegitimate 
regimes have been quickly replaced by unaccepting societies. Nothing will turn 
heads more than a cry of ‘legitimacy crisis’. 
(Gilley, 2006, p. 499) 
participants in an institution, for instance the members of an organization or 
supporters of a rule-making mechanism. External legitimacy refers to the 
acceptance of a rule by non-members or nonparticipants’ (Biermann & Gupta, 
2011, p. 1858). Internal legitimacy seeks to provide members of the organisation 
(or country) with a perception of being ‘more worthy…more meaningful, more 
predictable, more trustworthy’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574; Bitektine, 2011). In order 
to achieve legitimacy with their constituents, organisations are prone to 
construct stories about their actions that correspond to expectations and socially 
assigned dictates. The stories do not have to actually be carried out through 
organisational actions, but are rather used as ‘symbolic reassurance’ (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). Drori and Honig (2013) suggest that internal legitimacy ‘acts as a 
tool that reinforces organizational practices and mobilizes organizational 
members around a common ethical, strategic or ideological vision’ (p. 346). 
This internal drive, leading to socialisation, could stem from the internal 
motivation of feeling part of a greater good, as part of a collective identity 
(Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992). Collective identities fulfil a 
fundamental ‘need to belong’ which is ingrained in human nature (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). Keck and Sikkink (1998) note states’ desire to belong to a 
normative community. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) assert that ‘states comply 
with norms […] for reasons that relate to their identities as members of an 
international society’ (p. 902), and that state identity shapes its behaviour, 
which in turn is shaped by the cultural-institutional context within which states 
act. 
The fragmented identities within the relatively young and ever-changing Israeli 
society, including the strong influence of the Palestinian issue on national 
identity (Cohen, 1995; Kelman, 1999; Bar-On, 2008), suggest that questions of 
identity and internal legitimacy may play a role in policymaking processes. 
Israeli identity is focused on separating itself from its neighbours and 
positioning itself as a western democracy in the Middle East (Smooha, 1998). 
 
2.2.2 Domestic Interests and climate change co-benefits  
A growing body of evidence suggests that climate policies which facilitate a 
transition to low carbon economies are in line with countries’ self-interest. 
Specifically, climate policies can contribute to cutting air pollution and 
improving health (Bussolo & O'Connor, 2001; Campbell-Lendrum, Pruss-Ustun, 
& Corvalan, 2003; Younger, Morrow-Almeida, Vindigni, & Dannenberg, 2008; 
Nemet et al., 2010; Harlan & Ruddell, 2011; Anenberg et al., 2012; Seinfeld & 
Pandis, 2012), aid transportation-related problems including congestion (Kousky 
& Schneider, 2003; Creutzig & He, 2009), and increase energy independence and 
energy security (Kruyt, van Vuuren, De Vries, & Groenenberg, 2009; McCollum, 
Krey, & Riahi, 2011). They can also contribute to better city planning, increased 
land use productivity, and resource efficiency (GCEC, 2014; Clarke et al., 2014; 
Dechezleprêtre, Martin, & Mohnen, 2014; 2014; Somanathan et al., 2014). 
In 1995, Michael Porter hypothesised that environmental regulation stimulates 
and encourages innovation, which enhances competitiveness and leads to greater 
resource efficiency (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995b, 1995a). In Porter’s words, his 
hypothesis served to ‘end the stalemate’ between social welfare and the net 
benefits of private firms. Subsequent work paved the way to the narrative of 
‘green growth’ – economic growth (defined in terms of GDP) which also achieves 
significant environmental protection (Ekins, 2000; Bowen & Fankhauser, 2011; 
Jacobs, 2012, 2013). Facilitated by evidence on enhanced innovation and 
competitiveness (Jänicke, 2012; Fankhauser et al., 2013) and positive impact on 
labour markets (Bowen, 2012), it is becoming clearer that climate mitigation 
policies are largely economically net-beneficial (GCEC, 2014; Somanathan et al., 
2014; Stern, 2015). 
Green (2015) argues that this body of evidence should shift the discourse on 
barriers to climate policy from the internationally-oriented ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ and ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ explanations to a different set of domestic-
based barriers, such as the inert nature of high-carbon systems (‘carbon lock-in’), 
pressure from interest groups including partisan pressures, distributive 
challenges, and normative and ideational disputes (see pp. 27-30). Moving from 
barriers to motivations, there is evidence that environmental policies are used as 
electoral incentives, corresponding to requests from constituencies. Costa (2014) 
finds that environmental policies are used as a ‘pork barrel’ signalling tool in the 
US (and see List & Sturm, 2004). Additionally, Fredriksson, Wang, and Mamun 
(2011) show that in the area of environmental policy, elected politicians are 
motivated by electoral considerations rather than by their own personal 
preferences. 
In Israel, there is evidence that renewable energies may increase energy security 
(Mor, Seroussi, & Ainspan, 2009) and generate net-economic benefits, including 
reduced energy bills and green jobs (Mor & Seroussi, 2008). A marginal GHG 
abatement curve produced ahead of COP 15 suggests that over 50 per cent of 
GHG abatement potential is net-beneficial to the economy (McKinsey and 
Company, 2009). Israel’s branding as a ‘start-up nation’ (Senor & Singer, 2009; 
Engel & del-Palacio, 2011) suggests that these will serve as additional 
motivations to act on climate change. 
 
2.2.3 Environmental norms 
According to scholars, environmental responsibility has emerged as an important 
‘global norm’ over recent decades, similar to other norms such as the protection 
of human rights (Lafferty, 1996; Meyer, Frank, Hironaka, Schofer, & Tuma, 
1997; Haas, 1999; Falkner, 2012; Bernstein, 2013). Norms define and regulate 
appropriate standards of behaviour for actors with a given identity, but can also 
be prescriptive or evaluative – defining what is ‘appropriate’ or ‘proper’ 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). Environmental norms correspond to the 
latter category, as they lie on the foundations of the concept of sustainable 
development (formalised by Brundtland et al., 1987) – which indeed seeks to 
prescribe and evaluate behaviour for states and individuals alike (Lafferty, 1996; 
Jörgens, 2004). The diffusion of global norms can be attributed to processes of 
norm internalisation, whereby decision-makers modify their beliefs according to 
norms existing in the international system (Haas, 2002). The internalisation of 
norms is a redefinition or change of perceptions and beliefs and through 
socialisation, is often said to arise from processes of participation in 
international fora, argumentation and persuasion, including by so-called norm 
entrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, the degree of internalisation of environmental norms varies among 
different states and other actors. One can expect, that higher levels of 
participation in global governance mechanisms, will contribute to the broader 
and deeper internalisation of norms. In that sense, Israel, whose international 
status within various international forums is often clouded by a broader political 
context (for example, it is excluded from UN regional working groups), may not 
be at the best position to harbour these norms in full.   
 
To conclude this section, it would be unreasonable to assume that a single 
motivation could be specified in explaining policymakers’ engagement with an 
issue. More often, motivations will resemble a combination of logic of 
appropriateness and consideration of consequences (Checkel, 2001; March & 
Olsen, 2004; Harrison & McIntosh Sundstrom, 2010, p. 270). Moreover, explicit 
and implicit motivations tend to mix, as policymakers frame their motivations 
purposefully for their voters. However, there may be more and less dominant 
motivations driving policymaking processes forward – for example, one might 
assume that external legitimacy might be a key motivation. The next sections 
investigate what these might be in the context of climate change mitigation 
policymaking in Israel.  
2.3 Climate change policymaking in Israel – 
background 
Israel’s political setting, growing population, and surging energy demand make 
considerations of environment core to its existence. Being a coastal, arid country 
exposes it to climate change risks, and its numerous innovative start-ups have 
been looking for a technical experimentation field, many of them in the area of 
renewable energies and energy conservation. Nevertheless, Israel has a fairly 
short history of environmental policymaking, and environmental concerns do not 
rank highly on its agenda. There is no green party in the Knesset, and the 
Ministry of Environment (MEP) was only founded in 1988, with 18 ministers 
filling the position since then, sometimes for only a few months. Until 2009, 
Israeli engagement with climate change mitigation amounted to a few reports 
commissioned by MEP and an inter-ministerial committee dealing with GHG 
emissions reduction. The committee operated between 2001 and 2004 following a 
government resolution, and ceased operating without reporting any results. As a 
non-Annex I party to the Kyoto protocol with negligible overall emissions, 
climate change was simply not on Israel’s policy agenda. In 2009, a GHG 
emissions reduction bill drafted by ATD was tabled in the Knesset,8 but despite 
being endorsed by over 70 members of parliament, it never progressed beyond an 
initial reading. The Ombudsman released a severe report criticising the lack of 
action on climate action in Israel. The summarising notes read ‘a country that 
will not prepare to reduce its (GHG) emissions may jeopardise its international 
status, and possibly be subject to restrictions and sanctions’ (Lindenstrauss, 
2009).9 
Policy efforts were ramped up during the period discussed in this paper (2008-
2013), in alignment with global developments – mainly the Bali and Copenhagen 
Summits (COP 13 and COP 15 respectively), and coinciding with the 
appointment of a new and energetic Minister for Environmental Protection (who 
maintained his position for four years). At COP 15 in 2009, Israeli president 
Shimon Peres declared that Israel, a non-Annex I signatory of the Kyoto 
Protocol, will reduce 20 per cent of its GHG emissions by 2020 compared to a 
business-as-usual scenario. Following this declaration (‘the Peres Commitment’) 
the government passed a resolution in March 2010 to formulate a national GHG 
                                               
8 Draft bill for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Bill, 2009. 
9 The report was not initiated by Israel but was rather part of a series of similar reports co-
ordinated by The European Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (EUROSAI), in 
which Israel was participating for the first time.  
mitigation plan consistent with Peres’s declared target.10 The director general of 
the Ministry of Finance was appointed head of an inter-ministerial committee 
(‘The Shani Committee’), which set out to formulate a national GHG mitigation 
plan. The committee, employing over 40 senior professionals representing 
various government agencies and key stakeholders, operated three sub-
committees: for energy efficiency, transportation, and green building. A fourth 
sub-committee for energy production never assembled, for political reasons. 
Several of the adopted policies were inspired by policies adopted in the EU and 
the US. Examples of these include: regulation for minimum efficiency for 
appliances, schemes to replace inefficient refrigerators for low-income families, 
and various measures to increase fuel efficiency. In late 2010, the government 
approved the National GHG Mitigation Plan (‘the mitigation plan’), with a 
budget of 2.2 billion NIS covering 2011 to 2020.11 A significant portion of the 
mitigation plan consisted of an adapted national energy efficiency plan, 
developed independently by the Ministry of National Infrastructures (MNI) but 
implemented as part of the Shani Committee. The budget for the plan was frozen 
in a round of budget cuts in 2012.12 In 2013 there was another failed attempt to 
pass an emissions reduction bill. 
Several relevant processes and events should be pointed out. First, the 
formulation of the mitigation plan coincided with Israel’s accession process to the 
OECD, which was completed in 2010. The accession process triggered rapid 
environmental action, as approximately a third of the commitments required by 
the OECD were environment-related. An environmental report submitted to the 
OECD included no reference to climate change mitigation, apart from 
participation in several projects under the Clean Development Mechanism 
(Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2008). Subsequently, as part of the 
                                               
10 Government resolution 1504, 14 March 2010  
http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2010/Pages/des1504.aspx  
11 Approximately 600 million USD or 450 million Euros (rates as of 28 November 2010). 
Government resolution 2508, 28 November 2010 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2010/Pages/des2508.aspx  
12 Funding was not restored until late 2015, when the mitigation plan was replaced by a new 
plan for energy efficiency and emissions reduction.  
OECD accession requirements, Israel committed to declaring its commitment to 
reducing GHG emissions. Second, the discovery of large reserves of natural gas 
from early 2009 onwards reduced Israel’s dependency on imports; however, the 
gas market has been mired in a regulatory deadlock, and great uncertainties 
remain regarding domestic use of those reserves. Finally, the increased tension 
with Palestine, the Hamas government in Gaza and Operation Cast Lead in late 
2008 and early 2009, as well as the ongoing occupation of the West Bank, 
resulted in harsh international criticism of Israel’s actions. These may suggest 
that considerations of external legitimacy may have been highly relevant for 
Israel. 
2.4 Methodology 
During 2012-2013, the author conducted 29 interviews (see Table 4) with Israeli-
based policy officials identified as Policy Officials (POs, n=18) and other actors 
identified as Other Actors (OAs, n=11) who were directly involved in the 
formulation of one or more of the policies in question. Policy officials were career 
civil servants from several ministries and government agencies, and included 
one elected official. Other actors included representatives of NGOs, think 
thanks, and academia. The interviewees represent a large purposive sample of 
people who were involved in the policy process and, given the small size of the 
environmental policymaking scene in Israel, are beyond a symbolic sample, 
avoiding systematic errors of non-response (Goldstein, 2002, p. 670). Interviews 
were conducted in person (save for one Skype interview) and lasted 53 minutes 
on average. Interviews were conducted in Hebrew and translated by the author 
where required. 
Interviewees were mainly approached by using the author’s contact network, 
developed through her work for an environmental think tank which has been 
involved in the formulation of the mitigation plan. The author, who ceased 
working for the think tank prior to taking up the research, reiterated during the 
interviews that these were conducted as part of academic research. 
Table 4 – Interviewees  
Category  Interviewees 
Elected officials13  1 
Policy officials (non-elected) 17 
Other actors 11 
Total  29 
 
Interview questions addressed the general attitude towards climate change 
policy and policymaking processes, and specifically the motivations to act on 
climate change. Policy officials were asked directly about their experiences and 
motivations; interviewees belonging to the ‘other actors’ group were also asked to 
provide their comments regarding policymakers’ motivations. The interviewees 
were prompted to construct ‘their story’ based on their recollections of the policy 
formulation process and encouraged to discuss specific events and ideas, while 
the interviewer attempting to advance themes and insights raised by the 
interviewees. Thus, interviewees were offered an opportunity to reflect on ideas 
previously unconsidered. This was noted appreciatively by some of them, 
commenting that upon reflection they may alter their choices in the future (see 
Hiller & DiLuzio, 2004). 
Research interviews are an artificial situation (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000), 
posing a risk of artificial answers, or answers interviewees think the researcher 
wants to hear (Schwarz, 1999). This is especially true when a researcher 
attempts to explore motivations or uncomfortable truths. Interviewees may also 
offer exaggerated or false accounts of events or feelings (Lilleker, 2003). A 
narrative-based interview, in which interviewees are presented with the 
opportunity to ‘tell their story’, may mitigate some of these risks. Through a 
process termed reflexive progression – a discursive activity in which previously 
unasked questions are posed – interviewees are encouraged to gain (and offer) 
new insights on their own experience (Hiller & DiLuzio, 2004). 
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 In order to protect the elected official’s anonymity, his/her quotes are cited as ‘PO’, as with 
policy officials, so as not to single him/her out.  
In this research, interviewees were generally open and willing to discuss 
complex, sensitive topics, and to offer critical hindsight on themselves, their 
colleagues, and the policymaking process. Personal rapport between the author 
and many interviewees, as well as cultural elements of directness (Katriel, 1986; 
Almog, 2000), leads to the belief that the accounts offered were largely candid. 
However, the author’s involvement in the processes poses a risk of confirmation 
bias – the interpretation or tailored seeking of evidence to support preconceived 
beliefs or hypotheses (Nickerson, 1998). This risk was mitigated by a variety of 
measures, from open-ended phrasing of questions, through suggesting 
alternative explanations to the data where possible, and finally, an 
acknowledgment of this risk. 
To complement the interviews, parliamentary committee protocol transcriptions 
(identified as CP, n=7) and media articles (identified as MA, n=96) were also 
examined (See Table 5). Protocols are from parliamentary committee meetings 
held by the Joint Parliamentary Committee for Environment and Health, which 
dealt with climate change mitigation and was held between 2008 and 2013.14 
While the interviews are a reflection on motivations and processes, committee 
protocols provide a more public expression of motivations, purposefully framed 
for a public debate. Media articles that appeared in five daily Israeli newspapers 
between 2008 and 2013 were compiled and scanned for direct quotes by 
politicians, policy officials, and other stakeholders, referring to climate change 
policies. Note, there is partial overlap between individuals who were 
interviewed, quoted in protocols and those in the media, however, to protect 
interviewees’ anonymity, this will not be indicated in the paper. Overall, 130 
individuals are represented in at least one of the sources (interviews, protocols, 
media) – 17 elected officials, 55 non-elected policy officials, and 58 ‘other actors’. 
Note, the original data is in Hebrew, and was translated as needed. 
 
                                               
14 The author has personally participated in one of those meetings. Prior to 2009, there were 
no parliamentary debates dealing with climate change. 
Table 5 – Textual data sources 
 Individuals 
quoted in 
parliamentary 
protocols 
Individuals 
quoted in media 
articles 
Elected officials  10 11 
Policy officials (non-elected) 28 14 
Other actors 36 22 
Total 74 57 
The interview transcriptions, protocols, and articles were coded thematically, in 
an iterative process which aimed to identify motivations to act on climate 
change. This was done in several steps: (1) identifying relevant quotes in the 
text; (2) recording all instances of a quote mentioning a reason or justification for 
the climate agenda; (3) creating a coding framework of expressed motivations. 
Steps 2-3 were repeated in full by an independent second researcher who did not 
have access to the first coding framework. The coding framework was then 
refined and consolidated. Finally, a third researcher coded the material again, 
based on the finalised coding framework. Overall, over 500 instances were 
recorded and analysed from the textual sources (342 in parliamentary protocols, 
166 from media articles). Inter-coder reliability stood at 80 percent between 
coders 1 and 2, and at approximately 70 per cent between the consolidated 
coding (1 and 2) and coder 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Coding framework with examples 
Themes coded Examples 
Domestic interests 
Economic 
considerations 
(including innovation 
and exports) 
 There are some policies, that if we don’t adopt, it’s 
like there’s money on the trees and we’re not 
picking it…for every Shekel we’ll invest, we will see 
15 Shekels back (OA4). 
 Maybe the Israeli mind will create new industries 
that the world is looking for so much, and will 
invest trillions of dollars in (PO in CP4). 
 Israeli technology is very important in this regard, 
and we already see that Israelis and Israeli start-
ups are changing the photovoltaic world (OA in 
CP3). 
Pollution and Health  Alongside global warming there is the direct impact 
of emissions on us, first and foremost air pollution 
(PO in CP2).  
 [Reducing emissions] is great even outside of the 
international context, as we’re a fraction of global 
GHG emissions, but it’s good for reducing local air 
pollution (OA in CP1). 
Transportation   Public transportation not only reduces emissions 
because so and so people switch from cars to buses, 
but also reduces traffic congestion, road 
infrastructure, and other things that were not 
considered here (OA in CP2). 
Energy independence 
and/or security 
 The meaning of this is health costs, for example, 
pollution, and increasing our dependence on foreign 
energy sources (PO in CP2). 
Contribution to 
adaptation, 
biodiversity 
 If the warming and the extreme weather changes 
continue, the damage to Israel will be great. We feel 
it already in the reduced rainfall and in the decay of 
the biological diversity (PO in CP2). 
General concept of co-
benefits 
 There is a missed opportunity here to make a 
cultural change not just for the reduction of 
emissions, but for something that will promote a 
much better quality of life (OA in CP5). 
Emulation and external legitimacy 
International 
commitments  
 The state of Israel has an international 
commitment. The international commitment is 
important, it is meaningful. We are talking about 
the credibility of the State of Israel; about a 
commitment that the President of Israel himself 
gave in a well-respected international summit, and 
we need to do everything to stand by that (PO in 
CP7). 
Themes coded Examples 
Anticipation of global 
pressure  
 If Israel won't be a part of the world that is fighting 
this fight, even though it is relatively small and so 
is its impact, it will pay a high price internationally 
(PO in CP1). 
Participation in 
international 
institutions (e.g. 
OECD)  
 We can’t get away with this much longer…Israel is 
a leading candidate for the OECD. We can’t tell 
them we’re a third world country when it comes to 
environmental policy (PO in CP2). 
Internal legitimacy, identity 
Identity   On one hand Israel protects its interests zealously, 
and on the other, it has a deep longing, almost 
childish aspiration to be one of the best…to be 
Scandinavian (OA10).  
Normative considerations 
Global norms, 
collective 
responsibility 
 After all, we inhabit this planet. We are part of the 
human race, and must take part in its struggle (PO 
in CP4). 
 
A quote could include more than one instance. Consider, for example, the 
following: 
The benefits of adopting a green growth strategy for Israel will increase 
its energy independence, allow for economic development, strengthen 
Israel’s international status, especially in the OECD, and will improve 
the environment and living conditions of citizens.  
 (M44) 
This sentence includes four recorded instances – (1) energy independence and/or 
security, (2) economic considerations, (3) quality of life and general well-being, 
and (4) Israel’s status as a developed country. Note, if a direct quote in the media 
appeared in more than one article (typically, following a press release), it was 
only counted once. 
2.5 Motivations for climate change mitigation 
policies – empirical evidence 
The analysis of interviews and documents reveal evidence for all four 
motivational groups – external legitimacy, internal legitimacy, domestic co-
benefits and, to some (small) extent, normative considerations. Parliamentary 
protocols transcripts and media articles provide evidence supporting the main 
findings of the interviews. 
2.5.1 Emulation and external legitimacy 
Numerous references in the data were made to developed countries and the 
global negotiations which were at a stalemate at the time the interviews were 
carried out. Some of these had to do with policymakers’ concern over Israel’s 
international status. Several policymakers stated that the climate agenda was a 
way for them to create and demonstrate normalisation, to bring Israel to the 
table as a member of the family of nations, engaging with ‘normal’ agendas, as a 
‘normal’ member (PO14, PO18). In contrast with other issues, in which Israel 
repeatedly reaffirms its sovereignty and independence, Israel can use climate 
policy to be, for once, as one senior policymaker put it, ‘the good boy at least in 
something’ (PO13), or, as another said: ‘Israel will have to consider if it wants to 
position itself as the naughty kid in class, or at least in the developed-countries 
class’ (PO18). 
This approach was also manifested at the president’s address in Copenhagen in 
2009: while the Palestinian delegation framed their climate challenge as an 
explicit security threat, referring to its people’s vulnerability to climate risks 
under occupation and emphasising adaptation over mitigation, the Israeli 
president took a different view, sustained by the separation principle, which 
disconnects Israeli environmental policy from its occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories (Mason, 2013): ‘We have to separate environment from 
politics...climate calls for actions regardless of borders…political disagreement 
should not hinder environmental cooperation…’ (President Peres’ declaration in 
COP 15). The Minister of Environmental Protection, a right-wing member of 
Benjamin Netanyahu's government, said in this regard: 
Differing from my position in regards to state affairs, according to which 
the states of the world cannot dictate to Israel the right solution for it 
when dealing with terror, on [GHG mitigation], wisdom is unfortunately 
not in the hands of Israel, and I do believe…that Israel is better off if it is 
part of the countries that have an obligation to mitigate their emissions.  
(Gilad Erdan, November 2009) 
The language of this last sentence implies that Israel is not better off if it 
reduces its emissions, but rather that Israel is better off if it belongs to the group 
of countries who do. 
Some interviewees said there was concern that Israel would be forced to take 
measures to reduce its emissions. One interviewee commented: ‘MEP managed 
to scare the government by saying “we’re joining the OECD, and we’ll be forced 
to reduce our emissions, so we should pre-empt this and come up with a plan of 
our own”’ (OA1). Other interviewees echoed the concern that, after COP 15, 
Israel would be forced to ‘graduate from kindergarten and go to first grade’ in 
terms of emissions reduction (OA7). In that respect, it is worth noting that the 
OECD (which Israel joined in mid-2010) does not deploy explicit political 
conditionality, and all member states voted unanimously to invite Israel to join. 
The only climate commitment Israel had to fulfil in the accession process was a 
declaration that it intended to reduce its emissions, which had been fulfilled by 
the president’s commitment and the subsequent government resolution. 
Furthermore, after COP 15, it was clear that Israel did not face further 
international commitments under the UNFCCC. 
 
2.5.2 Internal legitimacy 
In the 1970s, Henry Kissinger said that ‘Israel has no foreign policy, only 
domestic policy’. This well-known saying may suggest that external legitimacy 
does not tell the full story of policymakers’ motivations. Evidence shows that 
internal legitimacy and the desire to feel part of the developed world, serve as an 
equally robust motivation. Interviews provide ample support for this claim. 
Following other countries’ lead has been a repeated theme in all interviews. 
Interviewees said that engaging with climate change was ‘fashionable’ (OA1), 
‘sexy’ (PO3), that Israel should be ‘a part of the world, not some third world 
country’ (OA2), and ‘act like one of the industrialised countries’ (PO1). 
Acknowledging that you were doing something that other countries cared about 
was like a ‘Kosher stamp’ (OA4). Another interviewee mentioned that Israel has 
an ‘almost childish aspiration to be one of the best. To be Scandinavian’ (OA10). 
PO18 elaborated on this point: 
Every sentence we say is ‘according to the highest European standards’. A 
factory sends you a response ‘we acted according to highest global 
standards’/the ministry says ‘it was approved according to highest 
global standards’. There is no such thing. It is so important to everyone 
to show that they are like everyone. There’s an aspiration to be like 
others.  
 
Many interviewees noted that at times, the fact that something was done 
elsewhere seemed like the only reason to do it in Israel, and the question of 
‘what’s right’ was secondary to the question what others were doing: ‘everybody 
is looking for a textbook solution, a book where it tells them what to do…not to 
invent the wheel.’ (OA2). One interviewee bluntly said: ‘Sometimes we just copy-
pasted’ (OA6). However, this could be interpreted as a (bounded) learning 
process, in which cues are taken from trusted counterparts on the right thing to 
do, given that resources are limited and that knowledge is expensive. In a 
comparative analysis of environmental issues in Israel, Nachmany (2016) 
demonstrates that, regarding climate change, this was probably not the case. On 
a broader note, an interviewee who was closely involved with Israel’s accession 
process to the OECD commented on internal legitimacy: 
There’s a sentimental factor [in the accession to the OECD]. It’s about 
acceptance; about being accepted by someone. It’s like living in a bad 
neighbourhood and saying ‘Oh but I don’t belong here’. That’s us, we 
always want to show that we are not like our neighbours; we belong in 
the better neighbourhood.  
(OA3) 
Some interviewees commented that their perception was that other policymakers 
were motivated by international issues, and believed that framing issues as 
international made them more attractive. Almost every interviewee believed 
that framing actions as being aligned with the international community in 
general, and with regards to climate change specifically, creates greater leverage 
to operate. NGOs and think tanks have made this assertion with regard to 
bureaucrats, bureaucrats have made it with regard to those senior to them, and 
senior bureaucrats have made it with regard to the political level. The climate 
agenda was explicitly referred to as ‘fashionable’ and ‘sexy’, and people involved 
in the policy processes noted that using international experience, or 
demonstrating that the formulated policy had an international ‘look and feel’, 
were preferable to local initiatives or innovations. Interviewees used terminology 
such as ‘marketing’ and ‘selling’, as though the policy had to be ‘sold’ to senior 
policymakers in the ministries (PO10, OA2). One interviewee noted, ‘to find out 
how things were already done in the world was sometimes a greater question in 
meetings I’ve been to, than the question of what the right thing to do was’ (OA2). 
Interestingly, Israel’s engagement with climate change adaptation came down to 
the establishment the Israeli Climate Change Information Center (ICCIC), a 
research centre concerned with climate adaptation. Given that Israel is an arid, 
coastal, desert-bordering country, it could be expected that more resources would 
be directed in that direction. This could be consistent with the perception of 
adaptation efforts as something belonging to those ‘third world countries’ that 
policymakers were disassociating from, although this hypothesis is not explicitly 
supported by the data. 
Approximately a quarter of instances from parliamentary protocols and media 
mentions responded to this motivational theme. This may suggest that 
considerations of identity and legitimacy were not discussed only in private, in 
anonymous interviews, but were also conveyed to broader audiences. 
 
2.5.3 Domestic motivations 
Interviews tell a slightly different story – most interviewees stated that they 
thought that mitigation of GHG per se was irrelevant to Israel as a small, low-
emitting country, but that a positive externality could be created by addressing 
climate change: ‘Let’s take issues we want to promote, harness them to the same 
cart, and get to the place we want to get to’ (PO18). Many interviewees said they 
thought domestic considerations were more important, and that personally, their 
motivations were about promoting domestic interests. The Ministry of Finance 
led this approach, explicitly preferring domestic over global agendas: ‘It was the 
Ministry of Environment’s role to deal with the global agenda’ (PO7). 
Those domestic interests which can be regarded as co-benefits of climate 
mitigation also feature prominently. Most of the interviewees said they saw 
climate change as an opportunity to promote local causes, or sub-issues, which 
were perceived as very salient. They mentioned ‘riding the wave’ of climate 
change (PO16), with regard to energy efficiency (PO1, PO6, PO17, OA1, OA4, 
OA6, OA7, OA8), air pollution (PO1, PO5, PO6, PO17, OA6, OA8), energy 
independence (PO1, PO6), green industry innovation (PO6, OA2, OA4), and 
generally, as a net-profitable avenue (PO5, PO6, PO11, PO17, OA1, OA4, OA6, 
OA9, OA12). OA9 added that this was a strategic approach, and that ‘the 
minister understood more than all his predecessors…that climate change was a 
way to leverage other environmental issues’. 
In parliamentary protocols which, although public, are more of an internal 
dialogue amongst policymakers, this theme represented just over a third of 
expressed motivations, mainly referring to economic benefits and to health and 
pollution co-benefits. In media quotes, which appeal directly to the domestic 
audience, this represented the most dominant motivational theme, representing 
more than 45 per cent of instances. 
However, given the low priority that climate change per se has on the agenda, 
one would expect the discussion to be framed in the opposite way: climate change 
mitigation being the co-benefit of increasing energy efficiency or reducing air 
pollution. However, the fact that this did not occur lends support to the 
legitimacy (internal or external) motivational argument; it seemed that energy 
efficiency measures weren’t attractive enough in themselves, and a more 
prestigious framing was required. Addressing issues in the energy sector – the 
most prominent co-benefit of reducing emissions, including resource efficiency, 
reduction of pollution, and enhanced energy security – was not part of climate 
policy efforts. This also suggests that the adoption of climate policies may have 
been a case of ‘label diffusion’ (Mossberger, 2000; Radaelli, 2005), where the 
main benefit is reaped by letting various audiences believe that the issue is 
being dealt with, without attaching significance to its actual content. The 
prevalence of domestic considerations in local media suggests that a quest for 
internal legitimacy is the main motivation. 
  
2.5.4 Normative motivations 
One of the clearer findings of this research was that climate change mitigation 
per se was not perceived as important by Israeli policymakers. Most of the 
interviewees, including prominent policy officials who are environmental 
champions in other fields, said explicitly, that they had other priorities, that 
Israeli GHG emissions were minute, and that climate change was not something 
Israel should be concerning itself with (PO11, PO13, PO14, PO16, PO18, OA1, 
OA6). Not a single interviewee stated normative considerations, climate justice, 
or global responsibility as a motivation for engaging with the agenda. 
Nevertheless, one policy official (without claiming that climate change was a top 
priority) wondered: ‘when you’re abroad and you see that the whole world is part 
of the [climate] discourse, you ask yourself, “Am I the last Idiot?!”’ (PO5). 
Documental data also reveals little evidence for the role of normative or 
ideological motivations in policymakers’ decision-making. Less than 18 per cent 
of parliamentary protocol instances referred to these considerations, with a 
similar figure for quotes in that media. 
These findings are consistent with Israel’s position as an environmental laggard 
in general (Vogel, 1998). The late formation and resource-poverty of its Ministry 
of Environmental Protection and the frequent reshuffle of ministers are both 
indications and drivers of this. It could be argued that this is consistent with the 
general logic of Maslow’s famous pyramid of needs (1943): the perception of 
existential threat and security considerations, coupled with high poverty rates 
and widening inequalities (discouraging data on Israel's performance on the 
latter two can be found on OECD, 2015), leave little room for the more 
‘privileged’ of environmental norms. 
2.6 Concluding remarks  
Upon setting out to uncover the motivational forces propelling policy action, it is 
not unlikely to find more than one. This paper attempts to map and detangle the 
main motivational forces driving climate change mitigation policy in a developed 
yet low-emitting country, challenging simplistic narratives around perceived 
international pulls. 
The analysis of Israel’s climate mitigation policymaking process points to a 
number of motivational themes. Evidence strongly features an international 
narrative, revealing a motivation to adopt climate policies because they have 
been adopted in other countries. One might expect that this would result from 
strategic considerations of Israel’s international status and quest for legitimacy. 
However, there is evidence that policymakers are no less strongly driven by 
considerations of internal legitimacy and identity-building – feelings of belonging 
to a group of advanced economies rather than being ‘some third world country’. 
In addition, those domestic considerations which can be regarded as co-benefits 
of climate mitigation also feature prominently in expressed motivations. But 
even those failed to generate real action, and the (small) budget for many of 
those net-profitable activities was frozen. This suggests that climate 
policymaking was a matter of ‘label emulation’, supporting either internal or 
external legitimacy motivations. Finally, there is little evidence for the role of 
normative, ideological, and moralistic motivations in policymakers’ decision-
making. 
Motivations may be independent of each other, and can also co-exist (Checkel, 
2001). For example, being a solar-technology leader could contribute both to 
domestic-self-interest motivations of increased revenues from innovation, export, 
and job creation; they can also play a role in preserving a valued self-identity of 
being innovative, pioneering entrepreneurs capable of ‘making the desert bloom’, 
to quote David Ben Gurion. It would be difficult to disentangle these, and 
existing findings do not allow drawing robust conclusions without further 
research. 
Israel is situated in an uncommon, albeit not unique, position in terms of its 
international standing, heightening potential considerations of legitimacy. Other 
countries struggle with unpopular political actions, and may turn to climate 
actions as compensation or distraction and some of the findings from this paper 
may also be generalised to less politically-charged environments; there are 
countries which do not share the normative ethos on climate change, and climate 
change does not rank highly on their agendas. 
There is wide recognition that ambitious action is still needed to combat rising 
GHG emissions (Boyd, Stern, & Ward, 2015; Stern, 2015). Scholars and policy 
researchers have long been trying to understand what is required to break the 
gridlock preventing countries from acting more assertively on climate change 
mitigation. Although an international agreement was reached at the COP 21 in 
Paris in 2015, with participants declaring their national ambitions, it is still 
unclear how credible these commitments are (Averchenkova & Bassi, 2016). The 
Paris agreement not only requires countries to put policies in place, but also 
demands they upgrade and strengthen those every few years. This will require 
sustained momentum – sustained motivation to act. While narratives are 
constructed and taken apart by scholars and policy experts in order to encourage 
countries to ramp up their climate ambition and action, there is still a lack of 
clarity on whether these narratives actually have any impact on policymakers. 
Advancing the understanding of policymakers’ motivations may serve a valuable 
role in unlocking further climate action. 
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Annex – summary of document analysis 
Theme   
Instances in 
parliamentary 
protocols 
per cent 
Instances in 
media articles 
per 
cent 
Combined: Media 
& protocols 
per cent 
External legitimacy  76 22% 24 14% 100 20% 
  International commitments 60 
 
16 
 
76 
 
  
Anticipation of global 
pressure 
16 
 
8 
 
24 
 
Internal legitimacy  78 23% 32 19% 110 22% 
  
Status of a developed 
country 
78 
 
32 
 
110 
 
Domestic interests 146 43% 88 53% 234 46% 
  
Economic considerations, 
innovation and exports 
56 
 
46 
 
102 
 
  Pollution and Health 31 
 
24 
 
55 
 
  Transportation benefits 18 
 
1 
 
19 
 
  
Energy independence and 
security  
10 
 
9 
 
19 
 
  Adaptation, biodiversity  16 
 
5 
 
21 
 
  Quality of life, well-being 15 
 
3 
 
18 
 
Normative considerations  42 12% 22 13% 64 13% 
  
Global responsibility & 
environmental justice 
42 
 
22 
 
64 
 
Total   342 
 
166 
 
508 
 
 Chapter 3: Can issue attributes explain 
different mechanisms of policy diffusion? 
An exploratory framework  
Abstract 
Policy diffusion scholarship has made significant advances on what 
determines policy diffusion. Drawing on a literature concerned with the 
diffusion of innovations, scholars have offered valuable insights on how 
attributes of different policies affect the likelihood and rate of policy 
diffusion. This paper advances the literature on attributes and policy 
diffusion by offering several important contributions. It proposes a 
conceptual model, suggesting that different attributes of the policy issues 
have an influence on policymakers’ motivations, which in turn affect the 
propensity for certain diffusion mechanisms to arise. The conceptual 
model is then applied to examine five issue attributes (salience, 
complexity, fragility, perception as opportunity or threat, and 
geographical scope), and their effect on two diffusion mechanisms – 
learning and emulation – forming specific hypotheses regarding the 
relative likelihood of the process being dominated by the different 
mechanisms. Four perceived attributes are hypothesised to increase the 
propensity for learning-based diffusion: high salience, high complexity, 
high fragility, and the perception of an issue as an opportunity. The 
propensity for emulation is hypothesised to be increased if the issue is 
perceived as a threat or has an international (rather than domestic) 
orientation. The paper offers a theoretical contribution by acknowledging 
issue attributes as explanatory factors for different mechanisms of policy 
diffusion, addressing an acknowledged gap in the literature. The 
conceptual model allows for future exploration of different attributes and 
diffusion mechanisms. Additionally, it refines the muddled conceptual 
line between attributes of issues (problems) and of policies (solutions). 
Finally, it offers potential theoretical and policy implications for this 
model. 
3.1 Introduction 
Nearly half a century of policy diffusion research has led to a broad consensus on 
its definition – as a process in which policies in one policy unit are influenced by 
policies in other policy units (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin, Simmons, & 
Garrett, 2007; Shipan & Volden, 2012; Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2013) – and 
on its main mechanisms: learning, emulation, competition, and coercion 
(Meseguer, 2005; Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006; 
Dobbin et al., 2007; Shipan & Volden, 2008). This paper is concerned with 
understanding the variance in occurrence of these mechanisms: for example, 
under what circumstances are learning or emulation more likely to take place, 
and why? 
A useful typology (Gilardi, 2003) arranges the different diffusion mechanisms 
into two groups according to the motivations to engage in outward-looking 
activity. Problem-dependent mechanisms of learning and competition arise when 
actors embark on policymaking processes because there is a policy issue that is 
inadequately addressed. Learning takes places when policymakers gather 
information about practice in other policy units (city, federal state, country) and 
use that information to inform their own policy-making. Alternatively, they 
respond competitively to choices made by another policy unit that alter their own 
payoffs, generating a dynamic of ‘race to the bottom’ or ‘race to the top’. For 
example, they may adopt a taxation scheme which is more attractive to investors 
than a neighbouring country’s scheme. On the other hand, motivations driving 
problem-independent diffusion mechanisms, emulation and coercion, are external 
to the specific policy issue. Emulation occurs when policymakers adopt a policy 
solution because they believe it either provides political capital in the form of 
legitimacy or peer approval, or they perceive it to adhere to a general logic of 
appropriateness (see work by March & Olsen, 2004); Meseguer (2005) states that 
‘the drive behind emulation is not so much problem solving, as the search for 
credibility, status, or simple conformity with international trends’ (p. 73).  This 
means that ‘the normative and socially constructed characteristics of policies 
matter more than their objective consequences’ (Gilardi, 2012: 13). Thus, 
learning could be seen as a quest for ‘successful’ policies, emulation may be seen 
as a quest for ‘appropriate’ policies, and competition as a reaction to competitors’ 
policies (Maggetti & Gilardi, 2015). Finally, coercion, excluded from several 
diffusion typologies, is the dynamic in which more powerful actors impose their 
preferred policies on others. 
Significant advances have been made towards understanding the policy diffusion 
patterns’ conditionality on various factors, among others: political orientation 
(Gilardi, 2010), policy type (Mooney & Lee, 1995; Boushey, 2010), the role of 
intergovernmental institutions (Cao, 2009; Strebel, 2011), size of the government 
(Shipan & Volden, 2008), programme scope (Clark, 1985; Taylor, Lewis, 
Jacobsmeier, & DiSarro, 2012), variations in interest-group organisation, 
strategic framing and venue (Boushey, 2010), strong versus weak tie arguments, 
spatial proximity, and cultural proximity (Strang & Soule, 1998). Recently, 
scholars have urged their peers to develop and test interesting hypotheses and 
discern more systematic patterns related to the conditional nature of policy 
diffusion, as ‘not all policies spread in the same manner, and we know that not 
all mechanisms are at work in the spread of all policies’ (Graham et al., 2013, pp. 
699-697; Gilardi, 2015). 
One area with a ‘great potential to break new ground’ (Jordan & Huitema, 2014, 
p. 724) is the study of the nature of the ‘diffused matter’ itself. Recognising an 
empirical and theoretical gap, scholars have attempted to understand the 
explanatory power of the attributes of the diffusing innovations (Karch, 2007b; 
Fulwider, 2011). Drawing on Rogers’ model of diffusion of innovations (2003), the 
following attributes have been modelled as factors affecting diffusion processes: 
salience and complexity (Mooney & Lee, 1995, 1999; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; 
Boushey, 2010, 2012; Winburn, Winburn, & Niemeyer, 2014; Mallinson, 2015), 
fragility (Clark, 1985; Savage, 1985; Mooney & Lee, 1995; Hays, 1996; Mooney & 
Lee, 1999; Tews, Busch, & Jörgens, 2001; Karch, 2007b), symbolic nature (Clark, 
1985), and observability (van der Heiden & Strebel, 2012). Combinations of 
innovation attributes have also been explored, notably high salience paired with 
low complexity (Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Boushey, 2010, 2012; Winburn et al., 
2014; Mallinson, 2015). 
This body of work has several limitations: First, it is focused mainly on the 
likelihood and rate of diffusion, and less on the different mechanisms at work, 
bypassing the causal factors at the root of these differences. An attempt to model 
the effect of innovation attributes on certain diffusion mechanisms was 
performed by Makse and Volden (2011), who applied the question to various 
criminal justice policies. However, their findings are limited to learning, without 
considering alternative diffusion mechanisms. Second, by focusing on the 
innovations, or the policies, a critical step is overlooked – it is that figurative 
(and largely over-simplified) moment, when policymakers raise their heads from 
their desks and decide to look outwards. Since the different mechanisms are 
informed by different motivations, researching a policy solution at the point 
where it has already been considered leaves a crucial gap in understanding the 
underlying process. 
One way to address this is by taking a step back from the policy innovations – or 
solutions – and looking at the policy problems – or issues of concern. These are 
conceptually distinct (Kingdon, 1984), and deserve discrete scholarly attention. 
Redirecting scholarly attention towards policy issues (air pollution, for example) 
away from policy solutions (such as imposing industry emissions standards) 
‘assumes actors asking “what should we do about x” in contrast to the 
conventional approach, which usually assumes that actors ask “should we do y”’. 
(D. M. Glick, 2014, p. 343). Existing scholarship on issue areas (Gray, 1973; 
Mooney & Lee, 1995, 1999; van der Heiden & Strebel, 2012; Winburn et al., 
2014) has made contributions on the probability or rate of adoption, generally 
focusing on one issue rather than taking a comparative approach (save Gray’s 
work, which noted the differences between issues but attributed them to 
variance in federal funding). More recently, Glick’s (2014) work on learning has 
paved the way to increasing interest in the different diffusion mechanisms at the 
issue level. 
This paper addresses a significant gap in the literature by developing an 
exploratory conceptual model that ties the ‘what’ to the ‘why’, and suggesting 
that issue attributes have an influence on the policymakers’ motivations, which 
in turn affect the propensity for certain diffusion mechanisms to arise. By 
analysing the motivational vectors influenced by several issue attributes, specific 
hypotheses are formed regarding the relative likelihood of the process being 
dominated by learning and emulation mechanisms. The first three attributes – 
salience, complexity, and fragility – have already garnered some scholarly 
attention; this analysis adds perception of the issue as a threat or opportunity 
and the geographical reach of the issue – namely whether it is locally or 
internationally oriented. The attributes are analysed individually, but what may 
be interesting is the assemblages in which they work, and how different 
combinations might play out in different issues. The conceptual model may be 
developed in the future to incorporate other attributes and mechanisms. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section ‎3.2 provides an overview of the 
existing literature and its limitations. Section ‎3.3 presents the conceptual model, 
followed by its application to a set of attributes and diffusion mechanisms. 
Section ‎3.4 offers a discussion on future directions for future research, as well as 
potential academic and policy implications. 
3.2 Overview of the literature  
3.2.1 Policy diffusion mechanisms 
Policy diffusion is the study of the process through which policy choices in one 
unit influence policy choices in other units (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Simmons et 
al., 2006; Gilardi, 2012; Graham et al., 2013). It is the process of influence and 
decision-making, rather than a given outcome (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Recent 
reviews of policy diffusion literature (Gilardi, 2012; Graham et al., 2013; Gilardi, 
2015) note that there is broad consensus that diffusion can take on one of four 
main forms or mechanisms: learning, emulation, competition, and coercion, 
briefly described as follows: 
Coercion is the imposition of a policy by powerful international 
organizations or countries; competition means that countries influence 
one another because they try to attract economic resources; learning 
means that the experience of other countries can supply useful 
information on the likely consequences of a policy; and emulation 
means that the normative and socially constructed characteristics of 
policies matter more than their objective consequences.  
(Gilardi, 2012, p. 13). 
Learning is defined as a change in beliefs and ideas brought about by new 
information. It is rooted in the rational-institutionalist notion that governments 
(or other policy units) scan their environments for new information on policies 
and their success, and update their beliefs in light of new evidence obtained. The 
learning literature incorporates concepts from scholarship on lesson-drawing 
(Rose, 1991, 1993), policy transfer (D.P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Evans & 
Davies, 1999; David P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000), and policy convergence 
(Bennett, 1991; Holzinger, Knill, & Somerer, 2008). It asserts that policy units, 
especially in federal structures, serve as ‘policy laboratories’ (Walker, 1969; 
Karch, 2007a) and that, as a result, policy innovations sometimes undergo a 
process of reinvention –purposeful changes made during the diffusion and 
implementation phases (H. R. Glick & Hays, 1991; Hays, 1996; Rogers, 2003). 
While Tyran and Sausgruber (2005) emphasise the importance of information in 
increasing the likelihood of adoption, learning is not always a fully rational 
process and can take a bounded form, where the policymaking process is affected 
by limited resources and cognitive biases, resulting in cognitive shortcuts and 
heuristics (Meseguer, 2005; Weyland, 2006). 
Competition occurs when one government's choices alters the payoffs for 
another, changing incentives to act (Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Braun & Gilardi, 
2006; Dobbin et al., 2007). The literature observes patterns of competitive 
interdependence in several policy areas: economic policies (for a short review see 
Dobbin et al., 2007), including, for example: tax policies aimed at drawing 
investors from other jurisdictions (e.g., Cao, 2010); welfare, where states offer 
policies deterring welfare migration, creating a ‘race to the bottom’ (Peterson & 
Rom, 1990; Brueckner, 2000; critical notes by Volden, 2002); state lotteries and 
Indian gaming (Baybeck, Berry, & Siegel, 2011) and others. 
Emulation, on the other hand, suggests that policies spread because they are 
socially valued independently of the functions they perform (Simmons, Dobbin, 
& Garrett, 2008). Stemming from organisational literature on normative and 
mimetic isomorphism (Haveman, 1993), emulation is ‘driven by motivations 
other than problem solving and does not entail reflection on causal paths leading 
from policies to outcomes’ (Meseguer, 2005, p. 73). Rather, two main motivations 
are suggested to drive these processes: a logic of appropriateness and conformity 
with international norms, and a quest for legitimacy. In the case of ‘symbolic 
imitation’ (Weyland, 2005), measures are adopted not to solve problems, but as 
‘ceremonies’ (Edelman, 1985) or ‘rituals’ (Argyris & Schön, 1978, pp. 318-319) to 
exhibit the use of an appropriate or expected response to a situation. This can 
stem from ‘follow the leader’ patterns, led by the desire to conform to the policies 
of other valued countries (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, pp. 311-312; Meseguer & 
Gilardi, 2009) and ‘it often is rhetorical power of a new policy approach, rather 
than hard evidence…that matters’ (Simmons et al., 2008). For example, diffusion 
of central bank independence had 'larger symbolic meanings…not only for the 
expressed functions that (it) was initially developed for' (Castro & McNamara, 
2003, p. 3). Adoptions by way of emulation are motivated by and serve different 
purposes from those stated (Goldfinch, 2006). This may take the form of ‘label 
diffusion’ (Mossberger, 2000) in which the name or general notion is adopted, but 
the content is different or missing altogether, since the main motivation is being 
perceived as taking certain measures: ‘everyone wants to have a bottle of this 
wine at home’ (Radaelli, 2005, p. 930). Emulation by means of imitating 
structures or policies can also be a way of securing legitimacy, because 
‘organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political 
power and institutional legitimacy’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 150). In an 
analysis of EU countries' single currency policy, tax policy, and media ownership 
policy, it is claimed that European institutions promote isomorphic policy 
solutions to deal with their limited legitimacy (Radaelli, 2000). Emulation could 
eventually take an institutional form of ‘taken for granted-ness’, where the fact 
that many countries have adopted a certain policy makes it the obvious choice 
for others (also see Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Green, 2004). 
Finally, although an outlier in certain diffusion typologies, coercion is a 
mechanism by which powerful actors try to impose their preferred policy 
solutions on a particular government by altering the payoffs of action or inaction 
(Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin et al., 2007; Graham et al., 2013). This 
mechanism has been identified, for example, in the diffusion of democracy 
(Gleditsch & Ward, 2006) and pension privatisation (Brooks, 2002), as well as for 
the spread of environmental management standards (Delmas, 2002). Coercion is 
excluded from some diffusion typologies because “’it emphasizes top-down 
pressures rather than the horizontal interdependencies that are at the core of 
our definition of diffusion’ (Braun and Gilardi, 2006, n.4; see also Busch & 
Jörgens, 2005; Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Nevertheless, the fuzzy distinction 
between vertical and horizontal power dynamics can lead to similar observations 
about other mechanisms. 
These mechanisms can be assembled into two main groups based on the key 
motivations that drive them. The first group, which include learning and 
competition, is driven by the search for a solution for a given policy problem. 
‘Problem-independent’ mechanisms, which include emulation and coercion, are 
mechanisms through which policies 'spread irrespectively from their problem-
solving capacity’ (Gilardi, 2003, p. 5), in which the diffusion process will be 
driven by motivations or drivers which are external to a policy problem: 
First, learning is purposive: a problem is set and a solution is sought. 
Second, a solution is chosen on the basis of observed experience and a 
better understanding of which policies may lead to particular 
outcomes…But this is not the case when imitating others: emulation is 
usually driven by motivations other than problem solving and does not 
entail reflection on causal paths leading from policies to outcomes.  
(Meseguer, 2005, p. 73) 
This distinction somewhat resembles March and Olsen (2004)’s concepts of logic 
of appropriateness vs. logic of consequences – whereas the basis for decision 
making under a logic of consequences would be anchored in a cost-benefit 
calculation, and decision making based on a logic of appropriateness would be 
biased towards existing social norms. However, the two conceptual structures 
are not identical: for example, where considerations of legitimacy (‘problem 
independent’) would be weighed into a cost-benefit analysis (‘logic of 
consequences’).  
For example, a pandemic might prompt policymakers to search for measures to 
stop its outbreak. On the other hand, copying organisational structures may 
result from a need to secure legitimacy (Scott, 1995, p. 44; Radaelli, 2000). The 
mechanisms may occur independently, but a policy process might also exhibit 
elements of more than one mechanism (Shipan & Volden, 2008). Furthermore, 
diffusion mechanisms may be interrelated, for example, ‘governments may learn 
about how to compete with one another better’ (Graham et al., 2013, p. 695). 
Note that some scholars use the term ‘emulation’ to refer to the outcome of the 
diffusion process, describing it as ‘adoption, with adjustment for different 
circumstances, of a programme already in effect in another jurisdiction’ (Rose, 
1991, p. 22). However, in this paper, emulation is referred to as a process as 
described above. This is not only a linguistic clarification, but an essential 
distinction, which relates to the problem-dependent versus problem-independent 
typology: if the motivation for the adoption of the innovation had little to do with 
the policy problem, it is likely to be in the realm of emulation (as the concept is 
used in this paper). This distinction is useful, for example, when one considers 
adoption of policies due to rationally-bounded learning processes. When the key 
motivation is solving the policy problem, but it is accompanied by shortage of 
resources (time, capacity) for devising a custom policy solution, the result may be 
adoption or mimicry of an existing policy. However, since the motivation was 
solving the problem, this process will be situated within the (bounded-
rationality) learning variant of diffusion. If, however, adoption by mimicry was 
driven by considerations which are external to the policy problem, the diffusion 
process will be classified within the emulation mechanism. 
Increasingly, scholars are engaging with questions regarding the conditionality 
of policy diffusion, exploring different possible frameworks and conditions that 
might explain the variance in the observed patterns of diffusion. A key question, 
which has significant scholarly and policy implications, is under what conditions 
might policymakers be more inclined and motivated to look for successful 
policies, and when are they more prone to look for appropriate ones? Scholarship 
suggests certain factors including political orientation (Gilardi, 2010), size of 
government (Shipan & Volden, 2008), variations in interest-group organisation, 
strategic framing, and venue (Boushey, 2010). Other empirical research on 
diffusion points to actors, showing the effect of gender (Bouché & Wittmer, 
2015), ideological preferences (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, & Peterson, 2004; 
Gilardi, 2010; Butler, Volden, Dynes, & Shor, 2014), professionalism, and 
expertise (Shipan & Volden, 2006, 2014). 
 
3.2.2 Attributes, motivations, and actions 
Innovation attributes15 have been modelled to explain variance in the rate and 
pattern of adoption of innovations. The rationale for engaging with the content of 
the policies is put forth by Eyestone:  
We do not yet know enough about policy content, I think, to risk the 
confusions of lumping together large numbers of policies, especially if 
in doing so we would be mixing representatives of several distinct 
diffusion models...the common elements among the policies in these 
clusters will presumably also be important in explaining the observed 
diffusion pattern.  
(Eyestone, 1977, pp. 444, 447) 
The case for attributes as decision-shaping factors stems from categorisation 
theory, anchored in organisational theory, asserting that people form cognitive 
                                               
15 When discussing innovations, the reference point of ‘newness’ is the adopting unit or actor: 
‘“new” means only new to the adopting agent, and not necessarily to the world in general’ 
(Downs & Mohr, 1979, p. 385).  
categories based on their observations of attributes of issues or objects (Lyles & 
Mitroff, 1980; Mervis & Rosch, 1981). These categorisations are formed as part of 
a problem formulation stage (Cowan, 1986) by translating cues into linguistic 
labels and cognitions, which, in turn, influence decision-making (Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Lyles, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988). In short, assigning 
perceived attributes to an issue is part of sense-making of that issue, and is 
linked to subsequent action: ‘If the first question of sense-making is “what's 
going on here?” the second, equally important question is “what do I do next?”’ 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 412). 
 Organisational literature on the diffusion of innovations has engaged with 
understanding the effect of various innovation attributes, including clarity, 
‘politicality’, complexity, specificity, relative advantage, compatibility, 
observability, and pervasiveness (Rogers, 1962; Perry & Kraemer, 1978; Lyles, 
1987). Building on these concepts, public policy scholars turned to investigate 
the effect of attributes of policy innovations on policy diffusion. Lowi (1972) was 
the first to suggest that policies affect politics, in the sense that policymakers’ 
actions are impacted by the type of policies that they are dealing with – 
specifically, whether they were distributive, redistributive, regulatory, or 
constituent policies.  
In analysing the salience and complexity of regulatory issues, Gormley (1986) 
claims: ‘Salience and complexity shape the contours of regulatory politics. They 
affect incentives to participate, the choice of tactics, the selection of a forum, and 
the kinds of criteria that are invoked’ (p. 603). 
Nicholson-Crotty (2009) finds that high salience and low complexity of a policy 
explain the rapid diffusion of policies. Based on the assumptions that 
policymakers are rational actors, whose primary goal is re-election, he suggests 
that policymakers will gather information on policy choices made elsewhere 
(learning), to increase the probability of a positive policy income; he further 
states that in some cases, policymakers will opt for an immediate electoral gain 
by forgoing information gathering (no learning), or by ‘relying very heavily on 
information shortcuts, cues from trusted states, or other tools of boundedly 
rational learning’ (footnote 7). 
Karch (2007b) suggests that imitation is likely to occur under uncertainty and 
disagreement about a certain policy’s merits, and when the impact of a policy is 
more symbolic than economic, including morality policies. Diffusion by 
competition will occur where there are cross-border externalities, causing the 
situation in one jurisdiction to affect another – this mainly relates to economic 
policies (see also Brueckner, 2000). 
Attributes of the policy transfer itself have been suggested by Strebel and 
Widmer (2012) to predict the diffusion mechanism which is likely to take place. 
The attributes they use are visibility (a transfer that is clearly recognisable in 
legislation) and facticity (a tangible, demonstrable fact, which is not only on 
paper). 
There is often a confusion of terms between issue attributes and policy 
attributes, for example: ‘a salient policy, or issue…’ (Nicholson-Crotty, 2009, p. 
195). Shipan and Volden (2012) say their findings must be seen ‘in light of 
political circumstances and policy contexts’ (p. 792), and Mooney and Lee (1999) 
ask ‘do different classes of policy have unique reinvention patterns, based on the 
characteristics of those policies and the politics surrounding them?’ (p. 81). While 
there is sometimes semantic overlap, the conceptual difference between what 
Kingdon calls the ‘problem stream’ and the ‘policy stream’ is clear; with the 
latter often independent of the former, as ‘solutions are developed whether or not 
they respond to a problem’ (Kingdon, 1984, p. 88). In the context of the different 
policy diffusion mechanisms, this difference is critical, as cognitions and actions 
(based on innovation attributes) can only be formed in relation to the desired 
outcome or the motivations driving the policy process. 
Issue attributes are often more difficult to assess or measure than attributes of 
policy instruments (D. M. Glick & Friedland, 2014). Nevertheless, the question of 
issue attributes has occupied scholars from early on. Jack Walker and Virginia 
Gray’s seminal works on policy diffusion (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973) were the 
first to ask whether policy diffusion varies across policy issues. While Walker 
claimed that ‘there does not seem to be much difference in the diffusion patterns 
of issues of different types’ (1969, n. 9), Gray demonstrated a different rate of 
diffusion among education, welfare, and civil rights policies, suggesting federal 
intervention as a possible explanatory factor (Gray, 1973, pp. 1180-1181). Issue 
salience, complexity, and level of policymaking (state/federal) have been used to 
explain variance in the rate of diffusion by learning in the context of the 
American states (D. M. Glick & Friedland, 2014). 
Problem severity has been found to play a role in determining government 
attention in the agenda setting stage (Daley & Garand, 2005; Pacheco & 
Boushey, 2014). The rate of diffusion of morality issues is explained by the 
different attributes of abortion regulation (Mooney & Lee, 1995) and the death 
penalty (Mooney & Lee, 1999). Taking into account their (high) issue salience, 
(low) complexity, and debate over basic moral values, it is suggested that these 
attributes involve less learning. Further work has tended to focus on salience 
(Boushey, 2010; D. M. Glick & Friedland, 2014), complexity (Boushey, 2010; D. 
M. Glick & Friedland, 2014), and level of government (state/federal) (D. M. Glick 
& Friedland, 2014). Adopting Rogers’ typology of innovation attributes, Makse 
and Volden (2011) demonstrate that with regards to criminal justice policies, 
these attributes predict the likelihood and rate of adoption of innovations among 
states. However, their analysis is limited to learning processes, as they note: 
Other diffusion mechanisms are likely to be less relevant to the spread 
of criminal justice policies. Simple imitation (e.g., Shipan & Volden, 
2008) or ideological similarity across states (e.g., Grossback et al., 
2004) may have some relevance in this policy area  
(p. 112, n.4). 
Although there is growing evidence of the link between issue attributes and 
policy diffusion, this link has not been explained. In their work on transnational 
advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink (1998) assert that issue attributes affect 
its amenability to advocacy networking – comparable in some ways to policy 
diffusion. They point to two issue attributes around which most networks are 
organised: issues of bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, where the normative 
logic calls for change, and issues of legal equality of opportunity where change is 
prompted by juridical and institutional logic. Damore (2005) suggests that in 
presidential campaigns, a competitive dynamic is created by interdependence 
when a given issue is on someone else’s agenda (and see Soroka, 2002). 
The scholarship on policy diffusion makes a useful distinction between problem-
dependent and problem-independent diffusion mechanisms, which can be traced 
back to the motivation to engage in policy formulation based on others’ 
experience. These motivations may be shaped by different factors, including the 
attributes of the policy issues in question.  In their framework of policy transfer 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p. 10) , present a variety of alternatives to why, how, 
by whom, and to what degree ideas, goals, policies, and instruments ‘travel’ 
between jurisdictions. Among others, they sketch a continuum of reasons (or 
motivations) to engage in policy transfer: from ‘want to’ (perfectly rational lesson 
drawing), to ‘have to’ (e.g. direct imposition, political pressure), through a 
mixture of the two (e.g. conditionality, international pressures, and perceptions). 
Yet, the alternatives are identified without drawing pathways between the 
different elements. The following section proposes the next step in modelling 
pathways of policy diffusion: it introduces a conceptual model suggesting that 
issue attributes affect the motivations of policymakers to act, which in turn 
affect the process or mechanism of diffusion. The model is then applied to five 
attributes and examines their potential explanatory power for two diffusion 
mechanisms. 
3.3 Linking issue attributes to diffusion 
mechanisms – an exploratory model 
3.3.1 Conceptual model 
The model that is described below is used for conceptualising the relationship 
between issue attributes and diffusion mechanisms; it follows the general logic 
presented by Perry and Kraemer’s (1978) model of diffusion of innovations: they 
suggest that innovation attributes affect motivations, which in turn affects 
diffusion outcomes. They also note that attributes of the innovations are seldom 
empirically tested for their explanatory power regarding processes of diffusion, 
but are rather used mainly for case selection. Similarly, the model presented in 
this paper seeks to unravel the explanatory power of issue attributes: it suggests 
that issue attributes have the capacity to affect policymakers’ motivations to act 
- the greater the value for an attribute (for example, the more complex an issue 
is), the more it is likely to elicit certain motivations; motivations, in turn, affect 
the propensity for certain diffusion mechanisms to occur – as the different 
mechanisms are driven by different forces, including the motivation to replicate 
experience. 
The model goes further to suggest two possible variations:  the first, is that 
certain issue attributes affect the likelihood for certain actors to be involved in 
the policymaking process, which in turn affects the propensity for certain 
motivations. This is consistent with Gormley (1986), who suggested that the 
actors and institutions involved in policymaking vary according to the 
configuration of salience and complexity. For example, there is evidence that 
high-level involvement in policy issues correlates with the issue’s salience 
(Eshbaugh‐Soha, 2006), and complex issues are identified by (or defined by) the 
involvement of professional experts. Their set of motivations and incentives may 
differ from those of ‘generalist’ policymakers. The second variation, is that 
assemblages of certain attributes have a combined effect on the likelihood that 
certain motivations will manifest themselves, which goes beyond the effect of 
each of these attributes separately. 
The model does not suggest an injective function – motivations may be 
influenced by more than one attribute; an attribute may also operate in more 
than one way, depending on context. It is important to note that the different 
diffusion mechanisms are not diametrically opposed, e.g. if a high value assigned 
to an issue attribute increases the propensity for learning, a low value will not 
automatically increase the propensity for emulation, unless a separate 
motivation or explanatory mechanism is in place. Understanding this allows 
predictions regarding different combinations of attributes. 
As described in section ‎3.2.1 above, policy diffusion is the process of influence 
and decision-making, rather than a given outcome (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). In 
defining policy transfer, one of the branches of policy diffusion, Dolowitz and 
Marsh described a process “in which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is 
used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in another political setting’ (David P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000: 5). This 
broad framework lends itself to a variety of policy outputs, from ideas to specific 
policy instruments; it therefore allows a focus on the motivation to look 
outwards, recognising that the final outcome will depend on multiple factors 
which go beyond the original motivation. The conceptual model presented here 
follows that logic, by focussing on the early stages of the diffusion processes, and 
not on the outcome of these processes. Thus, it offers a prism which goes beyond 
most of the existing diffusion literature, which deals with policy outcomes, often 
as these are more visible and measurable.  
Policymaking is an intricate, messy process, shaped by numerous forces tugging 
in opposite directions, and does not always lend itself to a single explanatory 
model. It is clear that some of the logical pathways sketched in this model will be 
more relevant for some issues and policies than for others (as some issues will 
feature certain attributes more prominently)16, and some hypotheses will be 
stronger than others. Nevertheless, the model facilitates observations about the 
propensity of certain motivations and mechanisms.  
Figure 1 below depicts the hypothesised pathways between the different 
elements in the conceptual model (as described above). The basic pathway 
sketched shows that certain attributes may trigger certain motivations, which in 
turn affect the propensity for the occurrence of certain diffusion mechanisms. 
The main distinction is between problem dependent and problem independent 
mechanisms.   
Figure 1 – conceptual model 
 
 
 
This conceptual model is developed and applied to five issue attributes: salience, 
complexity, fragility, opportunity/threat, and locally- or internationally-oriented 
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 For example, applying Rogers’ (2003) typology of innovation attributes to criminal justice 
policies, Makse and Volden (2011) note, that while they use attributes to predict likelihood 
and rate of adoption of innovations among states, their analysis is limited to learning 
processes, as ‘other diffusion mechanisms are likely to be less relevant to the spread of 
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issues. These attributes are discussed in detail in sections 3.3.2-3.3.6 below. 
Salience, complexity, and fragility are comparative (or analytic) attributes, 
meaning that they are used to measure issues in relation one to another, e.g. one 
issue is more salient than another. Opportunity/threat and geographical scope 
attributes are used to organise issues into discrete groups, e.g. an issue is either 
perceived as a threat or as an opportunity (Cobb & Elder, 1972; Dutton, Walton, 
& Abrahamson, 1989). The motivational effect is explored with regards to two 
diffusion mechanisms: learning and emulation, respectively representing 
‘problem-dependent’ and ‘problem-independent’ mechanisms, and highlighting 
the distinction between these two types from a motivational point of view . 
 
 
3.3.2 Salience 
Salience can be defined as the importance that an actor attaches to an issue 
(Laver, 2001) measured in relation to other issues (McLean & McMillan, 2009). 
A salient issue is one that ‘stirs the blood’ and ‘affects a large number of people 
in a significant way’ (Gormley, 1986, pp. 596,598), giving rise to a situation 
where people ‘will likely notice and care about new policy’ (D. M. Glick & 
Friedland, 2014, p. 23).17 In the face of salient issues, the response of elected 
officials is a realisation of their responsibilities, exercising the mandate they 
received upon election: taking care of the problems that matter. Salience 
therefore invokes accountability, and an inadequate or unsuccessful response 
may lead to ‘electoral consequences or a decline in public support’ (Eshbaugh‐
Soha, 2006, p. 227). Salience is a subjective attribute, as it is defined by people’s 
(public, media, policymakers’) perception of an issue, which varies between 
actors as well as over time (Gormley, 1986). Moreover, different measurements 
                                               
17 Attitude research literature distinguishes between importance and salience, where 
important attributes (of a product) are perceived to have significant consequences attached to 
them, while salient attributes are those that come to mind first when prompted to think 
about that product (Myers & Alpert, 1977). 
 
of salience in the literature produce different results (Warntjen, 2012). 
Nevertheless, most of the literature makes assumptions about which, or to what 
extent, issues are salient. Models that include salience as a predictor of decision-
making tend to perform well (Schneider, Finke, & Bailer, 2010). Salient issues 
tend to be dealt with by higher levels of the organisation (Eshbaugh‐Soha, 2006; 
Häge, 2007). Brief, Delbecq, Filley, and Huber (1976), suggesting that elites are 
more likely to adopt innovations for problems with high perceived severity. 
There is evidence that policies with high salience tend to diffuse more quickly. 
This is explained by constituents’ high demand for a policy solution, which 
generates an electoral-driven incentive for policymakers to respond quickly 
(Eshbaugh‐Soha, 2006; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Boushey, 2010; Foucault & 
Montpetit, 2011). Nicholson-Crotty (2009) concludes that for high-salience low-
complexity policies, the need to respond quickly influences policymakers to forgo 
policy learning in favour of immediate adoption. Alternatively, He suggests that 
this quick response may alternatively involve rapid diffusion bounded learning, 
but this avenue remains unexplored. This argument is especially relevant to 
elected officials, and may be less relevant to non-elected officials. D. M. Glick and 
Friedland (2014) find no link between issue salience and the propensity to learn, 
as measured by policy researchers’ reporting on others’ policies. Salience has 
previously been found to be a good predictor of decision-making (Schneider et al., 
2010). 
A related attribute to salience is urgency, or the perceived accumulated loss from 
inaction, may also play a role in the salience of the policy, as it adds a notion of 
time-sensitivity to the relative salience of the issue (Scanlon, 1975). A sense of 
urgency, causing ‘impatience of the various actors to secure agreement on a 
policy’ (Pollack, 1997, p. 122) can drive processes of rapid diffusion, as it compels 
decision makers to react quickly, often taking shortcuts by replicating existing 
experiences (or even experiments) of their peers, based on expected outcomes 
(May, 1992; Foucault & Montpetit, 2011; Boushey, 2012). In that regard, David 
P. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p. 8) note:  
If a government searches hurriedly for a solution to an urgent problem, 
it is more likely that there will be transfer, because the need for a 
‘solution’ is imperative, but less likely that the transfer will be 
successful, because limited time will inevitably lead to a limited search 
for models, and thus probably to flawed transfer. 
However, urgency in itself does not rule out a learning process, but instead may 
increase the propensity for bounded learning, implying informational shortcuts 
and other heuristics (see Nicholson-Crotty, 2009, p. n. 7). Notably, although not 
restricted to urgent issues, when faced by a salient challenge, policymakers may 
turn to ready-made solutions from respectable counterparts because they assume 
that a copied policy will be a successful one. While this ‘taken for grantedness’ or 
mimicking of others is not a rational learning process, it is still driven by the 
motivation to solve the problem. Therefore, it belongs to the ‘problem-dependent’ 
side of the typology. 
Urgency is a concept which may be inter-twined with salience – there are some 
issues which are truly time-sensitive with irreversible consequences of not acting 
on them (e.g. responding to security threats), while the urgency of other issues is 
derived from their perceived salience – high salience drives a desire to act 
promptly (to some extent, this applies even to ‘objectively’ time sensitive issues – 
if their salience is low, they would not be perceived as urgent despite the cost 
associated with inaction). The notion of perceived urgency is difficult to 
disentangle from the salience of an issue, which is why it is not dealt with here 
as a separate attribute but rather within the framework of salience.  
Salient issues are problem-focused; therefore it seems more likely that the 
solution will be ‘problem dependent’. The logic of response to constituent demand 
can be extended to anticipate that policy response to salient issues will be driven 
by need to adopt successful policies rather than appropriate policies, as the 
relevant audience seeks an answer to a problem, rather than a need to be 
aligned with a certain normative position. Moreover, when policymakers are 
inclined to make ‘appropriate’ decisions, it may be easier for them to resort to 
less salient issues, as the main drive is independent of that issue. 
h1: Issues with perceived high salience are more likely to exhibit 
learning-based diffusion rather than emulation-based diffusion. 
 
3.3.3 Complexity 
Complexity ‘exists to the extent of the number and variety of elements and 
interactions in the environment of a decision process’ (Dryzek, 1983, p. 346). It 
can be described as ‘the number of moving parts’ in an issue. Highly complex 
issues require special knowledge and ‘raise(s) factual questions that cannot be 
answered by generalists or laypersons’ (Gormley, 1986, p. 598). Complex issues 
can be identified by asking whether generalist policymakers are likely to seek 
specialised expertise, and whether policy instruments are generally 
multidimensional. For example, a congressional committee’s performance relies 
on the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) experts with regard to a 
complex environmental issue, whereas such dependence on an external agency is 
reduced with regards to consumer protection measures (Price, 1978, p. 572). In 
the context of innovations, complexity is defined as ‘the degree to which an 
innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to understand and use’ (Rogers, 
2003, p. 242). Complexity is an attribute which is more rigid than salience, as it 
changes less over time – although changing conditions, such as technological 
developments, may alter its value with regard to an issue (Gormley, 1986). 
Examples of highly complex issues include the environment, health, genetic 
research, occupational safety, and electricity regulation (Gormley, 1986; D. M. 
Glick & Friedland, 2014).18 
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 Highly complex strategic problems have been referred to as ‘unstructured’ or ‘wicked’ problems (Ackoff 
1974, Mitroff, Mason and Barabba 1982). Apart from their technical complexity, as analysed in this paper, 
these are problems that have a significant influence on the organisation as a whole and are more ill-
defined than other problems, therefore more resistant to resolution. While examples could include 
nuclear energy, use of stem cells, or genetically modified food, the majority of the policy literature on 
wicked problems relates to health– and environmental issues (Van Bueren, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 2003; 
Blackman et al., 2006; Batie, 2008; Hannigan & Coffey, 2011; Australian Public Service Commission, 2012). 
‘Super wicked problems’, a category so far applied only to climate change, acknowledges climate change’s 
unique challenge in terms of time, actors, and long– and short-term planning dissonance (Levin, Cashore, 
Bernstein, & Auld, 2012; Head, 2014). 
Complexity has been found to be important in understanding administrative 
behaviour (Price, 1978; Gormley, 1986), and with regard to regulatory policies, 
suggesting that high-complexity policies affect different actors in different ways: 
politicians are ‘repelled’ by complexity (Gormley, 1986, p. 603) while bureaucrats 
are drawn to it, and being professionals, they are also most influential with 
regard to complex policies. This has been found to be consistent across various 
types of policies such as civil rights, clean air, and domestic farm policies 
(Eshbaugh‐Soha, 2006). The involvement of more experts at the policy 
formulation stage suggests they may be more inclined to focus on successful 
professional decisions, rather than on broader considerations of appropriateness, 
unlike generalist politicians: 
If a policy is technically complex, politicians are unlikely to look to the 
public for guidance because they are not motivated by electoral or other 
democratic concerns to adopt complex policies. Instead, politicians will 
look for expert opinion to inform their decisions on complex policies, or 
defer to experts to make policy decisions. Because they are experts, 
bureaucrats are likely to dominate the implementation of complex policies 
without much political oversight.  
(Eshbaugh‐Soha, 2006, p. 227) 
It has been suggested that complexity impacts the diffusion of innovations (Perry 
& Kraemer, 1978; Rogers, 2003). Complexity of policies has been found to slow 
down the rate of diffusion, mitigating the effects of high-salience policies (Clark, 
1985; Eshbaugh‐Soha, 2006; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Boushey, 2010; Makse & 
Volden, 2011). The slower pace is explained by the need to collect data, create 
infrastructures, train professionals, etc. (Clark, 1985). The greater the amount of 
information required for consideration, the less the impact of policy learning on 
decision-making (Mooney & Lee, 1995). It is, however, important to note, that 
while scholars use the observations about the reduced rate of diffusion to 
demonstrate that complexity slows down the learning process, they do not 
consider alternative diffusion mechanisms.  
h2: Issues with perceived high complexity are more likely to exhibit 
learning-based, rather than emulation-based, diffusion. 
 3.3.4 Fragility 
Fragility refers to the level of divisiveness, conflict or disagreement surrounding 
an issue. It has been referred to as ‘the attribute of a proposal which elicits 
irrational (or emotional) responses among members of the (decision-making) 
elite’ (Brief et al., 1976, p. 229), and is described as ‘the degree of perceived 
organized resistance to their adoption’ (Savage, 1985, p. 117). Fragility may 
provoke a perception of risk among adopters of innovations, which in the case of 
policymakers is defined in terms of potential conflict with opponents. The more 
influential the opponents, the greater the risk (Savage, 1985).  
From a policy diffusion perspective, there is evidence that less fragile issues 
diffuse more quickly (Savage, 1985). Controversy arising during policy diffusion 
processes can lead to policy reinvention; the case of living wills and the highly 
conflictual abortion reform (pre Roe v. Wade) are suggested to have led ‘to a 
truncation of the temporal learning curve’ (Mooney & Lee, 1995, p. 621). In a 
comparative analysis of three policies, Hays (1996) suggests that later adopters 
of innovations will learn from the mistakes of early adopters by taking more 
limited, cautious approaches, and that this pattern would be even more 
pronounced for controversial policies, driven by fear of opposition (cf. Nishita, 
Liebig, Pynoos, Perelman, & Spegal, 2007). Recently, similar reasoning has been 
suggested for the diffusion pattern of the controversial ‘Stand Your Ground’ laws 
(Butz, Fix, & Mitchell, 2015). Exploring the controversial abolition of the death 
sentence, Mooney and Lee (1999) suggest that learning will take place; in 
particular, negative- and political lessons will be drawn. Brief et al. (1976) do not 
find evidence for their hypothesis that fragility reduces probability of adoption of 
innovations. 
This body of work suggests that if an issue is highly divisive, the debate on policy 
alternatives will be shaped by different forces, each actor or group of actors 
raising claims supportive of their position, while scrutinising and dismantling 
claims made by their opponents. This may be conducive to learning processes as 
it makes it more difficult to overlook failed policies (as those opposing them will 
intentionally bring them up). Additionally, the likelihood of agreeing on what is 
an appropriate point of reference is reduced, as different actors will have 
different views of appropriateness. 
The combination of fragility and salience has been addressed in international 
relations literature, arguing that in negotiating salient issues, actors will be 
more willing to make concessions in order to reach an agreement (Keohane & 
Nye, 1977; Schneider et al., 2010, p. 92). Research on congressional committees 
shows that issues with perceived high conflict and low salience will be least 
attractive to legislators, while those with perceived low conflict and high salience 
are the most attractive (Price, 1978). 
The compromise and negotiations required when addressing a fragile issue are 
more likely to be conducted in the realm of what is possible than in the realm of 
what is appropriate, adhering to a logic of learning rather than one of emulation. 
On the other hand, it is possible that salient issues will split policymakers and 
the public along ideological lines, decreasing the importance of others’ policies 
(D. M. Glick & Friedland, 2014); this can lead to stagnation or inaction, or 
heightened considerations of appropriateness, by identifying a policy choice with 
a broader agenda and alignment. 
h3: Issues with high fragility are more likely to undergo diffusion by 
learning than by emulation, especially if they are salient. 
 
3.3.5 Opportunities and threats  
Threats and opportunities are complex attributes, defined by a combination of 
conditions: a threat is a (a) negative situation, (b) in which loss is likely, and (c) 
over which there is little control, while an opportunity is a (a) positive situation, 
(b) with potential gains, and (c) over which there is a fair amount of control 
(Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Barrett, 2003). The strategic 
issue interpretation literature (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Ocasio, 1995; Sharma, 2000; 
Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber, 2001) has identified that categorisation of 
issues as threats and opportunities has a consistent effect on actions, regardless 
of organisational context. According to this body of literature, managers who 
view innovations as threats are unlikely to search for innovative solutions, while 
categorisation as opportunities will tend to increase proactive approaches to 
problem solving. There is evidence that the greater the degree to which a 
company's managers interpret environmental issues as opportunities, the higher 
the likelihood of the company exhibiting voluntary environmental strategies, and 
the more they are perceived as risks, the more conforming approaches are taken 
(Sharma, Pablo, & Vredenburg, 1999; Sharma, 2000). Haney (2015) suggests 
that in the case of the perceived threat of climate change, firms demonstrate 
innovative behaviour due to mechanisms of social liability and moral legitimacy. 
Dutton and Jackson (1987) suggest that issues categorised as opportunities will 
be dealt with at lower levels of the organisation, while threats will be dealt with 
by higher levels. Following the same logic as with complexity, general political 
considerations – taking the organisation’s overall position and status into 
account – are more likely to be dealt with at higher levels, while lower levels are 
more concerned with the specifics of the issue entrusted to them. 
Some of these observations have also been extended to policymakers. Berry and 
Berry (1992) identify that policymakers respond to perceived opportunities and 
threats in policy adoption decisions: for example, they find that policymakers 
adopt tax policies in conditions that are consistent with the avoidance of political 
risk, and that alternative explanations (supporting economic development or 
party control) are not supported by evidence. However, the authors do not 
propose which diffusion mechanisms might be at work. Dolowitz and Marsh 
(2000) claim that policy diffusion in times of social, political, and economic 
stability are more likely to be voluntary, while risks and crises may generate a 
need to conform: ‘If there is some form of “global” crisis, such as the economic 
downturn during the mid-1980s, actors are more likely to feel some pressure to 
engage in transfer’ (David P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 16).  
Simply put, when faced with an opportunity, policymakers are likely to 
investigate if the opportunity is worth pursuing. This is likely to involve a 
process of scanning the environment, gathering information, and assessing 
alternatives; this process resonates more with a learning mechanism. On the 
other hand, when faced with a threat, or even a crisis, decision makers will be 
under pressure to show that they have acted in order to resolve the threat. This 
may mean they resort to appropriate means, as the motivation will be to act, and 
because actors involved are more likely to have broader policy agendas.  
h4: Issues which are perceived as a threat are more likely to undergo 
diffusion by emulation. 
h5: Issues which are perceived as an opportunity are more likely to 
undergo diffusion by learning. 
 
3.3.6 Geographical scope 
The final attribute considered is perhaps the most intuitive of all: it asks 
whether an issue is perceived as being mainly relevant to the local policy unit, or 
whether it is also relevant in a broader geographical context. Notably, this paper 
refers to the transnational context, but the general concept can be expanded to 
any level of policy unit (for example other states or levels of government in a 
federal setting). Having a primarily transnational context does not mean that an 
issue does not have local consequences. The question, therefore, is whether an 
international focus generates an incentive to adopt more successful policies or 
more appropriate policies, and how the locally-induced motivations interact with 
those that are internationally-induced. 
A large body of literature on policy convergence is split on whether its driving 
forces are economic or ideational-normative (see Drezner, 2001 for a review). 
Both forces operate within a larger context than the issue in question, and 
generate an incentive to conform to prevailing practices: 
Theoretical consensus on an appropriate economic model raises the 
intangible costs of nonconformity. Perceived policy failures associated 
with ‘heterodoxy’ will suffer greater public condemnation than similar 
failures of conforming policy. Governments that resist ideational trends 
face reputational consequences that cast doubt on their approach to the 
economy and potentially the legitimacy of their governance.  
(Simmons & Elkins, 2004, p. 173) 
This does not mean that policy diffusion will necessarily take place for issues 
with an international focus, as an intricate set of considerations – including 
domestic policies – affects this dynamic. For example, Busch, Gupta, and 
Falkner (2012) suggest that in the case of genetically modified organisms, 
international contestation over appropriate regulatory directions hindered policy 
convergence. 
D. M. Glick and Friedland (2014) propose that the American states are more 
likely to learn from each other on issues which are state-local rather than 
federal, attributing the anticipated difference to federal constraints which reduce 
the incentive for learning. Note that while their argument revolves around a low 
propensity for learning, they do not claim that emulation is more likely to take 
place instead. Indeed, they find only limited evidence in this regard. Noting the 
differences between learning and emulation, Cao (2010) proposes that emulation 
is more likely to occur where there is a high level of interaction in networks: 
Policy learning is often based on shared information that travels 
through cognitive shortcuts bridging connected actors....Policy 
emulation, on the other hand, considers the affective dimension of the 
relational governance, and relies on trust, empathy, and sympathy 
among countries…High levels of interactions in networks are expected 
to strengthen this sense of affinity, and therefore facilitate policy 
emulation.  
(p. 825) 
It is suggested that internationally-oriented issues are more likely to adhere to 
norms and a sense of appropriateness, as the context of policy-making is wider 
than the given issue, by definition. In addition, social constructs and networks 
generate more opportunities for engagement with external actors than for 
locally-oriented ones, thus increasing the likelihood of emulation. 
h6: Issues which are perceived as international are more likely to 
undergo diffusion by emulation. 
 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
The policy diffusion literature has been struggling with sketching causal 
pathways to explain the different mechanisms comprising the phenomenon of 
policy diffusion, and the different conditions which may elicit specific 
mechanisms. In an attempt to achieve a better understanding of this question, 
this paper offers a few unique contributions. 
First, it proposes a conceptual model to explain how the attributes of a policy 
issue, or policy problem, have the capacity affect the motivations of policymakers 
to engage with the issue. These motivations, in a policy diffusion setting, may 
influence the propensity for certain diffusion mechanisms to take place. 
Detangling the conceptual knot which confuses between policies and policy 
issues, it applies this general conceptual model to five attributes and two 
diffusion mechanisms – learning and emulation – and proposes ways in which 
attributes influence the likelihood of each of the mechanisms. By doing so, it may 
help researchers to improve the design of their research questions and distil 
their arguments. 
For example, what is the role of information for different mechanisms? What is 
the relative power of competing explanations? Can bounded learning be 
distinguished from emulation, given that they might express similar rates of 
diffusion? Are patterns of adaptation and reinvention different? Additionally, it 
could encourage a more informed selection of datasets for quantitative and 
qualitative research, either by selecting issues with similar attributes in order to 
control for other factors that may explain diffusion patterns, or by selecting 
issues with different attributes to deepen the investigation of their impact. 
Future research would benefit from considering the attributes and motivations 
affecting competitive diffusion as well. There are also potential practical 
implications to the notion that some conditions are more favourable to policy 
processes which seek appropriate policies rather than successful ones, as those 
may be sub-optimal in terms of performance. The awareness of a higher 
propensity for convergence around a limited set of policies which are considered 
appropriate may serve as additional input in the choice to adopt them, or 
encourage potential interventions. 
The paper suffers from several limitations, the first of which is the multivariate 
nature of the problem. Sketching the vectors of potential forces influencing 
policymaking generates a complex map of hypotheses and assumptions – some of 
them related to issue attributes and some not at all. There are grey areas 
resulting from attributes ‘behaving’ differently under varying circumstances. 
These circumstances can either be assemblages of attributes, or other factors, 
which the mechanisms may be conditional upon. The literature suggests that 
salience is a powerful variable impacting the behaviour of other attributes. 
Exploring different combinations of attributes, as well as combinations with 
other explanatory factors, is a key direction for moving this research forward. 
Another limitation of this model is that it makes assumptions about 
homogeneity of motivations and perceptions of actors and does not delve into the 
intricacies of organisational inconsistencies. One possible way to further 
disentangle motivations is by refining the reference point of ‘policymakers’; in 
this analysis, it has been pointed out that professional experts may have 
different motivations than generalist policymakers. For example, Gilbert (2006) 
shows that perceptions of opportunity and risk can coexist in different sub-units 
of an organisation. Motivations may play out differently on different political 
levels, and policymakers in federal states or at the sub-national level may have 
motivations and considerations that are absent from non-federal or national 
settings, and vice-versa. 
The limited attention that issue attributes receive may be attributable to the 
empirical and methodological challenges: in order to identify which diffusion 
mechanism is at work, evidence needs to be collected at the pre-adoption phase 
of policymaking. The vast majority of research focuses on the binary decision of 
adoption or non-adoption (notable exceptions include Karch, 2007a; D. M. Glick, 
2014; Pacheco & Boushey, 2014; Karch & Rosenthal, 2015). Additionally, in 
order to understand the underlying motivations that lead policymakers to look at 
their neighbours’ grass, evidence needs to be gathered, either directly by 
qualitative research, or by robust inference from supporting data. An empirical 
challenge which will have to be addressed in future research is the need for 
robust definitions and measurement methods for the attributes. A first empirical 
exploration of the theoretical concepts is detailed in Nachmany (2016)19. 
Scholars have assumed that learning or competition occur more in certain fields 
than in others and, therefore, when selecting empirical data to advance an 
argument, they tend to choose an area that they assume would fit. However, 
some of these intuitions are faulty, and some simply preclude more experimental 
research designs and empirical sets. The model presented in this paper takes a 
step back from those assumptions by deconstructing issues into their 
components. It will hopefully encourage scholars to abandon some long-standing 
assumptions and make some adventurous new discoveries. 
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 Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Can issue attributes explain 
different mechanisms of policy diffusion? 
Evidence from three environmental 
issues 
Abstract 
Recent developments in the policy diffusion literature explore how 
different factors may condition the patterns and nature of policy diffusion. 
While attributes of the policies (solutions) have been suggested to affect the 
dynamics of diffusion, and especially the variance in rate of diffusion, the 
explanatory nature of the issues (problems, e.g. education or air pollution) 
remains largely unpacked. Recently, Nachmany (2016b) developed a 
conceptual model20  suggesting that various attributes of policy issues 
influence policymakers’ motivations, which in turn affect the likelihood of 
certain diffusion mechanisms. This paper offers a first empirical 
application of this model. Based on 34 interviews with policy officials and 
other policy actors in Israel, the model is applied to the processes of 
diffusion in three environmental policy issues: climate change, air 
pollution, and waste. Through the analysis of the differences in the 
attributes of these three issues, and variance in diffusion mechanisms in 
practice, the paper lends support to Nachmany’s conceptual model, as well 
as to some of her specific hypotheses. Its micro-level approach provides 
empirical evidence not only on correlational, but also on the causal, 
pathways tying issue attributes to specific diffusion mechanisms. 
Particularly, there is evidence that salience and complexity, and to a 
lesser degree, fragility, influence the propensity for learning-based 
diffusion to occur, and that international orientation increases the 
propensity for emulation-based diffusion to occur. There is insufficient 
evidence regarding the hypotheses on perceived threat and opportunity. 
Other contributions offered by the paper include advancing the 
understanding of policy diffusion processes in the pre-legislative stage, 
which is hard to capture in most quantitative studies, as well as 
advancing the literature on policy diffusion in non-federal settings. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Recent reviews covering half a century of policy diffusion scholarship (e.g. 
Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2013; Gilardi, 2015) acknowledge that broad 
consensus has been achieved on its definition and dominant mechanisms: 
learning, emulation, competition, and coercion. However, questions remain 
regarding the conditionality of policy diffusion. Scholars point to the nature or 
attributes of the diffused policies, and the policy area in which diffusion is taking 
place, as potential directions for deciphering these different mechanisms (Gray, 
1973; Clark, 1985; Shipan & Volden, 2008; Graham et al., 2013; Jordan & 
Huitema, 2014; Gilardi, 2015). 
The small but existing literature on attributes suffers from a series of 
shortcomings: First, existing work predominantly addresses the rate of diffusion 
(Savage, 1985; Rogers, 2003; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Boushey, 2010; Makse & 
Volden, 2011; Boushey, 2012; Mallinson, 2015), rather than the essence of the 
mechanisms at work. Second, it is generally focused on learning, thus 
overlooking alternative mechanisms of policy diffusion while making 
assumptions on the causal mechanisms of the diffusion process. Third, it fails to 
distinguish between attributes of issues (problems) and attributes of policies 
(solutions). While there is an intuitive correlation between the two, higher 
conceptual precision is needed as they are analytically distinct (Kingdon, 1984). 
Fourth, most diffusion studies focus on the phase of policy adoption (notable 
exceptions include Karch, 2007a; D. M. Glick, 2014; Pacheco & Boushey, 2014; 
Karch & Rosenthal, 2015), and are therefore short of capturing the decision-
making process itself. Fifth, the vast majority of existing empirical data is from 
the US. The literature could benefit from more diverse data to broaden the 
discussion beyond an American context and, moreover, beyond a federal context. 
Finally, most empirical diffusion studies focus on a single issue area, overlooking 
the potential difference between issues. 
A main question that remains unanswered is whether policy diffusion occurs in 
the same way across different issues of policy concern, or whether certain 
attributes of the issue increase the propensity for one diffusion mechanism over 
another. For example, if learning can be seen as a quest for successful policies 
and emulation a quest for appropriate policies (Goertz, 2006; Maggetti & Gilardi, 
2015), are there conditions under which policymakers are more likely to seek 
successful, rather than appropriate, policies, or vice versa? Recently, Nachmany 
(2016a)21 proposed that issue attributes have an effect on policymakers’ 
motivations, which in turn affect the tendency towards different mechanisms. 
Specifically, it is suggested that learning-based diffusion is more likely to occur 
for issues which have perceived high salience, high complexity, high fragility, 
and which are perceived as opportunities. It is further suggested that emulation-
based diffusion is more likely to occur on issues which are perceived as a threat, 
and are perceived as internationally-oriented rather than locally-oriented. 
However, although these hypotheses provide an analytical framework for 
advancing the understanding of different diffusion mechanisms, they remain 
untested. 
This paper provides several contributions towards addressing these gaps. By 
using empirical data to test the hypotheses developed in Nachmany (2016a), it 
looks to discover whether some attributes have more substantive significance 
than others, and to discern the attribute assemblages in which the effects on 
diffusion mechanisms are more expressed. This makes an empirical contribution 
but also feeds back into the theoretical concepts, allowing their further 
development. 
The paper examines case studies of policymaking processes in three 
environmental issues from Israel: waste, air pollution, and climate change. 
These three issues exhibit different issue attributes and the policy processes 
examined – leading to the formulation of the Packaging Waste Law (2011), the 
Clean Air Act (2008), and the National Greenhouse Mitigation Action Plan 
(2010) – appear to have been subject to different diffusion mechanisms. Israel 
makes an interesting case study as its position as an environmental laggard 
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(Vogel, 1998) leads to heavy influence by international policies; indeed, air 
pollution and waste policies exhibit evidence of learning-based diffusion, while 
climate change policy demonstrates evidence of emulation-driven diffusion. The 
results support some of the hypotheses raised in Nachmany (2016a): There is 
evidence to suggest that the propensity for learning is affected by salience and 
complexity, and to a lesser degree by fragility of the issue area. There is also 
evidence that international orientation increases the propensity for emulation. 
Finally, there is insufficient evidence regarding the hypotheses on perceived 
threat and opportunity. 
The data consists of 34 in-depth interviews conducted with senior policymakers 
and others heavily involved in the policy-making processes, supported by 
evidence from textual analysis of parliamentary protocols and media articles. By 
offering empirical qualitative evidence based on self-reporting, rather than on 
inferential statistics, the paper is able to offer insights which are harder to be 
provided by quantitative, binary-measured indicators such as adoption or non-
adoption, and also contributes to the measurement of attributes. 
The concepts employed in this paper operate at the micro level, contributing to a 
level of analysis largely absent from the policy diffusion network, which tends to 
focus mainly on the state level (notable examples include Weyland, 2006; 
Sugiyama, 2008; Taylor & Tadlock, 2010), and filling an often-mentioned 
methodological gap (Heclo, 1974, p. 306; Bennett, 1997, p. 225; Graham et al., 
2013, p. 695). Looking at policymakers as the unit of analysis is not only a 
methodological contribution, but an essential one, as it is their motivations and 
incentives that shape the policy processes (Grandori, 2000, p. 20). 
The policymaking phase is largely understudied, predominantly due to data 
access issues faced by researchers. This analysis, on the other hand, enables 
engagement with processes rather than outcomes alone, thus sketching 
pathways that are independent of results in the form of adopted.22 This 
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contribution sheds light on causation, rather than only correlation, and opens 
the way to studying future empirical cases where the result is more difficult to 
measure, such as cases of non-diffusion (see Barth & Parry, 2009; van der 
Heiden & Strebel, 2012). The detailed case studies also contribute to the 
literature on Israeli environmental policymaking (Vogel, 1998; Pedahzur & 
Yishai, 2001; Weinthal & Parag, 2003; Parag, 2008) and on the influence of 
foreign policies on Israel discussed, for example, in the context of education 
reform (Eyal & Berkovich, 2010), trade and competition law (Gal, 2007), fiscal 
policies (Maman & Rosenhek, 2009), and workfare (Helman, 2009). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant 
literature on policy diffusion and issue attributes. Section 3 describes the 
methodological approach of the paper. Section 4 presents the three case studies 
in focus, preceded by comments on Israel’s environmental policymaking. Section 
5 discusses how the findings from the case studies correspond to the theoretical 
hypotheses. Conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future research are 
brought together in Section 6. 
4.2 An overview of the literature  
4.2.1 Policy diffusion 
In order to understand governments’ adoption of policies, literature has 
traditionally offered two explanatory paradigms: that of internal determinants, 
contending that policymakers respond to internal characteristics of their 
environments when adopting or adapting policies, and that of external 
determinants – or policy diffusion – which claims that policy choices in one unit 
are influenced by policy choices in other units (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Simmons, 
Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006; Gilardi, 2012; Graham et al., 2013). Recent reviews of 
the policy diffusion literature (Gilardi, 2012; Graham et al., 2013; Gilardi, 2015) 
acknowledge the four main mechanisms by which this influence may be 
manifested: learning, competition, emulation, and coercion. 
Learning is a mechanism in which actors scan their environments for new 
information about policies and their success, and update their beliefs and ideas 
based on the information obtained. The learning literature overlaps significantly 
with the literature on lesson drawing (Rose, 1991, 1993), policy transfer 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Evans & Davies, 1999; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000), and 
policy convergence (Bennett, 1991b; Holzinger, Knill, & Somerer, 2008). 
Learning can be limited by cognitive shortcuts and heuristics (Meseguer, 2005; 
Weyland, 2006) and may sometimes undergo a process of reinvention, or 
purposeful changes made to innovations in the phases of diffusion and 
implementation (H. R. Glick & Hays, 1991; Rogers, 1995; Hays, 1996). 
Competition is a mechanism by which choices made by one policy unit alter the 
payoffs from the policy in another policy unit (Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Braun & 
Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007). Taking the form of ‘race to 
the bottom’ or ‘race to the top’, this mechanism has been observed predominantly 
for economic-oriented policies such as tax, welfare, and state lotteries (Peterson 
& Rom, 1990; Brueckner, 2000; critical notes by Volden, 2002; Cao, 2010; 
Baybeck, Berry, & Siegel, 2011).  
Emulation is a process which is driven by a logic of appropriateness, desire for 
conformity by following orthodox developments or a quest for legitimacy 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Rose, 1991; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Radaelli, 2000). 
Emulation could take the form of ‘ceremonial’ or symbolic imitation (Evans & 
Davies, 1999; Gilardi, 2005), or even ‘policy label diffusion’ in which the label or 
rhetoric of policy is adopted as a vessel, without its essential content 
(Mossberger, 2000). These adoptions are motivated by and serve purposes 
different to those stated (Goldfinch, 2006). 
Coercion is a mechanism by which powerful actors try to impose their preferred 
policy solutions on a particular government by altering the payoffs of action or 
inaction (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin et al., 2007; Graham et al., 2013). It is 
excluded from some widely accepted typologies of policy diffusion as it is more 
focused on vertical than horizontal dynamics (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). 
Nevertheless, as the definition of vertical power is a fuzzy one, similar 
observations can be made about other mechanisms (see Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 
p. 9). 
Both learning and competition share the motivational logic of a quest for the 
solution to a given problem: policymakers identify a policy problem which is 
inadequately addressed (Rose, 1991) and scan the environment for a remedy. 
Unlike these ‘problem-dependent’ mechanisms, another mechanism group 
including emulation and coercion can be defined as ‘problem independent’. These 
are mechanisms through which policies 'spread irrespectively from their 
problem-solving capacity’ (Gilardi, 2003, p. 5) and are subject to drivers which 
are external to the problem they wish to address. Maggetti and Gilardi (2015) 
summarise the difference between two core mechanisms as follows: ‘Learning 
means being influenced by successful policies; emulation copying “appropriate” 
policies’ (p. 6). 
Note that some scholars use the term ‘emulation’ to refer to the outcome of the 
diffusion process, describing it as ‘adoption, with adjustment for different 
circumstances, of a programme already in effect in another jurisdiction’ (Rose, 
1991, p. 22). But in this paper, emulation is referred to as a process, as described 
above. This is not only a linguistic clarification, but an essential distinction. 
Learning-driven diffusion, especially its bounded-rationality variants, may take 
the form of adoption (with or without adjusting for circumstances) of an existing 
programme. This distinction relates to the problem-dependent versus problem-
independent typology: if the motivation for the adoption of the innovation had 
little to do with the policy problem, it is likely to be in the realm of emulation (as 
the concept is used in this paper). 
 
4.2.2 Issue attributes 
The traditional divide, mentioned above, between internal and external 
determinants has started to fade away, with the growing recognition that they 
are not mutually exclusive, and may be conditional one upon another. There 
have been significant advancements in the study of conditionality of policy 
diffusion, focusing on, among others, political orientation (Gilardi, 2010), size of 
government (Shipan & Volden, 2008), gender (Bouché & Wittmer, 2015), 
ideological preferences (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, & Peterson, 2004; Gilardi, 
2010; Butler, Volden, Dynes, & Shor, 2014), professionalism and expertise 
(Shipan & Volden, 2006, 2014). 
Building on the concepts developed by Rogers (1995) on the attributes of 
innovations, and on scholarship of the categorisation theory (Lyles & Mitroff, 
1980; Mervis & Rosch, 1981), scholars have turned to investigate how the 
attributes of the diffused policies themselves impact the dynamics of policy 
diffusion. The basic logic is that people’s perceptions of an object (for example, a 
policy) are translated into linguistic labels and cognitions, which in turn 
influence actions (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). Policy innovation attributes have 
mainly been used to explain the variance in the rate and pattern of policy 
diffusion. Salience and complexity received notable attention (Mooney & Lee, 
1995, 1999; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Boushey, 2010, 2012; Winburn, Winburn, & 
Niemeyer, 2014; Mallinson, 2015), but other attributes have included fragility, 
defined as the level of divisiveness or conflict around a policy (Clark, 1985; 
Savage, 1985; Mooney & Lee, 1995; Hays, 1996; Mooney & Lee, 1999; Tews, 
Busch, & Jörgens, 2001; Karch, 2007b), symbolic nature (Clark, 1985), and 
observability (van der Heiden & Strebel, 2012). Combinations of attributes have 
also been explored – mainly policies with high salience and low complexity 
(Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Boushey, 2010, 2012; Winburn et al., 2014; Mallinson, 
2015). 
Although the question occupied early diffusion scholars (Walker, 1969; Gray, 
1973), the variance among policy issues – or policy problems – has been studied 
to a very limited extent. The intuition that issue attributes matter has been 
simply stated: ‘Scholars and practitioners should not expect the same degree of 
competition surrounding policies limiting youth access to tobacco as over welfare 
policies, the same amount of learning about trash collection as about education 
reforms’ (Shipan & Volden, 2012, p. 792). Apart from a general conceptual 
muddling between issues (problems) and policies (solutions), there has been very 
little systematic engagement with issue attributes, with existing work (Gray, 
1973; Mooney & Lee, 1995, 1999; van der Heiden & Strebel, 2012; Winburn et 
al., 2014) offering contributions either on the probability or the rate of adoption, 
with few comparative insights across issues. 
Recently, Nachmany (2016a) attempted to model policy diffusion conditionality 
on issue attributes by suggesting that issue attributes prompt different 
motivational cues for policymakers, which in turn affect the likelihood of 
occurrence of problem-dependent or problem-independent diffusion mechanisms. 
Borrowing the terminology from Maggetti and Gilardi (2015), she seeks to 
understand which issue attributes (or combinations thereof) prompt a quest for 
successful policies, and which attributes or combinations prompt a quest for 
appropriate policies. She argues that issue attributes have the capacity to affect 
policymakers’ motivations to act – and that the prominence of an issue attribute 
is (for example, the more salient an issue is) increases the chance that it will 
elicit certain motivations. She further argues that motivations, in turn, affect the 
propensity for the occurrence of certain diffusion mechanisms – as the different 
mechanisms are driven by different forces, including the motivation to replicate 
others’ experience. Her model does not focus on policy outcomes, but rather on 
the process leading policymakers to look outwards and seek to replicate or build 
on experience by others. The actual outcome – whether a policy or specific 
instrument or adopted, or even if they do not end up being adopted for a variety 
of reason, is somewhat less relevant in this context. 
Four perceived attributes are hypothesised to increase the propensity for 
learning-based diffusion: high salience, high complexity, high fragility, and the 
perception of an issue as an opportunity. Perceived high salience means that the 
actor attaches high importance to an issue (Laver, 2001). In the context of 
policymaking, this is likely in response to constituent demand. If the demand is 
problem-dependent, then it is anticipated that the policy response to salient 
issues will be driven by the need to adopt successful policies rather than 
appropriate policies. It is suggested that complex issues, defined as issues that 
require special knowledge and expertise that typically cannot be answered by 
generalists (Gormley, 1986), are also prone to a quest for successful policies. This 
is mainly because the people who are likely to be involved in the policymaking 
process are professional experts who care less about broad considerations of 
legitimacy and appropriateness and more about the problem itself (Eshbaugh‐
Soha, 2006). High fragility is suggested to prompt a debate on policy 
alternatives, informed by different actors, approaches and claims. The debate 
itself will be conducive to a learning process and there will be a reduced 
likelihood of seeking an appropriate policy, as there will be no consensus on what 
that might be. This effect is increased for salient policies, in which there is an 
added motivation to reach a solution. When faced with an opportunity a positive 
situation with potential gains, and over which there is a fair amount of control 
(Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Barrett, 2003), policymakers 
are prone to explore if the opportunity is worth pursuing. This is likely to involve 
gathering information, and assessing alternatives, which resonates with a 
learning mechanism. However, when faced with a threat, which is a negative 
situation in which loss is likely, over which there is little control, decisionmakers 
will be pressured demonstrate action to resolve the threat. This may lead them 
to resort to appropriate means, as the motivation will be to demonstrate action 
(or reaction). Lastly, Nachmany (2016a) hypothesises that issues with an 
international-orientation are more likely to undergo emulation-based diffusion: 
interdependence between countries will increase the tendency for symbolic 
imitation (Falk, 2005; Cao, 2010). 
While Nachmany’s framework is currently developed to include only two 
diffusion mechanisms – learning and emulation – and a limited set of attributes, 
its general concepts are expandable to other mechanisms and other issue 
attributes. Nonetheless, the framework is theoretical only, and has no empirical 
backing. This paper offers a first attempt to provide evidence to test the 
hypotheses put forth.  
4.3 Methodology 
The paper employs a qualitative research design based on the analysis of three 
case studies. This approach is consistent with the aim of gaining insight on the 
micro level of policymaking at the phase of policy formulation, through analysis 
of policymakers’ perceptions of issue attributes and decision-making dynamics. It 
advances the predominantly quantitative work on conditionality of policy 
diffusion in general, and with regards to the understudied pre-legislative stage of 
policymaking in particular, as pointed out by recent reviews of the diffusion 
literature: 
Without clear and well-founded facts on the ground, often best provided 
by qualitative research, Quantitative scholars have an insufficient 
understanding of the relevant politics to produce ultimately fruitful 
analyses…we are now at a point where qualitative research could 
nicely complement Quantitative analyses, such as with fuller 
assessments of what exactly policy makers seek to learn from others or 
how socialization comes about.  
(Graham et al., 2013, p. 695, emphasis by the author) 
The cases studies discussed relate to policy formulation processes in three issues 
on the Israeli environmental policy agenda between 2005 and 2011. The existing 
literature on policy diffusion and attributes focuses on federal states (mainly the 
USA) and features only a handful of non-federal case studies (Bennett, 1991a, 
1997; Tews et al., 2001). Innate similarities among these policy units, as well as 
the structural effects of a federal system, may provide explanatory power that is 
not generalisable to other geographies. Stepping out of an American federal 
setting, therefore, makes an important contribution. 
The issues and respective policies analysed in this paper are: packaging waste 
and the formulation of Packaging Waste Treatment Law 2010 (‘the packaging 
law’), climate change mitigation and the formulation of the National Greenhouse 
Gas Mitigation Plan 2010 (‘the mitigation plan’), and air pollution and the Clean 
Air Act 2008.23 For key information about the issues, see Table 7. These cases 
                                               
23 The Clean Air Act does not cover most greenhouse gases so there is little, if any, overlap 
between the Clean Air Act and the mitigation plan. 
were chosen because they have a balance of similarities and differences which 
allows a close examination of the hypotheses regarding issue attributes: all three 
are environmental issues, dealt with primarily by the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP), frequently even by the same people, over the same 
approximate time period. Policy formulation processes for all three issues exhibit 
evidence of policy diffusion. However, the issues differ in their attributes and in 
the apparent diffusion mechanisms in operation. This allows the studying of the 
connection between attributes and diffusion mechanisms while limiting 
alternative explanations, such as the differences attributable to actor 
differences. 
Analytical attributes are perceived in relation to other issues (Dutton, Walton, & 
Abrahamson, 1989). These perceptions allow policymakers to allocate resources 
of time, budget, and political capital according to their preferences. The issues 
below are discussed primarily in relation one to another, in accordance with the 
general low salience of environmental issues on the Israeli public agenda (see 
Section ‎4.4.1 below). There was a risk that assessing them with regards to other 
issues would have clustered them too closely together. 
Most of the existing scholarship measures attributes either by making 
assumptions or by employing an external proxy-measurement, such as media 
coverage (one exception is Mooney and Schuldt (2008), who use direct questions 
to assess salience and complexity during interviews). For the framework 
proposed in this paper, these assessments or measurements are limited since the 
policymakers’ subjective perceptions of the attributes are the focus of the 
analysis. This shift in focus enables a clearer understanding of the attributes 
impact on policymakers’ motivations. This methodological gap is pointed out by 
Makse and Volden (2011): ‘Surveys that include more of the actual policymakers 
who bring about policy change might better capture their true underlying 
perceptions of the policies and their attributes’ (p. 23). Warntjen (2012) finds 
that expert interviews, text analysis and media coverage yield different results 
when measuring salience, and notes that ‘expert interviews provide the most 
fine-grained and least ambiguous measure but are costly to conduct for a large 
number of proposals’ (p. 168). Mallinson (2015) finds a difference in the rate of 
diffusion for policies considered salient by the public, and those considered 
salient in the media, suggesting that legislators ‘may be taking more time with 
policies that are popular among the public than when a policy area is receiving 
increased national media attention.’ (p. 15). Introduction of a direct 
measurement of salience allows a further refinement of motivations. 
 
  
Table 7: Case studies 
 Packaging waste Climate change  Air pollution 
Policy 
formulated 
Packaging Waste 
Treatment Law 2010 
National 
Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation Plan 
2010 
Clean Air Act 
2008 
Type of policy Law National plan, 
mandated and 
budgeted by 
government 
decisions 
Law 
Main 
formulation 
period 
2009-2010 (passed in 
January 2011) 
2010 2005-2008 
Influential 
policies 
European Directive on 
Packaging and 
Packaging Waste, 
specifically the 
Belgian 
implementation model 
Climate change 
framework laws and 
action plans 
worldwide;  
a variety of specific 
measures from the 
EU and US 
US Clean Air 
Act, European 
Directive on 
Integrated 
Pollution 
Prevention and 
Control (IPPC) 
 
As this paper is concerned with policymakers’ perceptions and motivations, 
interviews were chosen as the primary data collection method, as ‘interviews 
yield rich insights into people’s biographies, experiences, opinions, values, 
aspirations, attitudes and feelings’ (May, 2001, p. 120). In 2012-2013, the author 
conducted thirty-four interviews with Israeli-based policy officials identified as 
POs (n=21) and other actors identified as OAs (n=13) who were directly involved 
in the formulation of one or more of the policies in question. See Table 8. 
The interviewees represent a significant and senior sample of the people 
involved, some of whom were involved in more than one policy, providing 
comparative views on the different issues. Because the Israeli environmental 
policymaking scene is very small, interviewees’ institutional affiliation is not 
specified, in order to protect their anonymity (Kaiser, 2009). The higher 
proportion of interviewees responding to the climate change issue is attributable 
to the fact that they were assessed with regards to the authors’ other parallel 
research work (Nachmany, 2016b)24 as well as to the fact that many of the people 
involved in waste or air pollution are also involved, and could offer input on, 
climate change. The fact that some interviewees were involved in more than one 
case study may pose a risk of case study ‘contamination’, where overlap between 
the accounts of different experiences blend together. However, the underlying 
rationale for picking individuals who were involved in more than one case, was 
precisely meant to neutralise the individual differences that lead to different 
motivational structures and behaviours. Individual interviewees described very 
different thought processes and motivations for action on the different cases, 
illustrating that there is significance to the case itself and not only to the 
position or character of the policymaker involved. 
 
Table 8: Interviewees, per policy issue 
 Interviews 
 Total Policy officials 
(POs) 
Other actors (OAs) 
(NGOs, think tanks, 
consultancies, 
industry 
organisations) 
Climate 29 11 18 
Air 12 6 6 
Waste 15 8 7 
 
 
Interviewees were identified on the basis of their continuous involvement in the 
policy-making processes, and were approached either by cold-calling or by using 
the author’s contact network developed through prior research for an 
environmental think tank involved in policy consultancy for the packaging law 
and the mitigation plan. During the interviews, it was reiterated that they were 
conducted in an academic capacity only. Interviews were conducted in person 
(save one that was conducted on Skype) and took 47 minutes, on average. 
Interviews were conducted in Hebrew and translated by the author where 
required. 
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 Chapter 2 in this thesis 
It should be noted that research interviews are an artificial situation (Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2000) carrying a risk of interviewees providing answers they think the 
researcher wants to hear (Schwarz, 1999), especially when the researcher seeks 
to uncover motivations or uncomfortable truths. At the same time, interviewees 
sometimes offer exaggerations or falsehoods (Lilleker, 2003). In order to reveal 
those, the researcher can facilitate a narrative-based interview in which 
interviewees are presented with the opportunity for storytelling, thus generating 
reflexive progression, a discursive activity in which questions which were 
previously unasked push the interviewee to gain new insights into his or her own 
experience (Hiller & DiLuzio, 2004). 
The interviews prompted a general recollection of the policy formulation and 
required the interviewees to construct ‘their story’, rather than answering a set 
of fixed questions. This process was punctuated by deliberate prompts to 
advance and refine the narratives and insights offered by the interviewees. This 
method allowed interviewees to reflect on matters they hadn’t previously 
considered; some of them noted appreciatively that participating in the research 
offered them a chance to reflect on the way they were processing information and 
making decisions, and upon this reflection said they may choose to do things 
differently in the future (this is consistent with Hiller & DiLuzio, 2004). 
Interview prompts included how the issue got onto the agenda in the first place, 
what was included in the information-gathering and alternative assessment 
stages and sought thoughts on interaction with policies from other countries as 
well as interaction among actors during the policy process. Interviewees were not 
directly prompted to discuss issue attributes, but they emerged from the text and 
context.  
Interviewees often had a vivid recollection of events and offered their reflections 
on the processes, including critical hindsight on themselves and their respective 
institutions. Israeli straight-talking, Sabra25 cultural values of openness and 
frankness (Katriel, 1986; Almog, 2000), and an established rapport with the 
                                               
25 A social-cultural term used to describe an archetype of native-born Israelis (Almog, 2000). 
author make it probable that the views expressed were indeed candid. The 
author’s prior knowledge of, and involvement in, the policy processes reduced the 
risk of exaggeration, but also posed a risk of confirmation bias (the partial 
seeking or interpretation of evidence to support preconceived beliefs or 
hypotheses) (Nickerson, 1998). In order to mitigate this risk, several actions 
have been taken, including acknowledging potential bias prior to conducting the 
research and phrasing questions in an open ended rather than in a leading way 
and suggesting alternative interpretations to the data wherever possible. 
In order to complement the interviews, 206 media articles from five Israeli daily 
newspapers were analysed. Articles covered the policy processes from 
commencement until right after the law or plan was passed. The publications 
were identified by scanning online archives for key words, and were scanned for 
quotes by policy officials and other key actors in the policymaking processes. 
Despite this effort, the quotes did not yield any meaningful insights that added 
to the interviews, and were therefore excluded from the analysis. 
Finally, parliamentary protocols dealing with the three issues were also 
reviewed. There are considerable differences between the protocols for the 
different issues, as debates took place in different stages in the policy process: 
the Knesset mainly debated packaging waste (n=8) and air pollution (n=23) after 
legislation proposals had been tabled. Air pollution legislation was debated for 
nearly three years, which explains the high number of debates. The Knesset’s 
climate change-related debates (n=5) were broad and thematic; practical 
deliberations on policy measures were conducted by the inter-ministerial 
committee which did not keep protocols. While the supplementary data for the 
three issues is not perfectly consistent, quotes from parliamentary debates 
provide complementary, albeit not systematic, information to that obtained from 
interviews. 
Interviews were transcribed in full and coded by the author using thematic 
analysis, a narrative analysis approach in which a narrative typology is 
organised by themes based on occurrences in the data text. Illustrations are 
provided by case studies or vignettes. This approach is useful for comparative 
analysis among a number of cases which display common thematic elements 
(Riessman, 1993). An inductive-deductive approach (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 
2008) was applied, which allows engagement with existing frameworks while 
identifying themes not originally anticipated: a basic coding framework was 
devised based on an initial literature review, with additional codes added based 
on narratives identified in the data.  
The coding framework consisted of (1) issue attributes (as perceived by the 
interviewees) and (2) diffusion mechanisms, including broader reference to 
diffusion mechanisms, and policy-related interactions with other countries. 
Identification of these elements and narratives was based on key phrases in 
context, and a ‘thematic map’ was created for every case study in each interview, 
mapping the instances from both groups that were expressed or referred to.  It 
was not always possible to extract direct quotes for the analysis, as the narrative 
was built along the discursive path, and the author exercised her judgement on 
whether a certain narrative was more dominant - for example, because it was 
elaborated on more at length, or because specific language was used (e.g. ‘this 
was the most important thing’). However, the number of times a word or a 
phrase was repeated, did not serve as sole evidence, due to differences in the 
conversation style of different respondents. Concise examples for theme 
instances are detailed in Table 9. Annex I includes a more detailed list of 
instances.  
Table 9: Coding framework with examples 
Themes coded Examples 
Attributes 
Salience  ‘core issue’ (OA10) 
 ‘super important’ (OA6)  
 ‘defined as a strategic goal’ (PO2) 
 ‘the government didn’t really care’ (PO20) 
 ‘something no one really cared about’ (PO8) 
Complexity  ‘government officials didn’t really understand the 
issue’  
 ‘It’s pretty simple: there’s waste, you need to get it 
out of the way’ (OA7) 
Fragility  ‘It was a common experience, and very good, very 
strong one…it is beneficial and serves to soften the 
conflict. NGOs aren’t always invited (on government 
delegations), and this time we were’ (OA13) 
 ‘NGOs also understood…all the actors dealing with it 
were ripe and ready for a more rational discussion’ 
(PO4) 
Opportunity  ‘When there were electricity shortages, we said – ah, 
that goes hand in hand with climate, so let’s ride 
that wave’ (PO20) 
 ‘There are great benefits from dealing with this, net 
profit to the market’ (OA1) 
Threat  ‘There was a crisis of electricity demand shortages’ 
(PO20) 
Local  ‘It is a local and not a global problem’ (OA7) 
International  ‘an international atmosphere’ (PO20) 
 ‘a large, sweeping international process’ (OA8) 
Diffusion mechanisms 
Learning & 
Seeking successful 
policies 
 ‘We read a lot…we saw a variety of systems and 
models, we saw it with our own eyes; (in Europe) we 
saw the difficulties they were struggling with’ 
(OA12) 
 We employed students to do research and had a team 
of legal experts analyse their findings (OA9). 
Emulation & 
Seeking 
appropriate 
policies 
 ‘Israel should be a part of the world, not some third 
world country’ (OA2),  
 ‘We should act like one of the industrialised 
countries’ 
 ‘It was fashionable’ 
 
 
In compiling the results from the interviews for a given case study, both the 
quantity and the quality of the emerging narratives were considered: first, the 
number of interviewees who, based on the thematic maps drawn up for each of 
them, identified certain attributes or the lack thereof, provided evidence for a 
certain diffusion mechanism, or for its absence; second, any qualitative evidence 
which sheds further light on the case – particular emphasis by the candidate, 
repetition, etc. Cases of internal inconsistency (in the same interview) or of 
external contradiction (between interviews) were noted, and are elaborated in 
detail section 4.4 below. 
A critical element in content analysis is replicability of the coding frame, 
represented by inter-coder reliability. This is done by having another researcher 
recode a sample of the data to measure the ‘extent to which the different judges 
tend to assign the same rating to each object’ (Krippendorff, 2004). In this paper, 
two methods were applied: first, the author coded a sample of the interviews 
twice, two years apart. The compatibility of the coding was 96%, differences 
attributable mainly to coding a long sentence as one instance in one round, and 
as two instances in the second round or vice versa. Second, a sample of the data 
was re-coded by a colleague who was not exposed to the first coding. The second 
researcher coded 6 of 34 interviews (17 per cent) and 52 of 206 media articles (25 
per cent), as well as 7 protocols (20 per cent). The sample size was determined 
based on common practice, which ranges from 10 to 22 per cent (see for example 
Bae, Anderson, Silver, & Macinko, 2014; Heikkila et al., 2014; Maggetti & 
Gilardi, 2015). The coding frames were generally consistent between coders, and 
inter-coder reliability was approximately 80 per cent. The second coder’s limited 
knowledge in the field led to a different classification of some instances, or to 
neglecting to code some instances altogether, not having fully understood their 
context.  The author revisited all cases of conflicting or incomplete coding and 
settled these differences after consultation with the second coder.     
4.4 Case studies 
4.4.1 Israel as an environmental policy adopter  
Almost unaffected by the wave of environmental policy in the 1970s and 1980s, 
Israel remained an environmental laggard, establishing its Ministry of 
Environmental Protection only in 1988. Israel doesn’t have an independent 
Green Party (Pedahzur & Yishai, 2001),26 and environment is absent from most 
political parties’ platforms. The low prioritisation of the environment on the 
Israeli agenda can be explained by cultural factors as well as by the dominance 
of security and related concerns (Vogel, 1998). But public opinion shifted 
somewhat in the 1990s, facilitated by an increase in civil society presence and 
actions (Mekelberg, 2012) leading to several policy changes. 
All interviewees agreed that the point of departure for formulating new 
environmental policies in Israel is international policy. They explain and justify 
this by Israel’s limited experience in environmental policymaking. Nine different 
interviewees used the expression ‘there’s no need to re-invent the wheel’ (PO6, 
PO16, PO20, OA2, OA6, OA8, OA10, OA11) and PO20 summarised: ‘We look 
outwards all the time. We don’t necessarily adopt it all, but wherever it makes 
sense, we do…while we have twenty or thirty years of experience, other 
countries have forty or fifty, so we always have to screen what is already out 
there’. PO14 added that ‘if it’s good for them (other countries), it must be good for 
us…they have experience, they’re ahead of us, they know, and they’re doing it. 
They’re big, they’re strong, they have money. Let’s check what they are doing 
and copy it’. Others explained this outward look by citing limited resources such 
as budget, human resources and political capital: ‘We are too small to invent 
regulation…it is more logical, convenient and cheap to take policy which is 
formulated elsewhere as a basis and adopt it to our needs’ (PO17). Looking for 
external solutions as a default starting point became so engrained in the 
policymaking culture (OA2) that presenting policy suggestions as ‘policies from 
                                               
26 The green faction partnered up with the ‘Zionist Camp’ party, and its first member entered 
the Knesset in December 2015 following the resignation of an elected MP. 
elsewhere’ helped promote them (PO20, OA1, OA2, PO2, PO7, PO11, PO13, 
PO19), whereas deviating from them often required persistence and struggle 
(PO1, OA2). Several interviewees also recalled that there was a government 
decision or policy to approximate Israeli laws to those of the EU (PO2, PO3, 
PO15, PO16, PO19); however, this could not be corroborated by the author 
despite significant efforts. 
PO18 noted that promoting existing international environmental practices was 
her way of expressing Israel’s normality and global engagement in contexts 
outside of the Palestinian conflict. Interviewees from the MEP said that they 
generally look to the EU as a first source; they referred to EU countries as 
environmental leaders and mentioned geographic and cultural similarities, 
including regulatory history. Often, this would be contrasted with the US, seen 
as being very different, whose environmental approach is therefore unsuitable 
for Israel. However, the convenience of turning to the EU was also mentioned: 
while both US and EU materials are accessible and written in English (the most 
common second language in Israel), geographical/political/cultural ties with 
Europe mean there are stronger existing working connections. Civil society 
organisations, including the prominent NGO Adam Teva V’Din (ATD), had 
initially adopted a more American approach, including litigation as an important 
front for advancing environmental issues; in part, this can be attributed to the 
fact that the founding members of the Israeli environmental movement were 
mainly Americans or people who had studied and lived in the US. But senior 
leaders of the environmental movement who were interviewed for this research 
noted that in recent years, there has been a shift in civil society’s focus away 
from the US, and it is no longer regarded as a default point of reference. 
In 2010, Israel joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). During the accession process, it had to meet a set of 
requirements (OECD, 2007), about a third of which were related to the 
environment. The accession was perceived as having many economic and 
reputational benefits for Israel, shifting away from being considered a third 
world country. An interviewee who had been heavily involved in the accession 
process noted that part of the motivation was acceptance: ‘We’re never wanted in 
any neighbourhood, and finally there’s a posh neighbourhood that wants us. The 
details of the commitments didn’t matter’ (OA3). The MEP saw the accession 
process as an opportunity to promote their agenda, and achieving the OECD 
accession requirements by adopting existing policies from OECD members: ‘If we 
want to be in the OECD, let’s do it like the OECD does it’ (OA5). The OECD was 
consistently referred to by interviewees as one bloc, overlooking the diversity of 
approaches to environmental legislation represented within the OECD countries.  
Embarking on a policy formulation process by scanning the environment for 
existing solutions is not a unique practice (see examples in D. M. Glick, 2014; D. 
M. Glick & Friedland, 2014), but in the case of Israeli environmental policies, 
looking outwards became both the default and the dominant path. 
 
4.4.2 Packaging waste 
The Packaging Waste Treatment Law (‘the packaging law’) introducing an 
extended ‘polluter pays’ principle into Israeli law, was passed in the Knesset in 
January 2011. The law imposes direct responsibility on Israeli manufacturers 
and importers to collect and recycle the packaging waste of their products; it also 
sets recycling targets and a zero landfill target for 2020. It obligates local 
authorities to make arrangements for the separation, collection and disposal of 
packaging waste. The law complements other waste policies including a landfill 
levy, a tire recycling law, and a law imposing a deposit on beverage containers 
(MEP, 2016). Efforts to promote a packaging law commenced in the late 1990s, 
‘following the spirit of existing packaging waste laws in the world’ (Avnimelech, 
1999, p. 142), but also taking negative lessons into account: 
Countries like Israel should learn from other nations’ mistakes, and try 
to avoid repeating them. This is particularly true in regard to the hasty 
imposition of command and control rules and regulations (e.g. the 
packaging ordinance in Germany) prohibiting landfilling, which have 
proved to be economically inefficient.  
(Ayalon, Avnimelech, & Shechter, 1999, p. 11) 
In 2008, ATD drafted a private members’ packaging bill, which did not pass. In 
fact, no real progress was made on packaging waste until 2009, when it was 
elevated to a key priority for the MEP in conjunction with the arrival of a new 
and determined minister. A willing and cooperative coalition between the MEP, 
the Manufacturers Association of Israel and ATD translated into rapid joint 
efforts to pass legislation (despite the fact that multiple interviewees claimed to 
have initiated the law). Facilitated by joint learning delegations to Europe, 
interviewees representing all actors commented on the generally broad 
agreement on principles and ways forward. An expert report was commissioned 
by the MEP and a delegation led by the Director General of the MEP (a waste 
expert himself), representatives of industry, local authorities and experts from 
environmental NGOs visited Holland, Belgium and Germany in order to learn 
about their waste treatment policies. Within a few months, the proposed 
legislation was brought to the Knesset, and the law itself was passed in January 
2011. 
 
4.4.2.1 Issue attributes - packaging waste 
Waste was recognised as ‘one of Israel's most pressing environmental problems’ 
(Vogel, 1998, p. 253) and was referred to by interviewees as a ‘foundation of MEP 
policy’ (OA13), a ‘strategic objective’ (PO11) and as a ‘core issue; daily existential 
issue’ (OA11). As OA9 noted: 
Waste was not on the agenda of the ministry; it was the agenda of the 
ministry. It’s like it was not the Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
but rather the Ministry of Waste and Recycling: in terms of budgets, 
human resources and media focus. 
(OA9, vocal emphasis by interviewee). 
Waste was also visible on the political agenda, internally as well as externally: 
‘Any member of the Knesset that wanted an environmental agenda wanted to 
suggest creative solutions for packaging waste’ (OA5). In the MEP’s brief note to 
the OECD environment policy committee, as part of Israel’s accession process, 
waste policy is the first issue to be addressed in detail, mentioning that 
packaging waste legislation was in the process of being drafted (Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, 2008). 
Packaging waste is a relatively non-complex issue. Without minimising the 
complication of multiple actors (households, local authorities, waste contractors, 
recycling and landfilling facilities, packaging producers, retailers), the issue was 
nevertheless manageable within a single department in the MEP, requiring 
relatively little technical expertise beyond generalist skills. Complexity of 
packaging waste management was not raised in interviews except to say that it 
was a ‘concrete issue with clear boundaries’ (PO11). The low complexity also 
implied less inter-ministerial coordination, increasing the political feasibility of 
passing legislation. OA7 commented on the relative low complexity of waste: 
It’s pretty simple. There’s waste, you need to get it out of the way. It’s 
simple especially in comparison to an issue like climate change. 
Everyone knows what it means to separate waste. To get the policy right 
is just a matter of plugging in the right numbers. It’s not like assessing 
the greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved by increased 
efficiency of an industrial chiller. I mean, most people don’t even know 
what a chiller is or what it looks like, but everyone has a garbage can. 
There is little evidence with regards to the opportunity/threat perception of the 
issue: only one interviewee used language referring to the issue as an explicit 
threat: ‘We were to be faced with mountains of waste if we didn’t do anything’ 
(OA9). It was noted by some (PO4, PO10, OA7, OA9) that the packaging law was 
an opportunity for the minister to demonstrate legislative action; as noted by 
PO6: ‘The minister explicitly said when he assumed the role that he wants to 
focus on issues where MEP has the sole authority, that’s where the influence will 
be most significant. And that was waste’. 
Overall the policymaking process was characterised by low fragility and enjoyed 
an overall sense of agreement and cooperation. A sense of ‘openness and 
connection’ between the industry and the MEP (PO10) was facilitated by a joint 
educational trip to Europe, which created ‘a very good, very strong, common 
experience’ (OA13). PO4 notes: ‘Not only did we (the MEP, industry and NGOs) 
talk to each other, we also went abroad together, saw everything with our own 
eyes together, asked the questions together’. OA6 said that after the trip to 
Europe, ‘everyone, including everyone: the greens, the minister, the industry, 
agreed that the Belgian model was the best model for us’. 
There were several references to the local nature of waste, and the relevance of 
local features to good policymaking (PO20, A04, OA9). Interviewees made no 
references to international status, positioning or commitments. Nevertheless, the 
introductory notes to the bill, which included several references to the European 
packaging directive (mentioned in six of fifteen paragraphs), included that 
‘joining the group of countries that deal with packaging waste will help position 
Israeli exports as more environmental for the international public and 
authorities’ (Knesset, 2010). This subject was not brought up by interviewees, 
nor was it mentioned in any of the relevant parliamentary protocols. 
To summarise, packaging waste was a salient, non-complex issue, which did not 
manifest clear evidence of being either an opportunity or a threat, save a 
political opportunity to demonstrate legislative action. Low fragility among the 
actors was observed, and the issue was perceived as entirely local. 
 
4.4.2.2 Evidence of policy diffusion – packaging waste 
The fact that the resulting packaging law was modelled after the European 
Packaging Waste Directive27 and the Belgian model was explicit in 
parliamentary debates, introductory notes to the legislation, in professional 
conferences (Manufacturers Association of Israel, 2010), and recognised by all 
interviewees. In terms of the policy process, there is evidence of a rapid 
environmental scan seeking and assessing alternatives based on the need to 
design a successful policy. These elements, as described below, correspond with 
learning-based emulation. 
                                               
27 European Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (94/62/EC). 
Interviewees noted that the packaging law emerged as part of a methodological 
evolution of Israeli waste policy, which had been in place since the 1990s; 
facilitated by a supportive and enthusiastic minister, it became an idea whose 
time had finally come (OA7, OA13, PO10, PO11, PO20). In this regard, the MEP 
director general’s long-time expertise in the area of waste was also mentioned 
(PO10, PO20). 
The policymaking process included a review of several alternatives, with the 
European policy serving as a departure point. Interviewees explained this, as 
well as the influence of the Belgian model, by citing geographical and cultural 
similarities (PO4, PO20, OA13, OA6, OA7, PO15, PO19): ‘The EU is the closest 
to us. The US or Australia or Japan are just irrelevant to us, with their vast land 
and endless landfill options’ (OA7); ‘Belgium is close to us in terms of population 
size and distribution’ (PO19). One interviewee said that he also researched 
countries with reduced organisational, managerial, and financial capacities, to 
see their achievements, in order to get a full picture (OA13). A policy report 
commissioned by the MEP included a literature review examining international 
policy solutions on packaging (including those of Japan, South Korea, the US, 
and Europe); however, only the European models were examined in detail 
(Ayalon et al., 2010). This, along with sending a delegation to evaluate existing 
models, is consistent with an approach of learning from ‘front-runners’, while 
restricting the quest to tried and tested solutions. 
Interviewees described a rational process of assessing strengths and weaknesses, 
saying they were engaged in ‘a very deep learning process’, and mentioning 
extensive reading of research and policy papers, as well as initiating follow-up 
conversations with authors. Several said they came back from the European trip 
with mixed impressions which allowed them to make choices based not only on 
what works, but also what doesn’t (PO4, PO11, PO20, PO15, OA6, OA11). 
Summarised by OA12: 
We can’t just take legislation from Europe, throw it on the table and say – 
it’s all or nothing. That doesn’t work. You need to adjust, to adapt. We 
read a lot. We all read a lot. We were informed by the NGOs, by think 
tanks. We looked at everything. We compared all the models. We saw a 
variety of systems and models, we saw it with our own eyes; (in Europe) 
we saw the difficulties they were struggling with…we weren’t only 
impressed by the numbers we were presented with. We asked a lot of 
questions. We were very critical. We analysed all the models one by one, 
the Dutch model and the German model too. 
The learning process was characterised by some shortcuts and heuristics. 
Several interviewees acknowledged that the EU was chosen because material 
was readily available in English (OA13, PO11, PO15; this is also mentioned in a 
general context by PO14, OA4, OA8). There was also political pressure to pass 
legislation quickly, so not all the options were evaluated; as PO10 reflected: ‘Why 
didn’t we consider Korea, which is very advanced in waste management? I don’t 
have a wise answer to that, maybe partially because it was a very rushed 
process’. PO4 reported that a combination of drivers led to the consideration of 
the Belgian model: 
Industry promoted the Belgian model from the start; they were in touch 
with the Belgians, read their papers, but it also made sense because of 
the characteristics of the Belgian market – in terms of size, and waste 
quantities, and population distribution, and even in terms of their way of 
thinking…they’re not as pedantic as the Germans...it worked better for 
us’.  
(PO4) 
There is some evidence suggesting emulation-based effects on the process, as 
illustrated by several examples. OA7 said ‘I wouldn’t consider looking at policies 
from African countries; we want to look like a developed country’. When debating 
the recycling target for glass bottles, OA12 recalls a senior policymaker insisting 
on retaining the European recycling rate: ‘If we’re doing it like Europe let’s do it 
like Europe – I don’t care how much beer they drink’.28 A very senior policy 
official summarised, albeit with a smile, that the choice of which countries to 
visit for learning purposes was based on ‘where the best chocolate was’ (PO16). 
To summarise, the evidence points to a process of learning, rationally-bounded 
and rapid, with a drive to create a good, successful policy by adapting existing 
                                               
28 Beer consumption in Europe is five to ten times higher than in Israel, affecting the number 
of recyclable glass bottles.  
models to the local reality. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest the issue was 
driven by emulative forces. 
 
4.4.3 Air pollution 
Until 2008, Israel did not have legislation to deal with air pollution. High levels 
of pollution were attributed to fossil fuel-intensive energy and industry, rapidly 
growing population concentrated in a small area combined with Israel’s 
geographic and climatic circumstances (for example, heavy dust pollution which 
serves as a carrier for other pollutants). Add to that the fact that industry had no 
binding obligations to limit or reduce pollution, ambient air standards (aligned to 
World Health Organisation recommendations) were breached daily, leading to 
increased pollution-related mortality and illness (Traubman, 2002; Ministry of 
Environmental Protection et al., 2003). In 1998, the MEP and the 
Manufacturers’ Association of Israel (MAI) signed a voluntary covenant 
controlling industrial emissions, adopting German and EU industrial emissions 
standards; however, the covenant failed to achieve any improvement in air 
quality (Kerret & Tal, 2005; Parag, 2006, 2008). ATD sought to advance 
comprehensive air pollution legislation; initial draft legislation was tabled as a 
private member’s bill in May 2005, and after three years of deliberations, the 
Clean Air Act was passed in the Knesset in 2008.29  
 
4.4.3.1 Issue attributes – air pollution 
The salience of air pollution during this time was on the rise, both for civil 
society organisations and for the MEP. The proposed legislation was supported 
by 48 (of 120) members of the Knesset, indicating the wide concern for the issue. 
In parliamentary committee meetings dealing with the proposed legislation, air 
pollution was referred to as: ‘essential’, ‘important to Israeli society’, and 
‘desired’. The Ministry of Transportation stated that the burdens resulting from 
the Clean Air Act will outweigh its benefits, but nevertheless that dealing with 
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 The Clean Air Act does not cover greenhouse gases, and the discourse on clean air did not include any 
reference to climate change, allowing a clear distinction between the two issues. 
air pollution was ‘vital’ (Knesset Internal and Environmental Affairs Committee, 
2005a, 2007). The classification of air pollution as salient is consistent with the 
literature (Eshbaugh‐Soha, 2006). 
Air pollution bears technical complexity as well as institutional complexity, and 
is recognised in the literature as highly complex (e.g. Künzli et al., 2000; 
Nadadur et al., 2007; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009). It entails identifying, isolating, 
measuring and controlling numerous sources of pollution, as well as assessing 
the costs of action and inaction, in completely a-generic processes, industries, 
and environments, with numerous internal and external variables with various 
levels of certainty and predictability. Over 20 detailed parliamentary debates 
took place over three years, with the participation of over 250 different people 
affiliated with over 70 organisations: 10 ministries, government agencies, NGOs, 
industry, and trade associations. The majority of the debates were highly 
technical, both scientifically and legally. Without exception, air pollution was 
perceived by those involved as a highly complex issue, as one interviewee 
summarised: ‘There was nothing generic about dealing with air pollution. No two 
industrial plants are the same; no two processes are the same. Everything has to 
be tailored. It’s as complex as it gets; complex and very important’ (OA9). 
Air pollution was perceived as an imminent threat to the health and wellbeing of 
citizens: ‘critical to human lives’; ‘a matter of health, of life and death’ (Knesset 
Internal and Environmental Affairs Committee, 2005a, 2007). Although threat-
related language was sparse in the interviews, various policymakers and NGO 
officials were cited in media articles and parliamentary protocols using strong 
and consistent references to the threat posed by air pollution. This could be the 
result of legislation already having been put in place by the time of the 
interviews, reducing the sense of perceived threat. Interviewees noted that 
politicians identified the issue of air pollution as a political opportunity: ‘It was 
clear that this bill can provide you with lot of political credit; it was an important 
matter that needed its own law, and not a generic reference in the public 
nuisance law’ (OA9); ‘There was a strong public opinion. Politicians realised they 
can use that’ (PO15). Prior to the proposing/drafting/debating/passing of the 
legislation, members of the Knesset increasingly raised the issue and criticised 
the existing covenant as insufficient (e.g. Hirschzon, 2004; Ness, 2004). 
 
4.4.3.2 Evidence of policy diffusion – air pollution 
Originally, the proposed legislation was inspired and influenced by the US Clean 
Air Act; this outward gaze was influenced by American-oriented civil society 
leaders, as well as Israel’s laggard position. One interviewee recalls: ‘The 
director of ATD, who was an American lawyer, once came back from the States 
with a thick blue book, and told me in his thick American accent: “This is the US 
Clean Air Act. Go for it”’ (OA9). Introductory notes to the proposed legislation 
declare it is based on ‘deep learning of similar arrangements from other 
countries, notably the US Clean Air Act, European directives and German 
regulation, adapted to the existing legal state, and the governmental and public 
institutions in Israel’ (Knesset, 2005). There is ample evidence that the 
development of the Israeli Clean Air Act was far from copy-pasting the American 
law, despite its initial branding. Although there were ‘fingerprints of collecting 
ideas from different places’ (PO15), there were also processes of learning, 
adapting, and coming up with new ideas; one interviewee described the 
formulation of the law: 
We took a bit of everything. Some nice ideas from the American law, some 
nice ideas from the European directives, from the German TA Luft…we 
collected examples of many air pollution laws from all over the world. We 
employed students to do research and had a team of legal experts analyse 
their findings. We had inter-disciplinary round tables – scientists, legal 
experts, economists, and policy experts, and that’s how we got to the 
proposed legislation. It didn’t take one day.  
(OA9) 
Parliamentary debates contained limited references to foreign models; although 
the first debate was concerned with an introduction to the American Clean Air 
Act (Knesset Internal and Environmental Affairs Committee, 2005b), 
subsequent debates only included anecdotal references to American and 
European policies. This contrasts with the parliamentary discourse on climate 
change, which included numerous mentions of ‘the developed world’ (Nachmany, 
2016b). During the debates there was explicit discussion on whether the law 
should refer to foreign legislation or not – for example, using the IPCC directive 
as a terms of reference. Proponents of direct reference, notably representatives of 
the industry and transportation sectors, noted that adopting existing regulations 
would contribute to competitiveness by increasing certainty and standardisation 
for the industry; for that matter, they claimed, it does not matter which model is 
chosen: 
We wanted to have legislation like any other developed country. We don’t 
care which one, as long as it’s developed. Let’s go there and take whatever 
they have and adopt it as is. Not just cherry pick like we’re used to. 
Europe is more convenient. It’s closer, it’s more approachable. It’s easier 
to be in touch with the Europeans than the Americans…that was a large 
part of the motivation to go there.  
(OA5) 
Opponents highlighted that foreign legislation may be formulated according to 
considerations that are alien to the sovereign interests of Israel. In this regard, 
one of the legislators noted: 
Although I agree that there’s no need to invent the wheel, especially 
where other countries have accumulated knowledge, I have witnessed 
more than once that international criteria have been subject to various 
extensive lobbying; do not think that anything that is imported from 
other countries is pure and is the bible; you’ll be very wrong.  
(Knesset Internal and Environmental Affairs Committee, 2008).30 
All the interviewees involved in the drafting of the law (both civil servants and 
employees) justified their policy choices as being the right fit for local 
circumstances: ‘I never said “this is how it was done in the world”. I didn’t take a 
fixed model from one place, but said that here we should do so and so, for 
essential reasons’ (OA2). Several interviewees commented that adopting existing 
legislation seemed to be met with greater receptivity: ‘It is easier for me to 
explain and justify and defend something which is anchored in European 
                                               
30 The final legal text achieved a compromise by requiring that secondary regulation (setting 
emissions standards, ambient air standards etc.) take into account, among others, similar 
arrangements in developed countries, including the EU – see Clean Air for Israel Act, 
Articles 6, 19, 32, 35, and 29. 
regulation than something which is unique to us’ (PO5). Nevertheless, 
policymakers asserted that they insisted on essential considerations, illustrated 
by the example of the MEP’s ‘green taxation’ of imported vehicles which was 
based on the emissions of six pollutants, deviating from the EU model which 
only considered CO2 emissions: 
I thought that the European method is wrong…they will end up 
suffering health costs of particulate matter from diesel engines, and I 
insisted on doing it differently. There was shouting, and resentment. 
They (the ministry) said ‘it can’t be that the entire world says one thing 
and you say another’. But I shouted back, and they ended up accepting 
it. 
(PO4) 
To summarise, clean air was perceived as a salient, complex issue, and branded 
as a threat. While air pollution was local, there were international consequences 
to the chosen regulatory approach. Evidence shows that the policymaking 
process was predominantly one of learning and re-invention, and less of 
emulation. Competitive forces played a role with regard to the industry’s 
position. Although competition-based diffusion was not explored in detail by 
Nachmany (2016a), it belongs to the same ‘problem-dependent’ group of 
mechanisms, together with learning. From a motivational point of view, the 
competitive dynamic of the air pollution issue is therefore closer to learning than 
to emulation.    
 
4.4.4 Climate change  
Until 2009, Israeli engagement with climate change mitigation had been very 
mild. Ahead of the Conference of the Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen in 2009, a 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction bill was tabled in the Knesset,31 but was 
abandoned after an initial reading. At the COP15, Israeli president Shimon 
Peres declared that by 2020, Israel would reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 
20 per cent compared to a business-as-usual scenario. The declaration was not 
based on a concrete action plan, and there was ambiguity regarding how the 
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specific figure was arrived at (PO20, OA1, OA8, OA9, OA12): ‘We joked that he 
would say 30 and then later everyone could say that they heard 13’ (OA12). 
Following the Peres declaration, the government passed a resolution to 
formulate a national greenhouse gas mitigation plan consistent with Peres’s 
declared target.32 The director general of the Ministry of Finance was appointed 
head of an inter-ministerial committee (‘The Shani Committee’), which consisted 
of three sub-committees: energy efficiency, transportation, and green building. 
The sub-committee for energy production never assembled due to a deep political 
divide between the MEP and Ministry of National Infrastructures (MNI); 
consequently, renewable energy and coal-powered plants were not addressed in 
the national plan. The National Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Plan (‘the mitigation 
plan’) was approved by the government in late 2010,33,34 and included a variety of 
policy measures regarding energy efficiency (mainly relying on a plan previously 
developed by MNI), green building and transportation. Some of the specific 
policy measures were based on similar practices elsewhere, for example: 
regulation for minimum efficiency for appliances, schemes to replace inefficient 
refrigerators for low income families, and various measures to increase fuel 
efficiency were modelled after similar policies in Europe and the US. For a more 
detailed discussion on Israeli climate change policy, see Nachmany (2016b).35 
4.4.4.1 Issue attributes – climate change  
Until 2009, climate change had virtually no place on the policymaking agenda. 
Within the MEP, climate change was dealt with by one or two people in the air 
quality department, and climate activities were generally not budgeted for – 
even funds streamed through the Shani Committee. Interviewees across the 
board noted the low salience of the issue and, consequently, policymakers’ low 
motivation to address it: ‘nobody really cared’ (PO5); ‘global warming was never 
                                               
32 Government resolution 1504, 14 March 2010, 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2010/Pages/des1504.aspx  
33 Government resolution 2508, 28 November 2010, 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2010/Pages/des2508.aspx  
34 The budget for the plan was frozen in a 2012 round of budget cuts. Funding was not 
restored until late 2015, when the mitigation plan was replaced with a new plan for energy 
efficiency and emissions reduction.   
35
 Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
an issue’ (OA1); ‘the government was not bothered with climate change’ (PO20); 
‘it was not really important for the (MOF) budget department’ (PO13); ‘I never 
identified climate change to be of any significance according to my worldview’ 
(PO18); ‘marginal effect’ (OA8); ‘Even if it didn’t cost (politicians) anything, in 
terms of conflict with rich people or budget, even then nobody cared…there was 
ignorance, borderline dismissal’ (PO22). 
Several interviewees (PO1, PO7, PO13, OA7, OA9) explicitly acknowledged the 
complexity of climate change as an issue. PO1 noted that ‘many people in the 
different ministries just don’t understand climate change. It’s not their 
profession’, and other policy officials admitted that it was indeed beyond their 
expertise (PO6, PO13). Climate change is widely recognised as the most 
complicated problem humanity has ever dealt with; so complex, in fact, that a 
new classification was invented to describe it alone; Super Wicked Problems 
(Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld, 2007; Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld, 
2012). It encompasses almost every aspect of human activity, interfacing with 
numerous functions regulated by the state. Even when disaggregating climate 
change to a number of simpler issues, for example reducing emissions from a 
specific sector such as transportation or energy production, each of these 
requires specialised knowledge and expertise. Sectors are also often co-
dependent. 
There was no clear fragility regarding climate change per se, perhaps due to the 
low salience of the issue. Parliamentary debates, most of which preceded the 
Shani Committee, were fairly uniform in their generalist approach that 
‘something must be done’. However, there was a deep conflict between the MEP 
and the MNI, the two key ministries involved. This led to energy production 
being omitted from the Shani Committee altogether, slashing its potential for 
emissions– and pollution reduction (PO3, PO7, PO13, OA7) while also affecting 
the work of the energy efficiency sub-committee. Additionally, politically volatile 
planning aspects of transportation were not discussed by the sub-committee 
(PO1, PO2, PO7), and the green building sub-committee was so divided over 
appropriate policy measures that they resorted to merely recommending several 
pilot projects (PO6, PO7, OA9). 
Climate change in Israel was not perceived as a threat. This could be attributed 
to the low salience of the issue, to the negligible contribution of Israel to global 
emissions, and to other threats, mainly security, which dominate the threat 
discourse in Israel. Only one interviewee said that Israel treated climate change 
as an existential threat, and was ‘behaving hysterically like all the other 
countries’ (OA6). 
Most of the interviewees said they saw climate change as an opportunity to 
promote local causes, or sub-issues, which were perceived as very salient. PO20 
said ‘the crisis was not climate, but a shortage in energy supply. Since climate 
goes hand in hand with that, riding that wave was the right thing to do’. Other 
sub-issues included energy efficiency (PO1, PO7, PO17, OA1, OA5, OA7, OA8, 
OA9), air pollution (PO1, PO6, PO7, PO17, OA7, OA9), energy independence 
(PO1, PO7), leading clean-tech solutions (PO7, OA2, OA5), and finally, as an 
opportunity to adopt financially profitable policies (PO6, PO7, PO14, PO17, OA1, 
OA5, OA7, OA9, OA12). The latter consideration was meticulously reflected by 
the mitigation plan, which included only net-profitable measures (Ministry of 
Finance, 2011). OA10 noted that ‘the minister understood more than all his 
predecessors…that climate change was a way to leverage other environmental 
issues’. 
It is important to note that the sub-issues addressed by the Shani Committee 
were perceived as independent issues with different attributes. For example, air 
pollution and energy efficiency were regarded as ‘serious’ (PO9) and ‘important’ 
(PO20). Green building and transportation did not receive any mentions 
regarding their importance and, accordingly, only 10 per cent of the budget for 
implementation in 2011-2012 was allocated to them. 
Climate change was a distinctly international issue. Nachmany (2016b) finds 
that nearly half the instances where the importance of climate change was 
mentioned in parliamentary protocols and media articles were in an 
international context. Interviewees mentioned ‘an international atmosphere’ 
(PO20), ‘a large, sweeping international process’ (OA8), ‘a global problem’ (OA7), 
‘a vibe around Copenhagen’ (PO6) and more. As will be evident from Section ‎0 
below, this was a defining factor in the policymaking process. 
At the same time, the sub-issues had a clear local focus, which was explicitly 
preferred to the global cause (PO9, PO13, OA1, OA12): ‘We rode the 
international wave to deal with a domestic problem. We don’t contribute 
anything to climate change, even if we go crazy, but it helps lead important 
domestic agendas’ (PO20). PO9 added: 
Our goal was to deal with local environmental issues… the by-
product would be climate policy, understanding that Israel has negligible 
global emissions and at the same time has serious problems of air 
pollution and inefficient energy use, and is a few steps behind the 
world in the policy tools it employs, so this would be a good time to close 
this gap, and if we get some positive climate impact, that would be a 
fantastic bonus. 
(Emphasis by the author) 
 
4.4.4.2 Evidence of policy diffusion – climate change  
Ample evidence from the interviews and supplementary documents suggests 
that on the whole, the decision to formulate a mitigation action plan was an 
emulation-driven diffusion process. Engaging with the climate change agenda 
resulted mainly from a drive to align with the developed world. Interviewees 
said it was ‘fashionable’ (OA1), ‘sexy’ (PO3), that Israel should be ‘a part of the 
world, not some third world country’ (OA2), ‘act like one of the industrialised 
countries’ (PO1) and that it couldn’t ‘be a lone wolf, with everyone going in one 
direction and you in another’ (PO1). Several interviewees mentioned the 
contribution of climate action to Israel’s international status (OA10), including 
the diversion of attention from the Palestinian issue (OA12). Some of the 
interviewees explained that climate action was done in order not to lose face: 
‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cared that we wouldn’t look bad, and the MOF 
didn’t want us to look like the last of the third world countries, especially on the 
verge of entering the OECD’ (PO13). PO22 said: ‘Only potential embarrassment 
ahead of an international forum generated some action…anything they did was 
to look okay, but they never cared about the topic’. OA9 asserted that the climate 
action plan was an act of public relations: ‘We need to do this because Peres said, 
because otherwise we’ll look stupid to the rest of the world’. OA7 summarised the 
approach to climate change, derived from its global characteristic: 
This was a global problem, and the solution had to resonate with global 
policies. There was no point in inventing the wheel. We set out to find a 
solution to copy. Unlike waste, which is a very domestic issue, with very 
local-specific characteristics – for climate change there was no point in 
developing any localised solutions. 
(OA7) 
There is limited evidence that learning took place. A report on potential 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions was commissioned by the MEP, and 
completed in early 2009. Ahead of the COP15, the MEP commissioned two more 
similar reports: one from a local think tank and the other from the international 
consultancy McKinsey, which was chosen, according to numerous interviewees, 
because of its recognised international brand rather than any advantage over 
locally produced reports (PO5, PO6, PO19, OA7, OA9). PO6 quipped that it 
allowed us to say ‘we both have McKinsey curves; you’ll show me yours, I’ll show 
you mine; it was a matter of prestige’. 
Overall, the formulation of the mitigation plan was only loosely informed by a 
learning process. The reports only specified the mitigation potential of different 
policy categories, rather than assessing specific policy measures. Mitigation 
strategies in other countries were not studied as a whole, and there was no 
outlet for discussion of climate mainstreaming or inter-dependencies among the 
different sub-committees. There were no visits to other countries or consultations 
with international peers. OA8 recalls: 
It was a pretty eclectic process, and there was no clear decision-making 
process. People would show up, present different things, and then there 
would be offline meetings with experts and consultants, where we would 
process items from committee meetings, and then it would go as a draft 
document to the steering committee where things would be decided 
independently both of the sub-committee meetings and of the expert 
meetings. 
(OA8) 
Each sub-committee was tasked with formulating net-profitable measures in its 
mandated area, supported by a small expert team which provided a short 
literature review of international policy measures. As in other issues, the default 
reference was policies already in place elsewhere (PO3, PO6, PO13, PO17); 
however, in the restrictive time frame provided, researchers sought to bring 
solutions that would respond to local challenges (PO3, PO6, PO13, PO17, PO20, 
OA9). Energy efficiency policy measures were de facto an adoption of a detailed 
plan formulated by the MNI (PO3, PO13, OA7). The green building team 
examined numerous international models, but rejected them all, claiming that 
the differences between countries meant that emulation of existing models was 
not justified. Members of the sub-committee agreed that the high degree of 
uncertainty of the outcomes required local pilot projects which were not based on 
existing models (PO6, PO7, PO13, OA9). 
A senior policymaker commented on the limited ability to assess international 
policy measures: ‘They would say “this was a great success in Germany”. They 
didn’t tell me that it failed in 10 other places or that other countries have 
considered it and decided against it’. (PO13). Other policymakers also 
commented on their limited ability to make informed decisions due to lack of 
expertise (PO1, PO6). 
Overall, the main exhibited drivers of engaging with the climate agenda are 
considerations of appropriateness and legitimacy, suggesting that an emulation-
based diffusion took place, with strong evidence that this was symbolic ‘label 
diffusion’. Policy formulation related to sub-issues of the mitigation plan 
exhibited elements of diffusion, selectively driven by bounded-learning. 
4.5 Discussion 
The case studies provide evidence on the level of salience, complexity and 
fragility of the issues, their local or international orientation, and their 
perception as opportunities or threats. The main mechanism of diffusion is also 
identified in each case.  
Table 10 and  
Figure 2 summarise the key findings. 
 
Table 10: Summary of issue attributes and diffusion mechanisms  
Perceived attributes Packaging 
waste 
Air pollution Climate 
change 
Salience High High Low (high for 
some sub-issues) 
Complexity Low High High 
Fragility  Low High High  
Opportunity/threat Political 
opportunity 
Threat (Threat for some 
sub-issues) 
International/local  Local Local International 
Main diffusion 
mechanism 
Learning Learning  Emulation 
 
Figure 2: Issue attributes and diffusion mechanisms for the case studies
 
  
Source: the author 
 
Note the partial but not insignificant overlap between air pollution and sub-
issues of climate change. These sub-issues are discussed in the context of climate 
change, rather than as independent case studies, as they are not 
methodologically difficult to deconstruct from broader contexts, which included 
other parallel policy processes such as the green taxation for vehicles scheme. 
Driven by Israel’s laggard position, environmental policymaking in all three 
cases was prone to processes of policy diffusion, albeit by varying mechanisms. 
However, deciphering these processes is complicated by each policy issue having 
different attributes, generating a ‘pull’ in different motivational directions. For 
some attributes, this discussion sheds light not only on the correlation between 
attributes and diffusion mechanisms, but also on the causal pathways that 
explain these correlations. For other attributes, this causal connection has 
proven more elusive. 
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It was hypothesised that high salience, high complexity, high fragility, and 
perception as an opportunity, will increase the propensity for learning, stemming 
from the motivation to formulate ‘successful policies’ (rather than ‘appropriate 
policies’). Learning was identified as the main diffusion mechanism for 
packaging waste and air pollution. There is evidence that waste was perceived as 
highly salient and as an opportunity for electoral gain. Air pollution was 
perceived as highly salient, highly complex, and highly fragile. On the other 
hand, climate change was perceived as highly complex, highly fragile and, to a 
limited extent, as an opportunity, and demonstrated very limited evidence of 
learning-based diffusion. 
The salience of an issue appears to be a key explanatory factor for understanding 
the learning-based mechanism. Motivated by the electoral considerations and, to 
an extent, by ideological considerations (which, in turn, contribute to the 
perception of salience), policymakers are more prone to take a course that will 
lead them to a successful policy. For both waste and air pollution, decision 
making was informed by years of research into policy alternatives; policymakers 
made efforts to understand these alternatives in detail, employed critical 
thinking, and resisted the notion that they were merely copying an existing 
model. Policymakers talked about how important the subjects were, and how 
important it was to get them right. Climate change, on the other hand, had very 
low perceived salience for policymakers, did not elicit these motivations, and did 
not, in fact, demonstrate evidence of learning-based diffusion. 
There is evidence to support the hypothesis that the high complexity of an issue 
will increase the propensity for learning. The analytic framework anticipated 
that complex issues would be dealt with by specialists – as opposed to generalists 
– who would be less affected by considerations of appropriateness which are 
external to their focused field of expertise. Air pollution, for example, was highly 
complex and was indeed dealt with by numerous experts over the years, 
exhibiting very limited evidence of emulation-driven diffusion, but rather 
adaptive learning-based diffusion. While climate change, another highly complex 
issue, was overall characterised by emulation-based diffusion, the adoption of 
measures for specific sub-issues corresponds with the hypothesis. Sub-issues 
such as energy efficiency and green building were highly complex and 
demonstrated evidence of (albeit bounded) learning, including the rejection of 
measures due to differences between the source country and Israel. 
High fragility was suggested to increases the propensity for learning. In the case 
of air pollution, a divide between industry and environmentalists engendered a 
long process of evaluating alternatives which were brought to the table by the 
various parties. In contrast to air pollution, in which fragility contributed to a 
learning process, the fragility of the climate change issue led to stagnation and 
inaction; so deep was the political divide between government agencies regarding 
energy production that the sub-committee refused to convene. The essential 
difference between air pollution and climate change may be traced to the 
difference in salience between the two issues: air pollution was a problem that 
needed a successful solution, so the different actors engaged in a process that 
brought their diverse inputs to the table. Climate change, on the other hand, was 
not perceived as a salient issue, reducing the motivation for finding a solution 
and resulting in inaction – the least resource-intensive option. Energy, a highly 
salient sub-topic, was simply removed from the climate change framework and 
dealt with under other domains. 
There is mixed evidence regarding the opportunity hypothesis, suggesting that 
issues perceived as opportunities are more prone to a learning process. There is 
evidence that the packaging waste law was identified as an opportunity, and 
that a learning-based process took place. However, it does not follow the basic 
logic of the hypothesis that opportunities (positive, net gain, controllable 
situations) will be dealt with by lower levels of the organisation, and on a 
smaller scale, allowing more space for a considered, expert-led response. Climate 
change was also identified, to an extent, as a political opportunity to advance 
other agendas, and there is very limited evidence regarding learning. In 
addition, packaging waste differed from climate change on the salience attribute, 
which may be a more significant attribute than opportunity. The literature on 
opportunity and threat generally refers to a threshold of strategic importance; in 
other words, if an issue (e.g. climate change) is not perceived as strategic, 
perceived opportunity will have little or no significance for predicting the 
diffusion mechanism. 
It was hypothesised that the following attributes increase the propensity for 
emulation: perception of a strategic issue as a threat, and perception of the issue 
as international rather than local. Climate change has both of those attributes. 
Air pollution has evidence of perception as a threat, but is generally local. 
Packaging waste did not exhibit either of those attributes. 
It is hypothesised that when issues are labelled as threats, they will be more 
prone to undergo emulation. This is because the issue is more likely to be dealt 
with at higher levels of the organisation, suggesting that broader considerations 
are at work. Additionally, presenting a solution will be a priority, whether the 
essential content lives up to the label or not. The evidence supporting this 
hypothesis is limited and inconsistent. Once again, the hypothesis relies on the 
issue being perceived as strategic, ruling out this hypothesis for climate change. 
On the other hand, from an international perspective, climate change was 
perceived as both highly salient and as a threat. It is possible that the 
combination of these two attributes can explain the emulation-based process. 
Nevertheless, air pollution, both salient and perceived as a threat (perhaps 
explaining the wide support in the Knesset for the initial Clean Air bill), did not 
exhibit evidence of emulation. Altogether, there is limited empirical evidence 
regarding perception of threat in these three case studies. 
The hypotheses also suggests that an issue will be more prone to emulation if it 
is perceived to be internationally oriented. This is supported by the case of 
climate change, which was perceived as such, while not bearing any local 
significance per se. The rhetoric on engaging with climate change revolved 
predominantly around Israel’s status as a developed country; devising a national 
mitigation plan appears to have been a quest for an appropriate solution to fit 
with Israel’s perception, by itself and others. (Nachmany, 2016b). Limited but 
supportive evidence is also provided in the case of air pollution, which industry 
regarded as having some international implications in terms of facilitating 
export through harmonisation of environmental standards. This is consistent 
with the industry’s preference to adopt comprehensive arrangements, rather than 
what they called ‘cherry picking’, as the context and appropriateness of the policy 
were more relevant. 
In contrast, waste policy was a completely localised issue, not bound to any 
international agreements or norms, and without implications for international 
issues such as trade. Therefore, there was no need for appropriateness. This 
rationale was summarised by PO2: ‘In general, we wanted to be like the 
enlightened countries. But if it was a local issue then plain mimicking doesn’t 
make much sense’ (PO2). 
4.6 Conclusions  
As the policy diffusion literature matures, and most of the ‘what’ questions 
addressed, it turns more and more to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions, especially 
with regard to the operation of different variants or mechanisms of diffusion. 
Scholars’ engagement with conditionality of policy diffusion is related more to 
the rate of diffusion, and less to the specific conditions favouring specific 
diffusion mechanisms. In an effort to address a gap in the literature, and 
building on Gray’s (1973) early question ‘does the issue matter’, an exploratory 
framework was put forth by Nachmany (2016a): it suggests that certain 
perceived issue attributes prompt different motivations for policymakers, which 
in turn affect the propensity for certain diffusion mechanisms to occur. 
Specifically, it seeks to distinguish between issue attributes that motivate 
policymakers to seek successful policies, and those that influence them to seek 
appropriate policies. 
This paper takes Nachmany’s framework a step further, providing an empirical 
contribution from three case studies which vary in their attributes and diffusion 
mechanisms. The evidence presented in the paper lends support to the general 
model: not only does it sketch a correlation between issue attributes and 
diffusion mechanisms, but it also supports the notion that motivations serve as a 
link between the two. Thus, through a body of first-hand accounts, a causal 
chain is established: from policymakers’ perceptions of different issues, through 
their motivations to scan their environment and respond to prompts, to actions 
expressed in the policymaking process. 
Furthermore, the paper lends support to some of the specific hypotheses on 
attributes. One of the main challenges of this model is the multivariate nature of 
the problem: there are inevitably interaction effects between the variables, and 
while some attributes demonstrate consistent behaviour with the hypotheses, 
others do not. There is evidence to suggest that high salience, high complexity, 
and an international orientation have the potential to affect the diffusion 
mechanism in operation. There is mixed evidence regarding fragility, which may 
be traced back to differences in salience. Finally, there is not enough evidence 
regarding the hypotheses on threat and opportunity. Perceived salience seems to 
have the strongest explanatory power, as it is appears to play a role in 
interactions with other attributes as well. 
The case studies discussed allow a relatively controlled examination of the 
explanatory power of attributes: the issues discussed are all defined within the 
larger issue area of ‘environmental policies’, all occurred around the same time 
frame under the main influence of a single ministry, and often involved the same 
people. These unique circumstances resist competing explanations for differences 
in diffusion mechanisms, for example, personal differences. Future cautious 
explorations of the interactions between issues with similar perceived attributes, 
but differences in other variables, could deepen the understanding of 
interactions between different explanatory frameworks. 
Although it is widely accepted that scholars would benefit from more in-depth 
accounts of the ‘black box’ of policymaking, micro-analysis has been largely 
absent from policy diffusion research. Attributable partly to difficulties in 
obtaining data, and partly to research approaches, this has limited the ability to 
expand the research agenda. This is because, conceptually speaking, it is people, 
not states, who have motivations and incentives, and who take action. It is 
people who seek and absorb information, and evaluate alternatives. It is people 
who make decisions in the hope that they will be re-elected, or make decisions 
that plainly make sense to them. When asking ‘why’ questions, it is only logical 
to go back to the micro level as a core unit of analysis. Another reasons for 
engaging with the micro level is that, methodologically speaking, perceptions 
and motivations are very difficult to assess without first-hand accounts. The 
difficulty of obtaining access to policymakers has meant that most research is 
based on proxy measures and assumptions. This paper benefitted from a unique 
dataset of 34 interviews with people closely involved in environmental 
policymaking processes. The non-mediated account of their experiences, 
perceptions, and motivations allowed an exploration of the research question in 
depth, thus contributing to filling the two gaps described above, and offering 
highly valuable insights. 
A question arises about the generalisability of this research, given the unique 
geopolitical circumstances of Israel. While there are some considerations which 
are unique, such as a heightened need for legitimacy, the subject area of this 
research is environmental. Most of the interviewees have been environmental 
policy experts most of their careers, and had relatively little to do with broader 
agendas such as security or the Palestinian issue, in which Israel may be an 
outlier. This mitigates the concern regarding Israel. At the same time, a large 
proportion of the diffusion policy scholarship is concerned with federal settings 
(notably the USA, whose unique circumstances are perhaps no more 
generalisable to other countries). Adding non-American, non-federal case studies 
to the literature is another contribution of this paper. 
The three cases were studied in the context of one another, and not in 
comparison with wider issue areas (such as health, education, or security). 
Operating in a relatively narrow field of environmental policies, one might ask if 
these results are generalisable to other issue areas. While the conceptual model 
is applicable, some attributes might be more fully expressed in other issues. For 
example, while the concept of threat and opportunity was not found to be 
significant in the perception of environmental issues, it may play a role in other 
issues such as education or migration. While more evidence is needed, there is 
also merit contributing to the understanding of environmental policies and 
policymaking – an area which is likely to receive significant attention in the 
coming years. 
While this paper is only an initial, small sample exploratory research with 
certain important limitations as noted above, it nevertheless suggests that issue 
attributes are indeed a promising research direction. In order to reinforce the 
model’s explanatory capabilities, more rigorous empirical evidence is needed – on 
different issues, different geographies, and different diffusion mechanisms (such 
as competition). 
Understanding the dynamics of policymaking and policy diffusion has the 
potential to yield highly valuable insights; for example, it may reveal whether 
some issues are more likely to attract genuine attempts at achieving good, 
successful policies, while others get diverted by other considerations, leading to 
convergence around a limited set of policies that are considered appropriate. 
Faced with great uncertainty regarding the outcome of policies, especially for 
highly complicated problems such as climate change, focusing on good policy 
processes may be the way forward. 
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Annex – Illustrative quotes for coding frame  
Issue attributes 
 Air Pollution Waste Climate Change  
Salience Air pollution was a hot, important 
topic. There was a strong public 
opinion around it. Politicians 
realised they can use that. (PO15) 
(Air pollution) was an important 
matter; one that needed its own law 
and not a generic reference in the 
Public Nuisance Law. (OA9) 
The minister realised what an 
important topic it was. (PO3) 
There is nothing generic about 
dealing with air pollution. No two 
industrial plants are the same; no 
two processes are the same. 
Everything has to be tailored. It’s as 
complex as it gets. Complex and 
very important. (OA7)  
 
Waste was not on the agenda of the 
ministry. It was THE agenda of the 
Ministry. It was not the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, it was 
‘the Ministry of Waste and 
Recycling’ – in terms of budgets, 
human resources, and media focus. 
(OA7) 
It is one of the more important 
topics because it is one of the most 
relevant to citizens. Between us, 
who cares about climate change? 
What can I do? But waste? Waste I 
can separate. (PO20) 
The minister made waste a key 
issue in his policy, out of the 
perception that it’s an area where he 
has most of the power – as opposed 
to other things, which may be more 
important but in which he doesn’t 
have the authority. (PO1) 
Any member of the Knesset that 
wanted an environmental agenda 
Maybe two people in the ministry 
thought this was of any importance. 
No budget was allocated to dealing 
with climate change, except for 
funds which were streamed through 
the Shani Committee, and that’s 
where it stopped. I don’t think it’s 
important either. Only for PR 
purposes. And that’s what drove the 
entire mitigation plan – there was a 
hysteria caused by ‘we need to do 
this because Peres said, because 
otherwise we’ll look stupid to the 
rest of the world’. (OA7) 
Slowly we entered into climate 
change and explained that climate 
was relevant to local air pollution. 
We rode the international wave to 
deal with a domestic problem. We 
don’t contribute anything to climate 
change, even if we go crazy, but it 
helps lead important domestic 
agendas. (PO20) 
Ahead of Copenhagen we wanted to 
 Air Pollution Waste Climate Change  
wanted to suggest creative solutions 
for packaging waste. (OA5) 
The pressure on decision-makers is 
much larger and on many levels 
when it comes to waste. Local 
authorities have recently been busy 
with calculating their GHG 
emissions etc. etc., but it’s clear to 
everybody that this is for PR, and if 
not PR then it’s some general policy 
measure…waste, on the other hand, 
is our core problem. That is what is 
pressing local authorities. Climate 
change is much less pressing, on the 
local and national levels. (OA10) 
 
We could have researched and 
constructed a suitable law. That 
would not have taken three or four 
months like this law did, it would 
have taken three or four years – and 
in the meantime, the environment 
would have been screwed. (OA3) 
pass a few bills in the Knesset. I met 
with the head of the opposition. She 
said she doesn’t care, she doesn’t 
care at all. Even if it doesn’t cost 
anything – conflict with rich people, 
budget – even then nobody cares. 
Only potential embarrassment 
ahead of an international forum 
generated some action. There is 
ignorance, borderline dismissal. 
Anything they did was to look ok, 
they didn’t care about the topic. 
(PO22) 
Engaging in any activity around it 
was ‘cover your ass’. Playing along 
to do the bare minimum. Can’t 
afford to go to an international 
conference without a paper. (PO21) 
Once the gas was discovered, all 
renewables were taken off the table. 
The Ministry of Finance said: ‘Israel 
doesn’t care about international 
issues if they don’t have anything to 
do with Palestinians, security etc.’ 
There is no real connection to 
international community. Maybe to 
some financial arrangements. 
(PO22) 
 Air Pollution Waste Climate Change  
I personally think Israel is making a 
giant mistake by disengaging from 
the international 
community…climate change is a 
very important and relevant issue to 
Israel – we’re highly vulnerable. 
Dramatic, important, big, it’s 
happening now. And nobody cares. 
It’s appalling. (PO22) 
  
Complexity There is nothing generic about 
dealing with air pollution. No two 
industrial plants are the same; no 
two processes are the same. 
Everything has to be tailored. It’s as 
complex as it gets. Complex and 
very important. (OA7)  
Air pollution became a more and 
more complex problem as industry 
has become more sophisticated and 
dominant, and as life itself became 
more complex. (PO15) 
 
This [issue] is a pretty simple one, 
especially in comparison to climate 
change. Everyone knows what it 
means to separate waste. To get a 
policy right is just a matter of 
plugging in the right numbers. It’s 
not like assessing the greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions achieved 
by increased efficiency of an 
industrial chiller. I mean, most 
people don’t even know what a 
chiller is or what it looks like, but 
everyone has a garbage can. (OA7) 
 
Many people in the different 
ministries just don’t understand 
climate change. It’s not their 
profession. If someone comes and 
tells you with confidence that this is 
what needs to be done, you do it. 
(PO4) 
 
Threat/oppo
rtunity 
It was clear that this bill can 
provide you with a lot of political 
credit. (OA9) 
 
 
We were to be faced with mountains 
of waste if we didn’t do anything. 
(OA7) 
Climate change was an opportunity; 
pre-Copenhagen, Israel was even 
hoping to see some money flowing 
from investors. (OA7) 
A crisis in my perception was not 
the climate, but a shortage in energy 
 Air Pollution Waste Climate Change  
supply, and since climate goes hand 
in hand with that, it was the right 
thing to ride that wave. (PO20) 
For years we tried talking about 
climate change and heard ‘let’s deal 
with our own problems first’...and 
finally we changed the discourse. We 
said sorry, this has nothing to do 
with melting ice caps and polar 
bears. This is about money. (PO20) 
The minister understood, more than 
all his predecessors, what 
environment is and how you can 
leverage it, especially the economic 
benefits of it. He internalised the 
OECD concept of green growth, and 
of climate change as a way to 
leverage other environmental issues. 
(OA10) 
We wouldn’t have been able to 
promote the climate agenda without 
clarifying to the government and to 
the public that there are numerous 
benefits – energy savings, energy 
independence, financial savings, 
more competitiveness. (PO10) 
 
Fragility NGOs also understood…all the ‘It was a common experience, and [relevant references were off the 
 Air Pollution Waste Climate Change  
actors dealing with it were ripe and 
ready for a more rational discussion’ 
(PO4) 
very good, very strong one…it is 
beneficial and serves to soften the 
conflict. NGOs aren’t always invited 
(on government delegations), and 
this time we were’ (OA13) 
 
record] 
Local/Intern
ational 
 Household waste is local and not a 
global problem (PO20) 
This was a global problem, and the 
solution had to resonate with global 
policies. (OA7) 
 
 
Diffusion mechanisms 
 Air Pollution Waste Climate Change  
Learning-
based 
evidence 
I never said ‘this is how it was done in the 
world’ or ‘you adopted the Dutch model but 
the Belgian model is actually better’. I didn’t 
take a fixed model from one place, but said 
that here we should do so and so, for essential 
[intrinsic] reasons. (OA2) 
We took a bit of everything. We took some nice 
ideas from the American law, some nice ideas 
from the European directives, from the 
German TA Luft…we collected examples of 
many air pollution laws from all over the 
world. We employed students to do research; 
and then had a team of legal experts analyse 
their findings. We had inter-disciplinary 
round tables – scientists, legal experts, 
economists, and policy experts, and that’s how 
we got to the proposed legislation. It didn’t 
take one day. (OA9) 
The Clean Air Act is a classic example where 
you can see fingerprints of collecting ideas 
from different places. (PO15) 
Nothing will be adopted in Israel unless it is 
fully adapted to the local needs and 
circumstances; we as NGOs worked very hard 
to make those adaptations, to offer the system 
what is right for the system – to challenge it, 
to advance it, but to be the right thing. (OA1) 
We performed a very deep learning 
process. (PO20) 
We can’t just take legislation from 
Europe, throw it on the table and 
say: all or nothing. That doesn’t 
work. You need to adjust, to adapt. 
We read a lot. We all read a lot. We 
were informed by the NGOs, by 
think tanks. We looked at 
everything. We compared all the 
models. We saw a variety of 
systems and models and we saw it 
with our own eyes and we saw (in 
Europe) the difficulties they are 
struggling with…we weren’t only 
impressed by the numbers. We 
asked a lot of questions. We were 
very critical. We analysed all the 
models one by one; the Dutch 
model and the German model too. 
(OA12) 
I usually refer to substantial 
research and policy papers, look up 
the author and email them with 
questions. (PO1). 
Coming back from the educational 
visits, policymakers came back 
 
We didn’t take the fine details as is; we made 
changes to reflect the local circumstances, 
including the institutional setting. (OA9) 
 
with doubts, and questions. They 
weren’t convinced so easily. (OA10) 
You never adopt without knowing 
what you’re taking. Sometimes you 
came back from these trips with a 
positive impact and sometimes 
with a negative impact. You 
usually go to conferences and talk 
and talk and talk. We never said 
we’re going for the Belgian model. 
There were a few models and we 
wanted to know which one worked 
best. There were a couple of 
crossroads where we had to make 
choices, compromises. (PO7)  
I make a point of analysing less 
successful countries as well, with 
reduced organisational and 
managerial and financial 
capacities, and to see what are the 
achievements there. (PO1). 
Industry promoted the Belgian 
model from the start; they were in 
touch with the Belgians, read their 
papers, but it also made sense 
because of the characteristics of 
the Belgian market – in terms of 
size, and waste quantities, and 
population, and even in terms of 
their way of thinking…they’re not 
as pedantic as the Germans...it 
worked more for us. (PO12) 
 
Emulatio
n-based 
evidence 
The director of ATD, who was an American 
lawyer, once came back from the States with a 
thick blue book, and told me in his thick 
American accent: ‘This is the US Clean Air 
Act. Go for it’. (OA9) 
 
The ministry cherry picked things that were 
convenient; some things from Germany, some 
things from Holland, some things from 
Belgium, or Canada or New South Wales. 
(OA5) 
When asked to justify what you do, 
and you say ‘guys, it works in a 
range of countries, in all the 
European countries. There’s no 
reason why it shouldn’t work here’. 
If I could stick to existing 
legislation, why not? (PO20). 
When we started working there 
was already something in the air 
about the way the Belgian model 
was purposefully presented as the 
‘successful Belgian model’; it was 
no doubt in the air, or deliberately 
put on the table by the industry. 
(PO2) 
This was a global problem, and the 
solution had to resonate with global 
policies. There was no point in 
inventing the wheel. We set out to 
find a solution to copy. Unlike waste, 
which is a very domestic issue, with 
very local-specific characteristics – for 
climate change there was no point in 
developing any localised solutions. 
(OA7) 
(Policymakers) understood that 
although Israel is not a central player 
in climate change because of its low 
overall emissions, it could still 
upgrade its international status by 
doing the right thing. (OA10) 
 
 
 Chapter 5: ‘A very human business’ – 
trans-governmental networking 
initiatives and domestic climate action 
 
  
Abstract 
The past two decades have witnessed a proliferation of networking 
initiatives, in both the private and public spheres, aimed at addressing 
climate change. Previous work has suggested that these initiatives largely 
achieve their governance functions through learning and the provision of 
resources. Our particular contribution in the present paper is to advance 
the current understanding of networking initiatives by suggesting that 
they may also perform emotional roles which are important in motivating 
domestic action on climate change. In order to illustrate our argument, we 
examine GLOBE International, an inter-parliamentary institution 
focused on supporting the development of domestic legislation in the area 
of sustainable development. Based on interviews with 26 legislators, we 
provide evidence that GLOBE functions as a network for learning – 
particularly political learning. Yet of equal, if not greater, significance is 
that involvement in the networking initiative has fostered a sense of 
common purpose, feelings of unity, inspiration, and an ‘esprit de corps’ 
amongst participants. In doing so, it has given rise to emotional energy, 
which has helped to motivate and sustain climate action by legislators. 
5.1 Introduction 
The past two decades have witnessed a ‘Cambrian explosion’ (Robert O. Keohane 
& Victor, 2011) of public and private initiatives in the transnational realm to 
address climate change. These initiatives have taken on a number of different 
forms, mandates, and regulatory functions (Hoffmann, 2011; Castán Broto & 
Bulkeley, 2013). Yet a feature of many of them is elements of networking. That 
is, they seek to connect spatially disparate actors, typically with the express aim 
of sharing information and ‘best practice’. Examples of such initiatives with a 
networking function include the C40 cities, the Climate Group, and, the focus of 
the present paper, GLOBE International. 
A frequently made assumption is that these networking initiatives – which can 
be understood as a type of ‘governance network’ (Blanco, Lowndes, & Pratchett, 
2011) – accelerate climate action amongst participants through two possible 
mechanisms. The first is learning. Through their involvement in networking 
initiatives, actors can learn about and draw practical lessons about policies 
already deployed in other contexts, using this knowledge to develop policies of 
their own (Hoffmann, 2011; Legrand, 2012; Stone, 2013; Busch, 2015). A second 
mechanism is resource acquisition. Networks provide additional resources, such 
as legitimacy, finance, and political leverage, which better enables participants 
to pursue climate action (Raustiala, 2002; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004). 
While we do not dispute these roles, we nevertheless argue that this view of 
networking initiatives is too narrow. In particular, conventional accounts largely 
omit more social and emotional roles performed by networks. Most importantly, 
and largely ignored in the literature, we posit that networking initiatives may 
help to generate solidarity and an ‘esprit de corps’ (Blumer, 1939). They may also 
be a source of ‘inspiration’ for participants (Thrash, Moldovan, Oleynick, & 
Maruskin, 2014). In doing so, network encounters potentially galvanise actors 
and give rise to emotional energy and motivation which are instrumental in 
sustaining commitment and subsequent climate action amongst participants. 
In order to illustrate our argument, we examine the dynamics of GLOBE 
International – an inter-parliamentary institution (IPI) focused on promoting 
sustainable development. More specifically, we focus on GLOBE’s climate 
change-related initiatives, which have sought to ‘provide a forum for legislators 
to share experiences in developing, passing and overseeing the implementation 
of climate change legislation and to support legislators as they move forward’ 
(GLOBE International, 2015). Our concern is with the constituent mechanisms 
through which GLOBE has catalysed domestic climate action, with a particular 
focus on the networking aspects of the initiative. Empirically, we focus on the 
experiences of participants in the network (i.e. legislators in national 
parliaments) in the run-up to, during, and following major summits. 
Our paper makes a number of important contributions. First, we advance the 
current understanding of how networking initiatives in the transnational sphere 
bring about changes in participants’ knowledge, beliefs, feelings, and practices. 
The academic literature has made significant progress in describing the 
emerging architecture of the climate governance system(s), highlighting the 
growing role of transnational and transgovernmental networks (Abbott, 2012; 
Kütting & Cerny, 2015). Yet, much less well-understood are the mechanisms 
through which these boundary-spanning organisations achieve (or otherwise) 
their governance functions. Through an analysis of GLOBE, we are able to 
provide more refined insights into how networking organizations influence, 
empower and inspire the actions of their participants. Our study also responds to 
calls for more work which documents how informal coordination and formal 
cooperation at the international level contributes to domestic climate-related 
policies and practices (Falkner, 2014). 
A second contribution is that we go beyond existing accounts in invoking a role 
for emotions. Inspiration for doing so comes from a growing body of work within 
disciplines ranging from sociology, political science, geography, through to 
international relations, which has identified a role for emotions in shaping 
human behaviour. Among other things, this literature has shown how 
participation in collective endeavours may forge a common identity amongst 
participants, as well as giving rise to heightened enthusiasm and commitment 
for particular causes (Hercus, 1999; Jasper, 2011; Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014). It 
has also drawn attention to the role played by inspiration in motivating 
individuals to bring certain ideas or visions into being (Thrash et al., 2014). We 
draw from, and build on, these insights to explain how the relational context of 
transgovernmental networks – and particularly those which involve episodes of 
corporeal co-presence – may stimulate emotions, feelings, and aspirations which 
facilitate subsequent animate climate action. In doing so, we offer a 
complementary narrative to existing accounts, which have almost exclusively 
focused on learning and/or the acquisition of resources, amongst other, by 
refining the distinction between the concept of emotional energy from the 
concept of normative learning (e.g. Henry, 2009; Huitema, Cornelisse, & Ottow, 
2010; Haug, Huitema, & Wenzler, 2011), 
Third, we contribute to understanding the role of IPIs and, more broadly, trans-
governmentalism36 (Slaughter, 2002) in contemporary environmental 
governance. The (somewhat limited) literature on IPIs (e.g. Cutler, 2006; 
Legrand, 2012) has largely ignored their growing engagement with 
environmental issues. By analysing GLOBE International, we are able to begin 
to fill this gap in the current understanding. GLOBE has a long-running 
involvement in global environmental issues, has attracted parliamentarians 
from a wide range of countries, and its activities have received high-profile 
media attention. Our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first of its kind 
to investigate its activities, dynamics, and impacts. An in-depth analysis of 
GLOBE additionally allows us to provide applied lessons for the design of 
networking initiatives in the area of the environment. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a more detailed 
background of GLOBE International and its activities focused on climate change. 
Understanding the structure, membership, and activities of GLOBE is important 
because it shapes the relational context in which interactions take place. Section 
3 critically reviews past contributions to the understanding of networking 
initiatives and argues the need to take greater account of the emotional roles 
they perform. Research design and methods are described in Section 4. Section 5 
presents our empirical findings, while discussion and conclusions are presented 
in Section 6. 
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 Keohane & Nye (1974, p. 43) define transgovernmental relations as,’ sets of direct interactions 
among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the 
policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments’  
5.2 GLOBE as an inter-parliamentary network 
Much of the existing literature on the role of networking initiatives in climate 
governance has focused on so-called transnational networks (Bulkeley et al., 
2012). These networks are engaged in governance in the sense that ‘they possess 
the authority and actually undertake to steer the conduct of target actors toward 
collective goals’ (Abbott, 2012, p. 572). Yet, a distinguishing feature is that they 
include at least one non-state and/or sub-national governmental actor. Our focus 
in the present paper is on a closely-related category of network governance 
which has received far less attention in the literature, namely inter-
parliamentary institutions (IPIs). IPIs are transgovernmental organisations in 
which parliamentarians (i.e. legislators) from different states interact, 
deliberate, and co-operate ‘with a view to formulating their interests, adopting 
decisions, strategies or programs, which they implement or promote, formally 
and informally, in interactions with other actors, by various means such as 
persuasion, advocacy or institutional pressure’ (Šabič, 2008, p. 258). 
GLOBE International37 – the subject of the present paper – was founded in 1989 
by legislators from the US Congress, European Parliament, Japanese Diet, and 
the Russian State Duma ‘with the mission to respond to urgent environmental 
challenges through the development and advancement of legislation’ (GLOBE 
International, 2015). It exists outside of any inter-governmental agreement and 
is intended to function as an action-oriented international knowledge and policy 
network, focused around peer-to-peer information exchange and the provision of 
support to national parliamentarians. Underlying this model of informal 
transgovernmentalism is the assumption that legislators will gain credible and 
authoritative information which they can use domestically to inform the 
development of new legislation through conventional domestic legislative 
channels, or else by influencing agency decision-making (Slaughter, 2002). 
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 Originally ‘Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment’ 
Our focus in the present paper is on GLOBE’s climate legislation initiative – 
although the organisation also operates international initiatives on 
deforestation, fisheries, and the conservation of marine environment and natural 
capital accounting. GLOBE’s involvement in climate dates back to 2005 when 
Tony Blair, then UK Prime Minister and President of the G8, asked the 
organisation to create a legislators’ forum consisting of parliamentarians from 
major parties of the G8, European Parliament, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and 
South Africa. In 2008, GLOBE entered a second phase with a consensus 
agreement between 100 senior legislators on a framework agreement on climate 
change at the G8+5 legislators’ dialogue on climate change in Tokyo. The 
framework agreement expanded GLOBE’s activity to G20 countries and 
established international policy commissions – including an International 
Commission on Climate & Energy Security, chaired by US Congressman Ed 
Markey. In October 2009, GLOBE hosted its Copenhagen forum in the Danish 
Parliament, ahead of the COP in Copenhagen, during which over 100 legislators 
from 16 countries adopted, by consensus, a set of legislative principles on climate 
change drafted by Ed Markey together with Chinese Congressman Wang 
Guantao. 
GLOBE operates through cross-partisan national chapters, which include at 
least 10 active parliamentarians in office – some of the larger chapters have over 
50 members. Chapters exist in over 40 legislatures across all continents, in some 
of which GLOBE has had dedicated staff (Japan, Mexico, India, Nigeria, EU, 
UK). There are focal points in approximately 40 other legislatures worldwide, 
and legislators are invited to participate in activities and events regardless of 
whether there is a formal GLOBE chapter in their country or not. National 
chapter members convene in varying frequencies, from bi-weekly to semi-
annually. GLOBE has an international board elected by the network members. 
The board is composed of the President, the Chairman of the Board and the Vice 
Presidents of Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe. 
An important feature of GLOBE’s activities has been a series of international 
summits. Important recent summits include: the first and second World Summit 
of Legislators held in Brazil in 2012 and Mexico in 2014, which were attended by 
legislators from over 70 countries, the first and second Climate Legislation 
Summits held in London in 2013 and Washington DC in 2014, and the Climate 
Adaptation Legislation and South-South Cooperation Summit held in Beijing in 
2013. Held in venues such as the US Senate and Mexican Congress, the summits 
have typically featured a combination of expert briefings and presentations by 
international organisations. Notable examples include the presidents of the 
World Bank and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Secretary General 
of the UNFCCC and of UNEP; the vice-president of the IPCC; and heads of state 
and ministers. The formal outcome of the summits is often a declaration or 
statement signed by legislators which they pledge to take back to their 
parliaments. Such documents have included the legislative principles on climate 
(Copenhagen, 2009), legislative principles on adaptation legislation (Beijing, 
2013), and a resolution on climate change (Mexico City, 2014). The summits have 
also seen the launch of the legislation studies produced by GLOBE in 
partnership with academic institutions – including climate legislation studies. 
GLOBE’s members have featured prominent and influential politicians ranging 
from Al Gore (former Vice President of the US), Shinzo Abe (Japan’s Prime 
Minister), Prakash Javadekar (India’s serving Climate Change Minister), Rafael 
Pacchiano Alamán (Mexico’s environment minister), and Bukola Saraki 
(Chairman of the National Assembly of Nigeria). However, participation in 
GLOBE has also attracted many lesser-known parliamentarians. In fact, the 
structure of the network, and especially its cross-partisan nature, means that 
some countries are represented, at times, by members of the opposition, and/or 
by people with little influence over decision-making in their respective 
parliaments. This reflects an important feature of GLOBE: membership is 
voluntary with participants being ‘invited’ by the GLOBE organisation to take 
part. In this respect, the organisation differs from some other IPIs, whose 
members are purposely chosen by national or regional parliaments as formal 
representatives (Kissling, 2011). 
The structure of GLOBE provides an opportunity for single parliamentarians to 
pursue their own interests independently of national governments – although 
they may seek to subsequently influence the domestic and foreign policies of 
these governments. Moreover, through the constituent networks, GLOBE allows 
single parliamentarians to connect, co-operate, and problem-solve directly with 
their counterparts in other countries. Importantly, participants in the GLOBE 
network are not bound by any formal obligations. Instead, the organisation relies 
on ‘softer’ governing processes such as learning, persuasion, and agenda-setting 
to achieve its goals of advancing domestic climate change legislation in its 
various countries. In this sense, GLOBE has much in common with several high-
profile transnational networking initiatives, such as the Cities for Climate 
Change Initiative (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Giest & Howlett, 2013; Hakelberg, 
2014). 
5.3 Understanding networking initiatives  
5.3.1 Conventional explanations and their 
shortcomings 
The existing literature which has sought to understand networking initiatives – 
including those focused on climate change – has largely focused on two key roles 
that they are assumed to perform: learning and the acquisition of resources. 
Learning comprises a potentially complex set of phenomena but, at its core, 
learning can be understood as a process whereby actors alter their thoughts 
and/or potential behaviours in relation to a particular issue (Sabatier, 1987). 
Actors can learn by analysing their own experience or, alternatively, by 
observing and interacting with others (Radaelli, 2008). A number of different 
typologies of learning exist (Sabatier, 1987; Bennett & Howlett, 1992; May, 1992; 
Baird, Plummer, Haug, & Huitema, 2014). One common distinction – widely 
made in the political science literature – is between policy learning and political 
learning (Nilsson, 2005; Radaelli, 2009). The former encapsulates learning about 
the means (instruments) and ends (goals) of policy38. Within the context of cross-
border learning, one of the most commonly mentioned forms of policy learning is 
‘lesson drawing’ (Rose, 1991), whereby actors purposely learn from observing the 
previous experience of others. A second broad category of learning is political, 
which is concerned with new strategies and tactics to achieve specific political 
goals. Political learning covers a number of different activities ranging from the 
substantive use of information to influencing political agendas through to the 
symbolic incorporations of concepts to increase policy-making legitimacy (May, 
1992; Radaelli, 2008).  
Scholarship on social learning in networks (e.g. Newig, Günther, & Pahl-Wostl, 
2010; Newig & Kvarda, 2012; Vinke-de Kruijf, Bressers, & Augustijn, 2014) also 
distinguishes between change of knowledge and change of norms. An important 
concept to note is that of normative learning,  which can be defined as ‘Learning 
encompassing a change in norms, values, and belief systems’ (Huitema et al., 
2010, p. 9). Normative learning (which will be distinguished from other concepts 
in section ‎5.3.2 below) is a process that is subject to social influence, amongst 
others by groups or networks, including advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993; Henry, 2009; Sabatier, Flowers, & Weible, 2011). This is 
demonstrated, for example, by the change in values by jurors after participating 
in Dutch Citizen’s Juries for water management  (Huitema et al., 2010). 
Normative learning is also related to second-order or double-loop learning 
(Argyris, 1976, 1982), which is a learning process in which there is change to the 
underlying norms (‘double loop’), unlike learning processes in which new 
information is used to bridge a mismatch to existing norms and values (’single 
loop).Previous work has demonstrated an important role for networks in 
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 Several streams of literature – including work concerned with the cross-border diffusion of innovations 
– distinguish between forms of policy learning where the aim is to improve the understanding of ‘what 
works’ and learning which is oriented towards enhancing ‘legitimacy’ (Radaelli, 2008; Gilardi, 2012). The 
latter is often referred to as ‘emulation’ and can be interpreted as a more symbolic form of policy 
learning. In the present paper, we do not make this distinction, not least because our central concern is 
not with the underlying motivations for policy learning. 
fostering cross-border learning processes. One stream of research has explored 
the activities of transnational professional networks and policy communities in 
creating ‘circuits of knowledge’ through which ideas, policies, and ensembles of 
assumed ‘best practice’ are created, legitimated, and diffused across geographic 
space (True & Mintrom, 2001; Stone, 2004; Goldman, 2007; McCann, 2008; 
Healey, 2013). For example, Paterson et al. (2013) document how networks of 
elite experts – comprising, amongst others, academics, NGOs, and international 
organisations – were instrumental in disseminating ‘common-sense’ ideas about 
the appropriateness of market-based approaches (e.g. emissions trading) as a 
solution for addressing climate change. Additional empirical support for the 
existence of learning through networks comes from various transnational 
governance initiatives in the area of climate change. Studies have provided 
evidence that transnational municipal networks (TMNs) facilitate policy 
learning through information sharing and lesson drawing (Gore, 2010; 
Hakelberg, 2014; Busch, 2015). They have also demonstrated how TMNs help to 
re-shape discursive framings of the problem of urban sustainability amongst 
participants (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004). What limited research has been 
undertaken into IPIs has also provided evidence that they facilitate information 
exchange and learning. Thus, Legrand (2012) shows how the Windsor 
Conference – an informal network comprising senior civil servants – provided a 
setting for positive and negative lesson drawing. 
A second role commonly ascribed to networking initiatives in the literature is the 
provision of resources. An underpinning assumption of this work, which has its 
roots in the notion of resource dependence in policy networks (Rhodes, 2006; 
Blanco et al., 2011), is that actors participate in networks in order to acquire 
resources that they might not otherwise be able to obtain. One of these 
resources, closely bound up with learning, is the provision of useful, credible, and 
authoritative information (Slaughter, 2002). However, the literature also 
variously discusses finance (accessing additional streams of funding), political 
resources (leveraging the support of wider coalitions of actors), and legitimacy 
(acquiring the right and acceptance to govern) (Eden, 2009; Hoffmann, 2011; 
Meckling, 2011). As an example: Betsill & Bulkeley (2004) find that the principal 
contribution of participation in the Cities for Climate Change Initiative was the 
provision of enhanced resources that helped to build local capacities to address 
climate action at the municipal level. Amongst others, these resources included 
‘political kudos’, which granted actors heightened legitimacy to realise climate– 
and energy-related goals domestically. 
We do not dispute the two roles performed by these governance networks – 
though we do note the limited amount of empirical work evaluating their 
incidence within the specific context of networking initiatives. Rather, our 
argument is that (by themselves) learning and resources provide a potentially 
unsatisfactory account of how networking initiatives achieve their governance 
functions. Networking initiatives are invariably voluntary and require time, 
commitment, and energy on the part of their members. Moreover, participants 
may lack the power, authority, and means to readily follow through on new 
knowledge, ambitions, and obligations which are hypothesised to come about 
from their involvement in networking initiatives. The result is potential 
disappointment, disillusionment, and even feelings of failure. This raises 
questions, not only about why participants engage in such initiatives in the first 
place, but also how participants sustain their commitment. An additional puzzle, 
which is not fully addressed by the existing literature, is why participants should 
necessarily engage in some of the co-operative activities they are alleged to 
within network settings – including the exchange of information. One response 
to these questions is resources. However, it remains unclear as to whether all 
participants should necessarily stand to gain resources, or whether participation 
in network governance (as opposed as policy networks (Blanco et al., 2011)), can 
always be portrayed in terms of a model reciprocal resource exchange. 
 
5.3.2 Bringing emotions into networking initiatives 
One way to begin to address these questions is by recourse to scholarship which 
is broadly concerned with emotions, collective action, and social movements. An 
important insight from this body of work is that collective ventures can forge 
solidarity amongst participants, whereby individuals identify with the collective 
unit (Hunt & Benford, 2004). The significance of solidarity not only lies in 
securing individuals’ participation, but also sustaining and reinforcing loyalty 
and commitment to the goals of a particular movement, collective enterprise, or 
organisation. Solidarity is closely aligned with the concept of ‘esprit de corps’ 
which seeks to capture ‘feelings of devotion and enthusiasm for a group that is 
shared by its members’ (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 439). The literature 
documents how esprit de corps is important in cementing a collective identity, a 
shared sense of purpose, and commitment to a common cause. 
Commitment is of particular significance because it defines whether (or not) 
individuals continue to participate and offer their time, energies, and ongoing 
support. Without sufficient commitment, individuals may decide to abandon a 
particular movement, cause, or organisation, or fail to carry out the 
requirements of its members (Hercus, 1999). Indeed, it is for this reason that 
esprit de corps has been deployed to understand how particular bureaucratic and 
judicial organisations realise (or otherwise) their goals, including in contexts 
where opposition exists (Vauchez, 2012; Juncos & Pomorska, 2014; Greenwood & 
Roederer-Rynning, 2015). 
One way of thinking about how commitment is generated, but also sustained, is 
through the concept of emotional energy (Gould, 2002). Emotional energy is a 
form of energetic arousal which creates feelings of excitement, enthusiasm, and 
vigour (Spreitzer, Lam, & Quinn, 2013). In the organisational and psychological 
literature, several phrases are used to describe to what degree people feel 
energized amongst others, energetic activation (Quinn, Spreitzer, & Lam, 2012), 
energetic arousal (Thayer, 1990), positive activation (Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & 
Tellegen, 1999), zest (Peterson, Park, Hall, & Seligman, 2009), and emotional 
energy (Collins, 1981). These concepts can be ‘experienced as feelings of vitality, 
vigor, or enthusiasm’ and manifested ‘in emotions (feelings with short durations 
targeted toward a specific object, event, or person), moods (longer-lasting, less- 
targeted feelings), or dispositions (enduring tendencies to be energetic or not)’  
(Quinn et al., 2012, p. 342).  
Collins (1993) develops a model of ‘interactional rituals’ which sheds light onto 
the relational nature of emotional energy. According to his model, social 
interaction within a group setting can generate (amongst others) positive 
feelings of enthusiasm and confidence, particularly within a context of co-
presence, a common focus of attention, and a shared set of feelings. The energetic 
arousal from interpersonal interactions may be temporary, although the 
emotional charge stored up from a series of successful ‘rituals’ can translate into 
more enduring affective commitments. Collins suggests that ongoing 
participation can be sustained by collective symbols which, in a political setting, 
could include slogans, pledges, policies, or even charismatic leaders. Symbols 
provide a common focus for interaction rituals and shared ideas around which 
collective thinking takes place. 
An important distinction to make is a between normative learning and emotional 
energy. As mentioned in section ‎5.3.1 above, normative learning encompasses ‘a 
change in norms, values, and belief systems’ (Huitema et al., 2010, p. 24). It is a 
process in which one’s beliefs about right and wrong change. Emotional energy is 
a complementary concept to normative learning, and goes beyond a change in 
beliefs and norms. It is the embodiment of the willingness or energy to act upon 
those beliefs or norms. To illustrate this, one can hold a normative position that 
reducing the use of energy is good. This normative position can be a result of 
(normative) learning. However, it does not mean one feels driven to act upon 
their norms. This drive, a desire for action, is propelled by emotional energy. If 
norms serve as one’s compass, normative learning can turn the needle, but 
emotional energy is the wind that actually blows the sails. 
Emotional energy is also not to be confused with relational learning (Huitema et 
al., 2010; Baird et al., 2014), which results in ‘improved understanding of 
mindsets of others; building of relationships; enhanced trust and cooperation’ 
(Baird et al., 2014, p. 53). The two concepts are not unrelated - emotional energy 
may be generated more easily in an environment of trust and cooperation - but 
they are not synonymous.   
A further concept which sheds additional light on how actors might be motivated 
to take a particular course of action is that of inspiration.39 Defined as ‘the 
process of being mentally stimulated to do or feel something’ (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2016), inspiration remains a comparatively under-explored concept 
in social science. However, its role is widely invoked, particularly in relation to 
understanding acts of devotion, creativity, and political activism (e.g. Marx, 
1967; Hellmanzik, 2012; Oleynick, Thrash, LeFew, Moldovan, & Kieffaber, 
2014). Thrash & Elliot (2003) suggest that inspiration arises where individuals 
become aware of new or better possibilities. Moreover, inspiration combines 
being inspired by, and inspired to, something (Thrash & Elliot, 2004). The 
former refers to the experience of being moved by the perceived value of a 
particular ‘eliciting object’, such as a role model, creative image, or idea. Being 
inspired to do something, on the other hand, describes the motivation to 
reproduce or extend the qualities of this evocative object. 
Past work provides support for several of these theoretical ideas. The empirical 
literature therefore documents how participation in collective endeavours is 
animated and sustained by feelings of solidarity, affective attachment to 
particular causes, and by positive emotional energy. Much of this has come from 
research into social movements which can be interpreted as constituting a 
particular type of network governance (Nicholls, 2009). Work has emphasised 
the emotional experiences of participants and, moreover, how emotions propel 
the creation, maintenance, and functioning of activist networks (Bosco, 2007; 
Gruszczynska, 2009). To take one example: Hercus (1999) describes how 
participation in protests, rallies, and other forms of activism provided feminist 
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 While some scholars do not classify inspiration as an emotion, Shiota, Thrash, Danvers, & Dombrowski 
(2016, p. 369) nevertheless note that ‘instances of inspiration are certainly emotion-laden’. 
activists with a recharge of emotional energy which allowed them to continue 
their activities in the face of several setbacks. 
Yet the importance of emotional energy is not restricted to social movements. 
Henn and Bathelt (2015) document how networking and face-to-face 
communications at business conferences helped to foster a sense of solidarity and 
community. Moreover, it was this camaraderie which created a context for 
interpersonal trust, in which information was freely exchanged amongst 
participants. There is also some evidence – albeit largely anecdotal – that 
international political conferences and summits are instrumental in generating a 
degree of emotional energy. For example, Mintrom (2004) briefly notes how 
various UN World Conferences on Women generated ‘excitement and energy’ 
which led to subsequent policy action. The standing ovations, tear shedding, and 
spontaneous hugs at the end of the Paris Summit (COP21) in 2015 may also 
provide a recent example for this energy. Witt (2003) 
The role of inspiration is less well-documented in the empirical literature. A 
number of authors have suggested that environmental policy adoptions in one 
country have ‘inspired’ the incorporation of similar policies elsewhere – although 
the motivational underpinnings of these alleged instances of inspiration are 
rarely unpacked (e.g. Kronsell, 2002). Betsill & Bulkeley (2004) describe how the 
Cities for Climate Protection Programme provided a ‘source of inspiration’ for 
participants seeking to advance domestic climate action. Others have 
highlighted how principles inscribed into global environmental treaties have 
inspired policies in various countries (Wapner, 2003). Witt (2003) notes the role 
that emotional affection take in shaping action when encountering policy 
problems, specifically economic policies. Furthermore, it seems that the 
resilience of policy issues in face of risks of being swept off the agenda or 
resisting reinterpretations, as well as their likelihood to experience favourable 
policy interventions, is correlated with the emotional potential these issues can 
activate (Meier & Durrer, 1992, cited in; Witt, 2003, p. 81).  
Drawing from these insights, we posit that networking initiatives – and 
especially those which involve corporeal co-presence – could well be a vehicle for 
animating and sustaining subsequent climate action by fostering solidarity, an 
esprit de corps, and emotional energy. In the context of GLOBE, the summits 
might be expected to create a bounded, relational space wherein delegates 
develop a sense of solidarity around the ‘common’ cause of climate change 
mitigation. The notion that such international gatherings constitute a form of 
staged ritual or spectacle, involving emotionally arousing displays of ambition, 
hope, and collective endeavour, has previously been recognised in the literature 
(Haas, 2002; Death, 2011; Mahony, 2013; Schüssler, Rüling, & Wittneben, 2014). 
Participants in GLOBE might be inspired by exemplars of climate leadership, 
ambitious policies, and stories of climate action. They moreover may well leave 
feeling energetically charged, with heighted enthusiasm and confidence to 
advance climate action domestically upon their return. Additionally, participants 
could sustain (or re-charge) their energy and commitment through ongoing 
interactions within networks created by GLOBE, both of the sort forged through 
attendance at the summits and those created by the GLOBE chapters. 
 
5.4 Research design and methods 
In order to investigate these dynamics (learning, resource acquisition and the 
creation of solidarity, emotional energy, and inspiration) semi-structured 
interviews were undertaken with 26 legislators, policy officials, and secretariat 
staff of the GLOBE network (see Table 1). Seven additional interviews were 
conducted with members of the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) who 
were not members of GLOBE. The rationale for including IPU members was to 
gather comparative insights into whether the dynamics of GLOBE were similar 
to other inter-parliamentary organisations. The interviews were all conducted by 
the authors in 2015, either in person or remotely via telephone or Skype, 
although two of the respondents sent in their answers to interview questions in 
writing. 
Interview questions sought to uncover the respondent’s personal motivations for 
participating in GLOBE activities, their experiences, and the perceived impact of 
the network on their knowledge, beliefs, feelings, and actions. Respondents were 
encouraged to reflect on memorable experiences and feelings during and 
following the summits. They were also asked about their involvement in other 
inter-parliamentary networks. All interviews were transcribed and coded 
thematically, with themes emerging from the text and organised and refined into 
a broad coding frame. 
A thematic map was then created, identifying for each interviewee key themes 
that they had referred to in their interview, and making qualitative notes about 
the perceived strength of these themes. These assessments relied on 
interviewees’ accounts of their experiences, using words such learning, 
information, knowledge, inspiration, and excitement. For some interviewees, it 
was possible to identify the most prominent theme(s) for them by relying on 
explicit expression (e.g. ‘the most important thing for me was…’). Yet, not all 
interviewees made such clear assertions. The analysis in the paper is based both 
on a count of interviewees who recalled motives, experiences, etc. aligned with 
the different themes, as well as on the accounts of interviewees who expressed 
that a certain theme was particularly prominent (Table 12 below summarises 
this information).  
It is important to note, that one of the key contributions of this paper was 
identifying and mapping the different roles that the network performs, rather 
than assessing the importance of these respective roles in relation to one 
another. Therefore, the qualification of the prominence of the themes serves (a) 
to ensure that comments were not taken into account beyond their original 
meaning; and (b) to lend support to the identification of new, under-explored 
roles of the network.  Finally, while the interviews alone could not measure what 
roles the network successfully performed, they point to the role(s) of the network 
as perceived by its members.  
Insights from the interviews are supplemented by results from a structured 
survey which was distributed to legislators and policy officials during a legislator 
summit organised by GLOBE in the Mexican Congress in June 2014. The survey 
was offered in 5 languages (English, Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Arabic) 
and comprised 28 mostly closed-ended questions (multiple choice or Likert-type 
scale). The questions focused mainly on the motivations, experiences, and 
impacts arising from participation. Responses were collected over the last two 
days of the three-day summit. The survey was completed by 34 legislators and 7 
policy officials from 27 countries. 
  
Table 11 - Interviewees and survey respondents 
 Number of 
interviews 
(countries 
represented) 
Number of 
people who 
responded to 
survey 
(countries 
represented) 
GLOBE staff 4 (n/a) - 
Legislators from GLOBE network 20 (16) 34 (24) 
Policy officials from GLOBE 
network (e.g. legal counsels) 
2 (2) 7 (7) 
Legislators from other inter-
parliamentary networks who are 
not members of GLOBE 
6 (6) - 
Policy officials from other inter-
parliamentary networks who are 
not members of GLOBE 
1 (1) - 
Total 33 interviews 
(22 countries) 
41 respondents 
(27 countries) 
 
One of the two authors was employed by GLOBE between March and July 2013, 
and furthermore was the lead author of the climate legislation study, produced 
in collaboration between GLOBE International and the LSE.40 Surveys were 
distributed during the period of her employment, but were accompanied by a 
participant information sheet clearly stating that the questionnaire was for 
academic purposes only, and that there was no obligation to respond. All of the 
interviews were conducted after the author’s employment with GLOBE was 
terminated, and it was made clear to interviewees that the author was no longer 
an employee of GLOBE. A potential problem of this association with GLOBE is 
respondent bias – which could manifest itself, for example, in respondents 
providing answers which might be expected to ‘please’ someone who has worked 
for the organisation. In the event, respondents provided open and frank accounts 
of their experiences of GLOBE, including both positive and negative aspects. If 
anything, familiarity appeared to make respondents more willing to be candid 
towards the interviewers, which we interpreted as a potential product of trust. 
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 Note, the other author has had no prior association with GLOBE International. 
In order to gain additional contextual detail into GLOBE International, and its 
impacts on climate change debate and policy, we additionally carried out a 
review of the available (non-academic) literature. Numerous references to 
GLOBE summits and to the legislation studies were found in print and 
electronic news media – both in developed and developing countries (see Annex I 
for detailed coverage). Although these news stories say relatively little about how 
GLOBE International operates, or how it might impact on policy at the domestic 
level, they nevertheless provide some evidence about the level of visibility and 
political attention that the network has attracted. GLOBE International has 
received less attention in government and other grey literature, although there 
are several notable mentions of GLOBE’s work in UK parliamentary debates 
(the UK held the GLOBE International presidency and housed the international 
secretariat for several years until 2014). 
 
5.5 Evidence from participants  
5.5.1 A network for learning and resources? 
GLOBE is conceived as a forum for experience exchange amongst legislators. 
Furthermore, the organisation seeks to empower legislators with policy-relevant 
knowledge, both through the legislation studies and through top-level expert 
presentations and dialogues. In the interviews, leaders of the GLOBE network 
repeatedly emphasised that the construction of formal knowledge by the 
organisation was purposefully tailored to the specific needs of legislators: 
You have legislators that are dealing with all sorts of things on a 
daily basis, not just for their constituents but also some issues in 
parliament, legislation and so on…they just simply don't have the 
time to get into the detail on some of these complex issues. By building 
something that is specifically for them, tailored for them, I think you 
can create a new baseline of knowledge that underpins or actually 
almost creates the motivation for them to act as legislators.  
(I010) 
 
Learning emerged as a major theme in the interviews; it was cited as the leading 
motivation for participation. Many legislators enrolled themselves into the 
network in the expectation that GLOBE would serve as a valuable platform for 
knowledge exchange and learning from experts and peers. Within this context, a 
number of respondents from developing/emerging economies mentioned their 
lack of prior knowledge and experience in the area of climate change policy, and 
how this hampered their ability to initiate legislative measures to address 
climate change. 
The majority (but not all) of the respondents highlighted the learning value of 
the network, and the summits in particular. For some members, the condensed 
learning opportunities provided by GLOBE were transformative in nature: 
I had zero knowledge prior to GLOBE...I was an environmental 
advocate, but it was limited to ‘the three Rs’ – reduce, reuse, 
recycle…but now I’ve learned about climate justice, climate finance, 
IPCC reports, and what’s going on internationally. 
(I015) 
Given the aspirations of GLOBE, one might expect lesson drawing to be a central 
feature of the networking initiative. Certainly, participants reported learning 
about legislative, policy, and administrative developments in other countries 
(e.g. interviewees 1, 2, 5, 20, 18, 21). As one respondent wryly noted, ‘[T]he 
capacity for legislators to learn from each other and to shamelessly steal policy 
ideas is really important’ (I04). Participants moreover reported gaining insights 
into the experience of other countries in putting policies into effect – learning 
about good practices as well as potential pitfalls to avoid in implementation. 
Yet, alongside policy learning, the GLOBE network also appeared to function as 
a site for political learning. For example, commenting on the value of the 
network, one legislator noted: 
GLOBE was also useful just to get in touch with other 
parliamentarians in other countries, who may be aware of what’s 
happening in those countries, but also will have experience in dealing 
with political issues that are common in any jurisdiction.  
(I021) 
Likewise, one respondent succinctly observed, ‘It was useful to get to know 
how people succeed, how they manage to pass legislation’ (I09). Another 
highlighted how ‘…this gathering of experience helps legislators put forward 
their proposals more boldly and more effectively’ (I016). 
The significance of political learning is perhaps unsurprising. The main 
participants in GLOBE are members of legislatures whose responsibility is to 
write, champion, and pass laws. They are not bureaucrats charged with 
designing specific policies to realise the ambitions and requirements enshrined 
in climate change legislation. It therefore makes sense that legislators should 
be interested in learning from their peers about the various ways in which 
they have sought to advance climate change legislation in their own countries. 
Many legislators exist in a context where there is significant domestic 
opposition to climate change policy, such that learning from others about 
potential political and administrative strategies assumes heightened 
importance. 
However the significance of political learning went beyond lesson drawing. 
Another theme that emerged from the interviews was how legislators had used 
their knowledge from GLOBE in a ‘substantiating’ capacity (Radaelli, 2009), that 
is, to help support their political position domestically. Important in this regard 
were the GLOBE legislation studies, which provide a compendium of climate 
laws and policies in various developed and developing countries. A number of 
legislators testified to ‘waving them around’ as ‘political weapons’ in 
parliaments.41 Information from the studies regarding the number of countries 
which had adopted climate change legislation was used strategically by 
participants, for example, to spur on further legislative action domestically. An 
example is the statement made in the UK parliament by Barry Gardiner, MP: 
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 Amongst others, mentions of the study were made in parliaments and by governments in China, India, 
South Africa, and Mexico. 
The hon. Gentleman talked about our country legislating for this area 
and leading alone, but will he peruse the GLOBE International report 
on 33 countries, 32 of which are making what I would call progress—I 
am sure he would not—in the area? Britain is not doing things alone; 
32 like-minded countries are passing legislation to similar effect.  
(September 10, 201342) 
It was suggested that one important consequence of GLOBE was heightened 
oversight of domestic government policy. Asked about the role of the 
organisation, one respondent noted that it contributed to: 
…ensuring that governments actually have legislatures who were on 
it, looking at what they were doing, monitoring it, auditing it, 
scrutinising government policy, and saying, ‘Hang on. No, you haven't 
got that right. You need to be going further in this, because actually 
you're not doing as well as this country over there or that government 
over there, and we don't want to lag behind here, and we think this is 
important.’ 
(I04) 
 
More broadly, political learning was important in the sense that it provided a 
better understanding of the realities of climate politics in other countries, 
which helped legislators form their positons on certain issues. While 
legislators are domestically-oriented, climate change comprises an 
international collective action dilemma, necessitating co-operation between 
nation states. Participation in GLOBE provided legislators with information 
about the domestic political challenges facing other countries and why, or why 
not, countries were making progress in tackling climate change (I025). For 
legislators from developed economies, in particular, this information had 
instrumental value. Several respondents therefore reported that learning 
about the problems faced by developing countries had allowed them to adjust 
their positions on international negotiations and/or climate-related foreign aid 
(I02, I020). 
Nearly all of the respondents said that their key learning experiences had been 
through interactions with other legislators at the summits, which allowed 
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participants to compare practices with each other and gain insights into more– 
and less effective administrative and legislative measures. Face-to-face contact, 
in particular, provided an opportunity for legislators to ask questions and seek 
out information directly relevant to their needs. Additionally, it enabled 
parliamentarians to forge connections with their counterparts from other 
legislatures, with whom they could stay in touch with after the summits (e.g. 
through email exchange, etc.). Interactions took place both formally, during the 
organised sessions (e.g. focused discussions on particular topics), and informally, 
between the sessions (e.g. during coffee breaks) (e.g. I018, I019). 
Contributing to learning was the general atmosphere in summits, which was 
reported by interviewees as being open, honest and conducive to candid 
discussion. For example: in one panel discussion on renewable energies in 
Mexico, one legislator elaborated on Germany’s ‘best practices’ in implementing 
feed-in-tariffs, while another legislator from Spain shared parallel insights from 
her country under the title ‘worst practices’. A contrast was sometimes drawn 
between GLOBE – which was described as a collaborative, non-competitive 
environment in which all legislators had a voice – and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – which was seen as a 
more closed, competitive venue for traditional inter-state diplomacy between 
government representatives. One respondent noted: 
I think what was interesting is that the motivations were much less 
geopolitical in the GLOBE process. For example, in the UN 
negotiations all the developing countries negotiate together as a block, 
in the G77 plus China, and it’s sort of almost like we have to get as 
much out of the developed countries as possible and don’t commit to 
doing much themselves, whereas in the GLOBE process I think there 
is very much more geopolitical neutral type stance that it was viewed 
as an issue of national benefit, national security.  
(I010) 
Important in this respect is the particular membership of GLOBE. Delegates are 
not official representatives of their national governments, irrespective of 
whether they are members of the ruling party/coalition or even the opposition. 
Participants are therefore not bound to take an ‘official’ party line, but can 
express their opinions more freely. Interviewees remarked on how this helped to 
‘create a sense of trust’ between legislators (I04). The membership of the network 
was important for other reasons. Insights about policy and practice imparted by 
legislators were considered as more relevant, in the sense of being ‘…more 
attuned to the different pressures that you….as a parliamentarian understand’ 
(I021). Indeed, participants were more likely to be more receptive to information, 
advocacy, and persuasion from fellow parliamentarians, as opposed to civil 
society. As one parliamentarian bluntly noted: ‘I’m not bloody having Friends of 
the Earth feeling like they can pretty much instruct my office what to do’ (I06). 
Learning did not simply take place through personal interactions. Several 
interviewees and survey respondents mentioned that their most significant 
learning episodes had been the high-level speakers – notably the scientific 
presentations from the IPCC, the US National Academy of Sciences and the UK 
Royal Society, as well as the dialogue with the President and Vice-President of 
the World Bank. References were also made to the climate legislation studies. 
Results of the survey (which was distributed in proximity to the launch of the 4th 
edition of the climate legislation study) revealed that over 60 per cent of 
respondents had read parts of the study. Interviews revealed that the study 
helped legislators to inform themselves – and, at times, their advisors – on 
developments in other countries they engage with: 
To have as a reference and guide so that when you go into a country, 
you need to see what's going on, so I open the book [The climate 
legislation study], and I say, ‘Right, they've done that. They haven't 
made a great deal of progress on this, but they're doing that.’ To be 
able to do that is hugely helpful, so that... when you're engaging with 
somebody, to show the respect that you've bothered to find out what 
their own legislation looks like...  
(I04) 
It was moreover noted how the studies were instrumental in stimulating a 
process of self-reflection, comparison, and benchmarking. As one representative 
of GLOBE commented: 
We started to generate a real competition, particularly between those 
major powers of what were they doing different and how they were 
advancing their domestic agenda. The GLOBE events were events in 
which you could cap off that and recognise that.  
(I019) 
Inevitably, assessing the impacts of learning – including through legislators’ 
subsequent involvement in advancing domestic, or even international, climate 
legislation – is fraught with difficulty, not least because of the multitude of 
factors potentially impacting their actions. We would caution against suggesting 
that GLOBE alone has had a decisive effect on domestic climate action because 
such a claim is not readily supported by the data. At least two respondents 
speculated that the involvement of members of national legislatures in GLOBE 
had contributed to the passing of a major climate law in Mexico, followed by 
attempts in several other Latin American countries (Costa Rica, Columbia, Peru) 
to introduce similar legislation (I01, I010). Another legislator from a developing 
country noted that, ‘I was the one who initiated the climate legislation law in my 
country, and I wouldn’t have thought about it if I had not[sic] been attending 
GLOBE’ (I014). A further respondent said that the knowledge exchange in 
GLOBE summits is what allowed his country to begin a process of legislating on 
climate change (I011). Yet across the interviews there was only limited evidence 
linking participation to specific instances of policy diffusion whereby learning 
about innovations in one country had unambiguously informed the development 
of particular policies (or administrative innovations) in another. Instead, the 
impact of learning through GLOBE lay more with empowering legislators, 
providing them with policy-relevant knowledge, strategies, and ultimately 
greater confidence which they could use in domestic legislatures to shape 
discourses and legislative activity. As one legislator observed, ‘What GLOBE 
would do is support legislators in their own agenda’ (I06). This support extended 
beyond the summits. There were also regional and bi-lateral meetings, ongoing 
communications with the secretariat, a newsletter, and a whole host of 
conversations (via emails, etc.) going back and forth between legislators in the 
network. 
While participants made frequent references to learning, the importance of 
resources was mentioned far less by respondents. A number of legislators from 
developing/emerging economies mentioned the enhanced opportunities provided 
by the summits to learn more about climate finance, as well as the chance to 
meet senior representative from organisations such as the World Bank, GEF, 
and from the United Nations programme on deforestation (UN-REDD+) (I01, 
I05, I014). Yet it was not apparent that the prospect of enhanced financial 
resources was a significant motive for participation or a consequence of 
legislators’ involvement.  
Where involvement in GLOBE appears to have been of greater value was in 
terms of providing legislators with enhanced domestic political recognition, 
legitimacy, and influence. One respondent noted how his involvement in an 
‘international framework’ had meant that ‘the speaker of parliament gave me a 
free hand’, in the sense of granting him additional opportunities to, for example, 
table bills (I09). Another noted how, as a result of his involvement in GLOBE, 
his country’s Minster of Environmental Affairs regularly consulted with him on 
climate change issues (e.g. international policy developments, the positions of 
other countries, etc.), and included him as part of the delegation for COP21 (I05). 
Additionally, it was noted how participation in GLOBE could raise the domestic 
‘profile’ of participants, and how ‘an international stage is good for them 
politically, domestically’ (I010). A further theme that emerged from the 
interviews was how GLOBE was instrumental in (re-)affirming the importance 
of domestic legislative action in addressing international climate goals and, with 
it, the central role of parliamentarians. There was a real sense that participation 
had psychologically ‘empowered’ certain legislators and helped them to reclaim 
‘ownership’ over the climate agenda domestically (I01, I03, I05, I010, I019). In 
order to understand the nature of this ‘empowerment’ further, however, it is 
necessary to unpack some of the emotional dimensions of the networking 
initiative, including notions of camaraderie and inspiration. 
 
5.5.2 Unity, esprit de corps, and inspiration  
 
Politics is a very human business, and GLOBE is a very human 
business. It creates human relationships around a topic. It provides 
information, a sense of common endeavour, and it provides shared 
solutions to help tackle what is an extreme form of a long-term 
problem.  
(I06) 
One of the most striking findings to emerge from all the interviews was how 
participation in the summits had forged a ‘human’ connection amongst 
participants and, moreover, how this created a psychological momentum and 
increased motivation to act. Commenting on the experience of GLOBE, one 
legislator noted how ‘a relationship was built…not only professionally, but also 
sometimes personally’ (I01). Likewise, a legislator highlighted the ‘comradery 
that builds up across the floor’ (I06), while a representative from GLOBE 
described how the organisation helped to create a ‘community’ amongst 
parliamentarians (I010). While most of the participants had a pre-existing 
interest in climate change, it was the very experience of participating in the 
network that was responsible for forging a sense of unity amongst 
parliamentarians. 
Legislators expressed an affinity to other participants in the network. An 
important factor underlying this affinity arose from the realisation that 
parliamentarians are ‘not on their own’ (I04), ‘a trust that other people are doing 
it [i.e. climate policy]’ (I010) and a sense of common purpose. Indeed, the 
interviews revealed an esprit de corps amongst participants, as evidenced by the 
following quote: 
It is very inspiring and very useful to build sort of a community, of 
people from different countries, that gives me the feeling that we fight 
the same battle – and we come back home and continue doing what we 
believe is right, and I have this feeling of being connected to them.  
(I016) 
Another legislator observed how ‘at GLOBE meetings, you couldn’t see easily 
that they [the legislators] were from this party or this party. It was like a 
common position’ (I01). 
One factor which was identified as contributing to this collective sense of 
purpose was intensity of the summits. As one of the leaders of the GLOBE 
network summarised: 
That openness, the fact that it isn’t formal negotiation, the fact that it 
is so well-informed, the fact that it’s so extreme, in a way, and there 
you are, everyone’s tired, flying in from everywhere and they’re 
spending all bloody day, Saturday and Sunday, wrestling this thing, 
not going out and seeing any light, gives a sense of the group that’s 
meant to do something. I think that infects Chinese members of the 
National People’s Congress as much as it does everybody else.  
(I06) 
A common and dominant theme was that this esprit de corps was associated with 
feelings of ‘enthusiasm’ and ‘excitement’. In fact, interviewees used these very 
terms to describe their experience of GLOBE (I01, I017, I020, I015) and recalled 
how these feelings helped to motivate them. One interviewee summarised the 
impact that being a part of the GLOBE network had had on him: 
The psychological impact of talking to people who are pursuing the 
same goals - that creates an environment in which a spark was 
happening. A spark was happening for me. You get a lot of energy 
from people doing the same thing…that’s probably one of the more 
useful things that a summit or a conference can do – just to refocus, 
recharge your batteries, and then you have energies for another round.  
(I013) 
Another legislator commented how ‘you come back really motivated and wanting 
to work more on it [i.e. climate policy]’ (I020). Likewise, one delegate recalled: 
Every time I have to opportunity to attend, I notice that it encourages 
you [sic] – that once you go back to your home country you look for 
issues that you can really advocate on, draw the executive arm of 
government’s attention, so that we can take a stance to mitigate or to 
adapt.  
(I017) 
Along similar lines; ‘[C]oming back from the summits, I was motivated, 
reassured, because having colleagues in other countries doing the same as what 
we are doing, gives you a sense of community that helps’ (I016). What this 
suggests is that involvement in GLOBE was not simply about exchanging 
information, learning from best practice, or increasing actors’ political 
legitimacy. Of equal, if not greater significance, participation in the networking 
initiative was instrumental in generating an ‘emotional energy’ (Gould, 2002) 
which helped to propel subsequent action by legislators. This point is 
encapsulated in the following quote: 
I think legislators come because they feel empowered, perhaps more 
psychologically than technically. Because at the end of the day there is 
only so much knowledge transfer that can be replicated to different 
countries, so I think at least half of the impact or half of the benefit is 
to feel psychologically empowered and motivated.  
(I03) 
Along similar lines, legislators emphasised how being part of the GLOBE 
network helped to increase feelings of self-efficacy, understood here as an 
individual’s belief in their capacity to execute necessary actions to achieve 
specific goals (Bandura, 1986). For example, one commented how ‘it is really a 
bit disappointing to fight this really important battle not surrounded by 
colleagues, and having conversations with others in other countries really 
helped’ (I016). Another noted how ‘coming from a small country you are isolated 
and feel helpless and there’s nothing we can do, and coming to a big 
meeting…it’s a positive reinforcement thing – reinforces sense of confidence in 
your own country, in your own parliament, in what you can do’ (I013). 
Heightening this sense of self-confidence was the fact that participation in 
GLOBE helped to make legislators feel ‘important’ (I010). The summits provided 
an opportunity for individual legislators to speak at prestigious venues (e.g. the 
US Senate, Mexican Congress), to network with senior representatives from 
organisations such as the World Bank, and ‘to be in the room’ with distinguished 
international figures (I05, I016, I019). They also gave a ‘voice’ to countries, 
including smaller ones, which have historically been neglected in multilateral 
meetings under the auspices of the UNFCCC (I05). 
Several legislators noted how the experience of attending the GLOBE summits, 
combined with the non-partisan structure of GLOBE, was instrumental in 
generating an increased sense of unity within their national delegation. 
Travelling together created opportunities for a range of social interactions 
amongst domestic political rivals, or legislators from other branches of the 
legislature, which might not otherwise happen (I01, I08, I016, I017, I021). In 
doing so, it helped to forge bonds between members of national delegations, 
raising the prospects for subsequent co-operative behaviour. In at least one case, 
a heightened sense of national unity was recognised as a key factor in passing 
significant legislation. In the process of drafting Mexico’s framework climate 
legislation, several separate proposals for a climate change law were tabled by 
different parties, and the GLOBE chapter convened a meeting in which members 
from all parties succeeded in creating a unified version, which later became 
Mexico’s General Law on Climate Change (I01, I08). 
Our findings regarding GLOBE resonate with previous research on social 
movements and activist networks in the sphere of civil society (Hercus, 1999; 
Bosco, 2007), for example, in highlighting how interpersonal interactions can 
give rise to heightened solidarity, confidence, and emotional energy to pursue a 
common goal. Yet, going beyond this body of work, a further important topic to 
emerge from our work was how participation ‘inspired’ participants. This was 
neatly summarised by a legislator from an emerging/developing country: ‘[W]hat 
happened [at the GLOBE summits] was a bit of everything – knowledge sharing, 
competition, but mainly inspiration’ (I01). For some, this inspiration had come 
from keynote speeches and others’ presentations: 
In Washington we had the occasion to be in the room with a really 
exceptional leader, Nancy Pelosi. She was really able to transmit not 
only a very strong engagement but also a highly effective action on 
these issues and she was really inspiring. But in general every 
presentation is inspiring – you learn from each other. If a colleague in 
another country has achieved that result it means we can do it too.  
(I016) 
Others were inspired by direct contact with delegates from other countries. One 
legislator therefore commented on the impact of meeting face-to-face with one of 
their counterparts from Micronesia: 
To hear from first hand from legislator there, what's happening there 
and that they still fight against climate change and didn't get 
frustrated. That they didn't get frustrated and said ‘okay, we cannot 
do anything anymore’. I really like the first hand contact with 
somebody who is faces the problems directly. I read about it before 
and knew all the examples and so on, but to talk to this person, 
literally right there…[that was] my moment in Washington. 
(I04) 
At least one respondent noted that ‘inspiration’ had directly contributed towards 
subsequent efforts to advance climate action: ‘We were inspired by all the 
information we got at that conference and we went back we asked the 
parliament to put forward a standing committee on climate change’ (I07). Others 
reported being inspired to renew their efforts to increase pressure on domestic 
governments to accelerate climate action. In line with Thrash & Elliot (2004), 
participants in GLOBE were inspired by (speeches, actions by other countries, 
etc.), and inspired to (scrutinise government policy, table bills to amend existing 
or introduce new climate legislation, etc.).  
Interviews of members of other networks, notably the IPU, did not generate 
similar findings with regards to emotional energy. Interviewees who were 
members of both networks (for example IO4, IO5, IO12, IO13) clearly said that 
the IPU meetings had a different feel to them than GLOBE meetings, that they 
were more political and diplomatic in nature.   
Interviewees who were members of the IPU (but not of GLOBE) did not once 
raise notions of inspiration or motivation, even when directly prompted to talk 
about their ‘state of mind’ during and after IPU summits. Instead, they focused 
on the diplomatic, negotiation-like side of the interactions at the summits, and 
the need to represent their countries’ interests as would be done in other 
international forums, such as the United Nations.   
This may be attributed to several factors. First, which arises from the fact that 
delegates to the IPU are official representatives of their country, unlike GLOBE, 
where members do not necessarily represent their country or governments.  
Second, while GLOBE focuses on environment and climate issues (with 
parliamentarians participating precisely because of their interests in these 
topics), IPU members deal with a variety of issues, ranging from human rights, 
international peace and security, to education and culture. One consequence is 
that the propensity of IPU members to be emotionally aroused by issues, which 
are often not in their field of expertise or enthusiasm, may be less than their 
counterparts in GLOBE. Third, it may be that the size of the forum (IPU holds 
much larger meetings), does not lend itself as easily to forging personal ties and 
emotional energy.  
While evidence from the interviews mostly portrayed a positive account of 
legislators’ experience of GLOBE – how it had energised, motivated, and inspired 
action – a note of caution is in order. Although a number of legislators testified to 
having taken concrete steps to advance domestic legislative action on climate 
change, qualifying the impact of the emotion-laden aspects of participation 
remains highly problematic. An important question in this regard is the degree 
to which the emotional ‘buzz’ from legislators’ involvement in GLOBE was 
ephemeral. One legislator voiced his frustration that, despite initial enthusiasm, 
an initiative to set up a sub-national GLOBE chapter never materialised (I020). 
Another legislator drew attention to the ‘shelf-life of parliamentarians’ and how 
this made it more difficult to build and sustain relationships over time (I03). We 
cannot discount the possibility that, for certain legislators, the emotional energy 
generated by involvement at the summits dissipated afterwards. It is also 
possible, that some people are more prone by their nature to experiencing 
emotional energy and to being driven by it. At the same time, it is hard to 
discount outright testimony that participation in GLOBE played a role in 
energising and inspiring certain legislators in the network, heightening their 
commitment to advancing legislative action domestically. 
 
5.6 Discussion and conclusions 
Networking initiatives have come to occupy an increasingly important position 
in the emerging landscape of climate governance (Hoffmann, 2011; Bulkeley et 
al., 2012; Busch, 2015). Yet, comparatively little is known about how they 
achieve their governance functions and, more specifically, the mechanisms 
through which participation leads actors to take actions which contribute 
towards advancing climate mitigation or adaptation. Our particular 
intervention in the present paper seeks to address this gap by focusing on one 
trans-governmental initiative, GLOBE International, which has been largely 
been ignored in the existing academic literature. 
Table 2 below summarises the main findings from the interviews. For each of 
the identified roles of the network, it specifies the number of interviewees who 
mentioned the theme, as well as the number of interviewees who assigned 
particular importance to this theme.   
Table 12 – frequency and dominance of themes in interviews 
 Number of interviewees 
who referred to 
particular theme  
Number of interviewees 
who mentioned 
particular as prominent 
for them 
Learning 24 17 
Resources 7 2 
Competition 1 0 
Emotional energy 16 11 
 
We found evidence to support the oft-made assumption that networking 
initiatives fulfil a substantive learning role (Legrand, 2012; Stone, 2013). 
Interviews with legislators highlighted how the information-rich social ecology of 
the GLOBE summits (in particular) created an environment which was 
conducive to learning by legislators in the network. Some of this learning was 
focused on policy and included examples of both positive and negative drawing 
from the experience of other countries (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). Yet, of greater 
significance in the present context was political learning. Involvement in 
GLOBE provided legislators with opportunities to gain insights into the political 
realities of climate policy, strategies to advance legislative action and 
‘substantiating information’ (Radaelli, 2009) which could be used to shape 
discourses in their domestic parliaments. 
Another role commonly ascribed to networks is the provision of resources to 
participants (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004). However, interviews with legislators 
indicated resources were generally neither a major motive for-, nor a significant 
outcome of, their involvement. The one area where the contribution of GLOBE 
was evident was in granting participants enhanced political legitimacy and 
influence domestically. The learning and networking experiences translated into 
a reputation for GLOBE legislators ‘being in the know’ which, in a number of 
cases, had enhanced their opportunities to advise governments and table new 
legislative climate initiatives. 
Our most significant finding concerns the emotional (and social) roles performed 
by GLOBE. The importance of the networking initiative went beyond learning 
from and about others – although this empowered legislators in ways which 
enabled them to form political positions, make more informed choices, and more 
effectively engage in legislative advocacy. Indeed, GLOBE helped to generate 
feelings of unity amongst legislators, forged around the idea that they are 
‘fighting the same battle’, are not ‘alone’ in this battle, and are part of a wider 
‘community’ with a common purpose. Additionally, the experience of 
participation was infused with positive emotions, giving rise to excitement and 
energy amongst legislators. We also found an important role for inspiration, 
especially around particular speakers, narratives of climate policy and action in 
the face of adversity. 
The significance of these emotions, feelings, and inspirations was three-fold. 
One is that the esprit de corps amongst participants facilitated discussion, 
debate, and the exchange of information in a comparatively open, honest, and 
unrestrained fashion. This openness also arose from the non-partisan nature 
of the network and the fact that participants were not official government 
representatives. However, beyond the particular social composition of GLOBE, 
there was a sense in which being part of a collective entity working towards a 
common goal facilitated exchange. Another reason as to why the emotional 
dimension of the network was significant is that the emotional energy was 
instrumental in invigorating participants’ commitments towards climate 
action during and following the summits. Although many of the legislators 
who were selected into the GLOBE network already had a pre-existing 
interest in climate change, interviews suggested that participation helped to 
strengthen and sustain their climate-related ambitions, advocacy, and actions. 
A third reason is that the comradery and feelings of unity which arose 
amongst certain national delegations was important in facilitating greater 
cross-party co-operation on climate change. This, in turn, increased the 
possibilities for subsequent legislative climate action domestically. 
We feel bound to qualify our findings. GLOBE International is an IPI with a 
particular set of characteristics. The organisation’s climate initiative has a 
comparatively narrow thematic focus in which many of its members have a 
particular interest. The climate summits are a carefully staged context in 
which one might expect to witness intense episodes of network learning. 
Additionally, the network creates multiple opportunities for learning between 
summits, ranging from bi-lateral meetings and dialogues with the secretariat 
through to informal emails exchanged amongst parliamentary members. The 
particular experience of GLOBE for legislators also involves a set of conditions 
which one might suspect are particularly favourable to the development of 
solidarity, emotional energy, and inspiration. Revealing in this regard were 
interviews with members of another IPI, the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(IPU), in which respondents made scant reference to terms such as energy or 
unity. Instead, the IPU was perceived as a more broadly-focused forum for 
inter-state diplomacy, wherein delegates represent and report back to national 
governments. What this suggests is that caution needs to be exercised in 
assuming that our findings can be generalised to all IPIs, or indeed 
environmental networking initiatives – though the fact that some of the latter 
have characteristics which overlap with GLOBE suggest that they may be 
sites where emotional aspects are more relevant. 
Accepting this caveat, our paper makes several wider contributions. One is 
that it offers a corrective to accounts of networking initiatives which have 
failed to consider their emotional roles. While previous literature has 
acknowledged the relational nature of network encounters, it has largely done 
so within a cognitive framework concerned with understanding how actors 
come to develop a common language, inter-subjective understanding, and 
discourse around particular problems (Knight, 2002; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; 
Bathelt & Schuldt, 2008). Our paper suggests that it may additionally be 
necessary to take account of the emotional aspects of networks and how, 
within the relational context of group settings, actors may come to develop a 
sense of solidarity, emotional energy, and inspiration. Indeed, we argue that 
these emotional aspects are potentially a useful complement to conventional 
accounts of networks focused on information and resources. For example, it 
was within the setting of the esprit de corps that existed at the GLOBE 
summits that particular episodes of learning became more meaningful, 
resonant, and inspiring for participants. That is, while learning may provide 
the cognitive blueprints for action, emotional aspects potentially supply the 
motivational propellant for putting these into practice. 
Another contribution we make is to understanding the conditions under which 
networking initiatives are likely to promote actions towards environmental 
goals. Our study suggests that a number of factors may be important in this 
regard. One is corporeal co-presence. Echoing the findings of recent work on 
international businesses conferences, trade fairs, and IPIs (Bathelt & Schuldt, 
2008; Legrand, 2012; Henn & Bathelt, 2015), the present analysis underlines 
the crucial significance of face-to-face contact and interactions. However, while 
this literature emphasises their role in learning only, we additionally suggest 
that interpersonal interactions are important in generating an esprit de corps 
and emotional energy. A further insight is that the credibility, saliency, and 
legitimacy of information matters. One reason why participants were receptive 
to the information circulating, exchanged, and presented as part of the 
GLOBE process was that it was seen as ‘usable knowledge’ (Haas, 2004). 
Hence it was salient in the sense that it addressed knowledge gaps and 
contributed to policy– and politically-relevant understanding, of direct value to 
legislators. The information was credible in that it was not seen as ‘politically 
aligned’. Much of the information was also perceived as legitimate, coming 
from authoritative information providers, not least the legislators themselves 
acting in a non-partisan capacity. We would also add that the information was 
emotionally arousing and inspiring, conveying positive stories of climate 
action, a common purpose, and a sense of hopeful anticipation that actions can 
make a difference. 
GLOBE is only one amongst a large number of networking initiatives in the 
environmental sphere – many of which have received surprisingly limited 
attention in the academic literature. Our study has made a preliminary 
contribution in unpacking some of the emotional aspects of participation and 
how these can impact the thoughts and behaviours of participants. An 
important task for future research is to further explore these emotional 
dynamics and understand where, when, and how they contribute to the 
governance functions of environmental networking initiatives.  
 
 
References 
 
Abbott, K. W. (2012). The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change. Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy, 30(4), 571-590. 
Argyris, C. (1976). Single-loop and double-loop models in research on decision making. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 363-375. 
Argyris, C. (1982). The executive mind and double-loop learning. Organizational Dynamics, 
11(2), 5-22. 
Baird, J., Plummer, R., Haug, C., & Huitema, D. (2014). Learning effects of interactive decision-
making processes for climate change adaptation. Global Environmental Change, 27, 51-
63. 
Bandura, A. (1986). The explanatory and predictive scope of self-efficacy theory. Journal of 
social and clinical psychology, 4(3), 359-373. 
Bathelt, H., & Schuldt, N. (2008). Between Luminaires and Meat Grinders: International Trade 
Fairs as Temporary Clusters. Regional Studies, 42(6), 853-868. 
Bennett, C. J., & Howlett, M. (1992). The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of policy 
learning and policy change. Policy Sciences, 25(3), 275-294. 
Betsill, M. M., & Bulkeley, H. (2004). Transnational Networks and Global Environmental 
Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program. International Studies Quarterly, 
48(2), 471-493. 
Blanco, I., Lowndes, V., & Pratchett, L. (2011). Policy Networks and Governance Networks: 
Towards Greater Conceptual Clarity. Political Studies Review, 9(3), 297-308. 
Blumer, H. G. (1939). Collective Behavior. In R. E. Park (Ed.), An Outline of the Principles of 
Sociology (pp. 221–280). New York: Barnes & Noble. 
Bosco, F. J. (2007). EMOTIONS THAT BUILD NETWORKS: GEOGRAPHIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
MOVEMENTS IN ARGENTINA AND BEYOND. Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale 
geografie, 98(5), 545-563. 
Bulkeley, H., Andonova, L., Backstrand, K., Betsill, M., Compagnon, D., Duffy, R., . . . Newell, P. 
(2012). Governing climate change transnationally: assessing the evidence from a 
database of sixty initiatives. Environment and planning C: government and policy., 30(4), 
591-612. 
Busch, H. (2015). Linked for action? An analysis of transnational municipal climate networks in 
Germany. International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development, 7(2), 213-231. 
Castán Broto, V., & Bulkeley, H. (2013). A survey of urban climate change experiments in 100 
cities. Global Environmental Change, 23(1), 92-102. 
Collins, R. (1981). On the microfoundations of macrosociology. American Journal of Sociology, 
984-1014. 
Collins, R. (1993). Emotional energy as the common denominator of rational action. Rationality 
and Society, 5(2), 203-230. 
Cutler, R. M. (2006). The OSCE's Parliamentary Diplomacy in Central Asia and the South 
Caucasus in Comparative Perspective. Studia Diplomatica, 59(2), 79. 
Death, C. (2011). Summit theatre: exemplary governmentality and environmental diplomacy in 
Johannesburg and Copenhagen. Environmental Politics, 20(1), 1-19. 
Eden, S. (2009). The work of environmental governance networks: Traceability, credibility and 
certification by the Forest Stewardship Council. Geoforum, 40(3), 383-394. 
Falkner, R. (2014). Global environmental politics and energy: mapping the research agenda. 
Energy Research & Social Science, 1, 188-197. 
Giest, S., & Howlett, M. (2013). Comparative Climate Change Governance: Lessons from 
European Transnational Municipal Network Management Efforts. Environmental Policy 
and Governance, 23(6), 341-353. 
Gilardi, F. (2012). Transnational diffusion: Norms, ideas, and policies. Handbook of international 
relations, 2. 
GLOBE International. (2015). website. from http://globelegislators.org/ 
Goldman, M. (2007). How “Water for All!” policy became hegemonic: The power of the World 
Bank and its transnational policy networks. Geoforum, 38(5), 786-800. 
Gore, C. D. (2010). The Limits and Opportunities of Networks: Municipalities and Canadian 
Climate Change Policy. Review of Policy Research, 27(1), 27-46. 
Gould, D. (2002). Life during wartime: Emotions and the development of ACT UP. Mobilization: 
An international quarterly, 7(2), 177-200. 
Greenwood, J., & Roederer-Rynning, C. (2015). The “Europeanization” of the Basel process: 
Financial harmonization between globalization and parliamentarization. Regulation & 
Governance, 9(4), 325-338. 
Gruszczynska, A. (2009). “I was mad about it all, about the ban”: Emotional spaces of solidarity 
in the Poznan March of Equality. Emotion, Space and Society, 2(1), 44-51. 
Haas, P. M. (2002). UN Conferences and Constructivist Governance of the Environment. Global 
Governance, 8(1), 73-91. 
Haas, P. M. (2004). When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the policy 
process. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 569-592. 
Hakelberg, L. (2014). Governance by Diffusion: Transnational Municipal Networks and the 
Spread of Local Climate Strategies in Europe. Global Environmental Politics, 14(1), 107-
129. 
Haug, C., Huitema, D., & Wenzler, I. (2011). Learning through games? Evaluating the learning 
effect of a policy exercise on European climate policy. Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 78(6), 968-981. 
Healey, P. (2013). Circuits of Knowledge and Techniques: The Transnational Flow of Planning 
Ideas and Practices. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(5), 1510-
1526. 
Hellmanzik, C. (2012). Does travel inspire? Evidence from the superstars of modern art. 
Empirical Economics, 45(1), 281-303. 
Henn, S., & Bathelt, H. (2015). Knowledge generation and field reproduction in temporary 
clusters and the role of business conferences. Geoforum, 58, 104-113. 
Henry, A. D. (2009). The Challenge of Learning for Sustainability: A Prolegomenon to Theory. 
Human Ecology Review, 16(2), 131-140. 
Hercus, C. (1999). Identity, emotion, and feminist collective action. Gender and Society, 13(1), 
34-55. 
Hoffmann, M. J. (2011). Climate governance at the crossroads: experimenting with a global 
response after Kyoto. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Huitema, D., Cornelisse, C., & Ottow, B. (2010). Is the jury still out? Toward greater insight in 
policy learning in participatory decision processes-the case of Dutch citizens’ juries on 
water management in the Rhine Basin. . Ecology and Society, 15(1), 16. 
Hunt, S. A., & Benford, R. D. (2004). Collective identity, solidarity, and commitment. The 
Blackwell companion to social movements, 433-457. 
Hutchison, E., & Bleiker, R. (2014). Theorizing emotions in world politics. International Theory, 
6(03), 491-514. 
Jasper, J. M. (2011). Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 37(1), 285-303. 
Juncos, A. E., & Pomorska, K. (2014). Manufacturing Esprit de Corps: The Case of the European 
External Action Service. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(2), 302-319. 
Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1974). Transgovernmental relations and international organizations. 
World Politics, 27(01), 39-62. 
Keohane, R. O., & Victor, D. G. (2011). The Regime Complex for Climate Change. Perspectives on 
Politics, 9(01), 7-23. 
Kissling, C. (2011). The legal and political status of international parliamentary institutions (Vol. 
4): Lulu. com. 
Knight, L. (2002). Network Learning: Exploring Learning by Interorganizational Networks. Human 
Relations, 55(4), 427-454. 
Kronsell, A. (2002). Can Small States Influence EU Norms?: Insights from Sweden's participation 
in the field of environmental politics. Scandinavian Studies, 74(3), 287-304. 
Kütting, G., & Cerny, P. G. (2015). Rethinking global environmental policy: from global 
governance to transnational neopluralism. Public Administration, 93(4), 907-921. 
Legrand, T. (2012). The merry mandarins of Windsor: policy transfer and transgovernmental 
networks in the Anglosphere. Policy Studies, 33(6), 523-540. 
Mahony, M. (2013). Boundary spaces: Science, politics and the epistemic geographies of climate 
change in Copenhagen, 2009. Geoforum, 49, 29-39. 
Marx, G. T. (1967). Religion: Opiate or Inspiration of Civil Rights Militancy Among Negroes? 
American Sociological Review, 32(1), 64-72. 
May, P. J. (1992). Policy Learning and Failure. Journal of Public Policy, 12(04), 331-354. 
McCann, E. J. (2008). Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities: Global Circuits of Knowledge 
in the Development of Vancouver, Canada's ‘four Pillar’ Drug Strategy. Environment and 
Planning A, 40(4), 885-904. 
Meckling, J. (2011). Carbon coalitions: Business, climate politics, and the rise of emissions 
trading: MIT Press. 
Meier, A., & Durrer, K. (1992). Ein kognitiv-evolutionäres Modell des wirtschaftspolitischen 
Prozesses. 
Newig, J., Günther, D., & Pahl-Wostl, C. (2010). Synapses in the network: learning in governance 
networks in the context of environmental management. Ecology and Society, 15(4), 24. 
Newig, J., & Kvarda, E. (2012). Participation in environmental governance: legitimate and 
effective. Environmental Governance: The Challenge of Legitimacy and Effectiveness; 
Hogl, K., Kvarda, E., Nordbeck, R., Pregernig, M., Eds, 29-45. 
Nicholls, W. (2009). Place, networks, space: theorising the geographies of social movements. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 34(1), 78-93. 
Nilsson, M. (2005). Learning, Frames, and Environmental Policy Integration: The Case of Swedish 
Energy Policy. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 23(2), 207-226. 
Oleynick, V. C., Thrash, T. M., LeFew, M. C., Moldovan, E. G., & Kieffaber, P. D. (2014). The 
scientific study of inspiration in the creative process: challenges and opportunities. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 436. 
Oxford Dictionaries (Producer). (2016). Inspiration. Retrieved from 
www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/inspiration 
Paterson, M., Hoffmann, M., Betsill, M., & Bernstein, S. (2013). The Micro Foundations of Policy 
Diffusion Toward Complex Global Governance: An Analysis of the Transnational Carbon 
Emission Trading Network. Comparative Political Studies. 
Peterson, C., Park, N., Hall, N., & Seligman, M. (2009). Zest and Work. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 30(2), 161-172. 
Quinn, R. W., Spreitzer, G. M., & Lam, C. F. (2012). Building a sustainable model of human 
energy in organizations: Exploring the critical role of resources. The Academy of 
Management Annals, 6(1), 337-396. 
Radaelli, C. M. (2008). Europeanization, Policy Learning, and New Modes of Governance. Journal 
of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 10(3), 239-254. 
Radaelli, C. M. (2009). Measuring policy learning: regulatory impact assessment in Europe. 
Journal of European Public Policy, 16(8), 1145-1164. 
Raustiala, K. (2002). The architecture of international cooperation: Transgovernmental networks 
and the future of international law. Virginia Journal of International Law, 43. 
Rhodes, R. A. (2006). Policy network analysis: Oxford. 
Rose, R. (1991). What is Lesson-Drawing? Journal of Public Policy, 11(01), 3-30. 
Sabatier, P. A. (1987). Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change: An Advocacy 
Coalition Framework. Science Communication, 8(4), 649-692. 
Sabatier, P. A., Flowers, J., & Weible, C. M. (2011). Advocacy Coalition Framework Encyclopedia 
of Public Administration and Public Policy, Second Edition (pp. 1-10): Taylor & Francis. 
Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (Eds.). (1993). Policy change and learning: An advocacy 
coalition framework. Boulder: Westview. 
Šabič, Z. (2008). Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of 
International Parliamentary Institutions. Parliamentary Affairs, 61(2), 255-271. 
Schüssler, E., Rüling, C.-C., & Wittneben, B. B. F. (2014). On Melting Summits: The Limitations of 
Field-Configuring Events as Catalysts of Change in Transnational Climate Policy. 
Academy of Management journal, 57(1), 140-171. 
Shiota, M. N., Thrash, T. M., Danvers, A. F., & Dombrowski, J. T. (2016). Transcending the self: 
Awe, elevation, and inspiration. In B. L. Fredrickson, M. M. Tugade, M. N. Shiota & L. D. 
Kirby (Eds.), Handbook of positive emotions (pp. 362-377). New York: Guilford Press. 
Slaughter, A.-M. (2002). Global government networks, global information agencies, and 
disaggregated democracy. Mich. J. Int'l L., 24, 1041. 
Spreitzer, G. M., Lam, C. F., & Quinn, R. W. (2013). Human energy in organizations: Implications 
for POS from six interdisciplinary streams. In K. S. Cameron & G. M. Spreitzer (Eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Positive Organizational Scholarship (pp. 155-167). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Stone, D. (2004). Transfer agents and global networks in the ‘transnationalization’ of policy. 
Journal of European Public Policy, 11(3), 545-566. 
Stone, D. (2013). ‘Shades of grey’: the World Bank, knowledge networks and linked ecologies of 
academic engagement. Global Networks, 13(2), 241-260. 
Thayer, R. E. (1990). The biopsychology of mood and arousal: Oxford University Press. 
Thrash, T. M., & Elliot, A. J. (2003). Inspiration as a psychological construct. Journal of personality 
and social psychology, 84(4), 871. 
Thrash, T. M., & Elliot, A. J. (2004). Inspiration: core characteristics, component processes, 
antecedents, and function. Journal of personality and social psychology, 87(6), 957. 
Thrash, T. M., Moldovan, E. G., Oleynick, V. C., & Maruskin, L. A. (2014). The Psychology of 
Inspiration. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 8(9), 495-510. 
True, J., & Mintrom, M. (2001). Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender 
Mainstreaming. International Studies Quarterly, 45(1), 27-57. 
Vauchez, A. (2012). Keeping the dream alive: the European Court of Justice and the 
transnational fabric of integrationist jurisprudence. European Political Science Review, 
4(01), 51-71. 
Vinke-de Kruijf, J., Bressers, H., & Augustijn, D. (2014). How social learning influences further 
collaboration: experiences from an international collaborative water project. Ecology 
and Society, 19(2), 1-10. 
Wapner, P. (2003). World Summit on Sustainable Development: toward a post-Jo'burg 
environmentalism. Global Environmental Politics, 3(1), 1-10. 
Watson, D., Wiese, D., Vaidya, J., & Tellegen, A. (1999). The two general activation systems of 
affect: Structural findings, evolutionary considerations, and psychobiological evidence. 
Journal of personality and social psychology, 76(5), 820. 
Witt, U. (2003). Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective. Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics, 13(2), 77-94. 
  
Annex I - Media mentions of GLOBE and the 
climate legislation study, 2014-2015 
 
CNN: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/27/opinion/climate-change-international-
opinion/ 
  
The Economist: http://www.economist.com/node/21597964/print 
  
Financial Times: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/718a1060-9e51-11e3-95fe-
00144feab7de.html 
  
Inter Press Service: http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/02/global-study-finds-
impressive-wave-climate-legislation/ 
  
The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/feb/27/report-
progress-climate-change-laws 
  
Business Week: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-02-26/emerging-
nations-lead-climate-action-as-laws-near-500-worldwide 
  
Bloomberg: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-27/emerging-economies-
lead-climate-action-globe-study-finds.html 
  
BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-26366989 
  
Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/27/global-climate-
legislation_n_4869685.html and http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-
bjerregaard/progress-in-climate-legis_b_4862245.htm 
  
The Australian: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/latest/legislative-
study-details-nations-efforts/story-e6frg90f-1226840196452 
  
India Times: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/environment/global-
warming/us-british-science-academies-climate-change-is-
real/articleshow/31103364.cms 
  
Business Green: http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/feature/2331385/the-28-
countries-leading-the-way-on-climate-change-legislation; 
  
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/analysis/2331184/legislators-around-
the-world-unite-to-pass-almost-500-climate-laws and 
  
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/interview/2331160/lord-deben-the-
technique-of-those-opposed-to-action-on-climate-change-is-spreading-
doubt 
  
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/james-blog/2331405/carbon-budgets-
and-green-manifestos-big-winners-as-climate-consensus-renewed 
  
Financial Times:  
Letter: Developing countries lead the field in climate legislation, From 
Lord Deben, Senator Edward Markey and Mr Cedric Frolick, 2 March 
2014  
Climate chief warns battle to curb warming is becoming harder, March 11, 2014   
 
Forbes: http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikescott/2014/02/27/we-are-not-alone-
climate-change-laws-span-the-world/ 
  
Scientific American: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/most-worst-
polluting-countries-now-have-laws-to-combat-climate-change/ 
  
China Daily: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-
02/28/content_17312961.htm  
 
Jerusalem Post: http://www.jpost.com/Enviro-Tech/Nitzan-Horowitz-to-
represent-Israel-at-US-Senate-climate-change-summit-343627 
  
Argentina 
Independent: http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/latin-
america-news-roundup-27th-february-2014/ 
 
IEDE: http://www.iede.co.uk/news/2014_4067/global-study-finds-
%C3%A2%E2%82%AC%C5%93impressive%C3%A2%E2%82%AC%C2%9D-wave-
climate-legislation 
  
RTE (Ireland): http://www.rte.ie/news/2014/0227/507207-climate-change/ 
  
Washington Examiner: http://washingtonexaminer.com/international-legislators-
plan-global-climate-push-ahead-of-2015-un-talks/article/2544794 
  
GNOM: http://news.gnom.es/news/climate-change-is-it-time-for-international-
agreements-to-recognize-national-laws 
  
RE New Economy: http://reneweconomy.com.au/2014/abbotts-climate-policy-so-
unintellectual-to-as-to-be-unacceptable-21542 
  
Trust (Thomson Reuters 
Foundation): http://www.trust.org/item/20140227222858-t37li/?source=hptop 
  
The Hill: http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/199420-mexico-china-led-on-
climate-action-in-2013 
  
Business Spectator: http://www.businessspectator.com.au/news/2014/2/27/policy-
politics/legislative-study-details-nations-efforts 
  
Think Progress: http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/02/27/3338011/countries-
climate-legislation/ 
  
News Tonight (South Africa): http://newstonight.co.za/content/no-doubt-about-
impact-climate-change-scientists 
  
Periscope Post: http://periscopepost.com/science-27/report-welcomes-progress-in-
international-law-on-climate-change-6027.html 
  
KSPR: http://www.kspr.com/news/nationworld/Climate-change-Time-for-
international-deals/21051646_24711000 
  
Eco Business: http://www.eco-business.com/news/global-climate-laws-now-cover-
nearly-90-cent-carbon-pollution/ 
  
EE News: http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059995234 
  
Morocco World 
News: http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2014/02/123796/moroccan-
parliamentary-delegation-in-washington-to-take-part-in-2nd-globe-climate-
legislation-summit/ 
  
News Today: 
http://www.newstoday.com.bd/index.php?option=details&news_id=2371166&dat
e=2014-02-26 
  
Nam News 
Network: http://www.namnewsnetwork.org/v3/read.php?id=MjYwNzc0 
  
UNRIC: http://www.unric.org/en/latest-un-buzz/29074-climate-change-cannot-be-
fought-without-legislation 
  
Blue And Green Tomorrow: http://blueandgreentomorrow.com/2014/02/27/report-
welcomes-progress-as-nearly-500-climate-change-laws-pass-globally/ 
 
Revista Exame (Brazil): http://exame.abril.com.br/rede-de-blogs/pegada-
sustentavel/2014/02/28/62-paises-ja-possuem-leis-para-combater-as-mudancas-
climaticas/ 
 
Instituto Carbono 
Brasil: http://www.institutocarbonobrasil.org.br/noticias2/noticia=736509 
 
El Pais (Brazil): 
http://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2014/03/01/sociedad/1393696243_051746.html 
 
Andi (Brazil): http://www.mudancasclimaticas.andi.org.br/node/213 
 
Brasil Post (Brazil): http://www.brasilpost.com.br/2014/03/10/acordo-climatico-
legislacoes-avancam_n_4919670.html 
 
Envolverde (Brazil): http://envolverde.com.br/ambiente/impressionante-onda-de-
legislacao-climatica/ 
 
Diario de Macae (Brazil): 
http://www.odebateon.com.br/site/noticia/detalhe/30832/leis-climaticas-ja-estao-
vigorando-em-66-paises  
Gulf news:  
http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/paris-to-finalise-new-global-
framework-1.1627076 
http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/the-climate-summit-can-deliver-
1.1630024 
ENS Newswire: http://ens-newswire.com/2015/06/07/world-governments-are-
limiting-carbon-emissions/ 
Greenbiz: 
http://www.greenbiz.com/article/dont-fall-behind-more-climate-legislation-
rules-world 
http://www.greenbiz.com/article/dont-fall-behind-more-climate-legislation-
rules-world 
The Hindu Business Line: 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/policy/solid-momentum-in-global-
legislative-architecture-on-climate-change/article7278958.ece 
Climate Wire: 
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060019397/search?keyword=copy  
Eco-business: http://www.eco-business.com/news/overheating-earth-staggers-
into-last-chance-saloon/ 
The Financial: New study finds 75 per cent of annual global greenhouse 
gas emissions  
Edie.net: 75% of global emissions covered by national targets 
The Daily Telegraph: World has policy handle 'on 75% of emissions' 
Perth Now: World has policy handle 'on 75% of emissions' 
Courier Mail: World has policy handle 'on 75% of emissions' 
Business Spectator: World has policy handle 'on 75% of emissions' 
Herald Sun: World has policy handle 'on 75% of emissions' 
The Australian: World has policy handle 'on 75% of emissions' 
 
Chapter 6: Thesis conclusion and 
reflections on contributions 
 
The key aim of this thesis is to contribute to the scholarly efforts unpacking 
motivations that drive international policy diffusion processes. This research aim 
is derived from a critical review of the literature, suggesting that some 
substantive gaps hinder potential advancements with regard to conditionality of 
policy diffusion mechanisms. Specifically, the explanatory power of policy issue 
attributes has been largely unconsidered, although raised as a potential research 
avenue, in the nascent days of policy diffusion research (Gray, 1973) and briefly 
mentioned in later scholarship as a gap which requires more careful attention 
(Karch, 2007; Fulwider, 2011). Some of the gaps reflect the particular 
methodological approach taken by political science scholars, and some reflect the 
hardships of obtaining high-quality empirical data which is capable of shedding 
light on more complex questions of causal pathways of decision making. This 
thesis aims to address some of the conceptual, empirical and methodological 
shortcomings identified in the literature. This concluding section summarises 
the key advancements and contributions made in the thesis, while recognising 
its limitations, and offering potential directions for future research.  
6.1 Key contributions of the research  
6.1.1 Theoretical contributions 
The first contribution offered by the research is the unpacking of the link 
between policy issues and diffusion mechanisms, in an attempt to understand if 
certain issue attributes affect the propensity for different diffusion mechanisms. 
Policy diffusion scholarship has increasingly engaged with conditionality of 
diffusion patterns on various factors, among others political orientation (Gilardi, 
2010), policy type (Mooney & Lee, 1995; Boushey, 2010), the role of 
intergovernmental institutions (Cao, 2009; Strebel, 2011), size of the government 
(Shipan & Volden, 2008), programme scope (Clark, 1985; Taylor, Lewis, 
Jacobsmeier, & DiSarro, 2012), variations in interest-group organisation, 
strategic framing and venue (Boushey, 2010), strong versus weak tie arguments, 
spatial proximity, and cultural proximity (Strang & Soule, 1998). One of the 
areas that have been flagged by scholars as potentially possessing substantive 
explanatory power is attributes of the ‘diffused matter’ (Karch, 2007; Fulwider, 
2011; Jordan & Huitema, 2014, p. 724). To date, most of the work on attributes 
focused on the nature of the policy solutions, and far less attention has been 
devoted to the nature of the problems – on the attributes of different policy 
issues. Furthermore, the fundamental distinction itself between problems and 
solutions is largely missing from the literature. This thesis contributes to the 
unpacking of the causal relation linking issue attributes and different policy 
diffusion mechanisms. It puts forth a conceptual model, suggesting that issue 
attributes prompt different motivations for policymakers, which in turn, 
influence the likelihood of certain diffusion mechanisms. In particular, it is 
concerned with a fundamental difference between ‘problem dependent’ diffusion 
mechanisms, and ‘problem independent’ mechanisms (Gilardi, 2003), each 
grouping stemming from different motivational roots: Problem-dependent 
mechanisms, namely learning and competition, are driven by a motivation to 
solve a given problem. Meanwhile, Problem-independent mechanisms (emulation 
and coercion) are driven by motivations which are external to the specific policy 
issue, for example a quest for legitimacy or for peer approval.  
As existing literature is focused mainly on the likelihood and rate of diffusion, 
and less on the different mechanisms at work (see, specifically, Table 1 in section 
1.2 of this thesis), it bypasses the causal factors at the root of these differences. 
This research uses motivations as a linking mechanism between attributes and 
diffusion mechanisms. while there is evidence to suggest that motivations affect 
diffusion mechanisms, and in addition, that issue attributes affect motivations 
(Perry & Kraemer, 1978; Dutton & Jackson, 1987), the chain leading from 
attributes to motivations through to diffusion mechanisms has not been 
formalised. By using the concept of motivations, the model unlocks elements of 
causality, potentially allowing predictions on the dynamics of decision making 
even in the absence of a complete identifiable diffusion ‘outcome’.  
The second contribution the thesis makes is by addressing the role that 
emotional energy plays in network dynamics, linking literatures on solidarity, 
emotional energy and inspiration to literatures on learning and resource 
acquisition. Literature on global governance mechanisms focuses largely on roles 
of transnational networks as facilitating learning  platforms (Hoffmann, 2011; 
Legrand, 2012; Stone, 2013; Busch, 2015) or resource-acquisition (Raustiala, 
2002; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004). Until now, it has been divorced from literatures 
on inspiration (Thrash, Moldovan, Oleynick, & Maruskin, 2014) and emotional 
energy, which have the capacity to generate heightened enthusiasm and 
commitment for certain causes (Hercus, 1999; Jasper, 2011; Hutchison & 
Bleiker, 2014). The thesis elaborates on the role of emotional energy as a 
propellant for action, distinguishing it from concepts such as normative learning 
(e.g. Huitema, Cornelisse, & Ottow, 2010) which shape the direction for desired 
action. By tying these literatures together, the thesis complements the literature 
on the roles of network governance.  
6.1.2 Empirical contributions 
This thesis advances the understanding on why policy diffusion takes place and 
what are they key motivational themes behind it. This is investigated 
particularly with regard to Israel, which remains little studied in the literature 
in general, and from an environmental perspective in particular.  
Through a series of three environmental case studies, the thesis contributes 
empirical evidence to support the conceptual model on issue attributes and 
diffusion mechanisms. In particular, evidence is provided with regard to the 
specific conditions in which learning- and emulation-based diffusion mechanisms 
are more likely to occur. Five attributes of the policy issues are used as 
explanatory attributes – namely salience, complexity, fragility perception as 
opportunity/threat, and international-orientation. Through the empirical case 
studies, hypotheses on salience, complexity, and international-orientation are 
confirmed.  
Furthermore, the thesis provides insights on the processes which led to the 
adoption of climate change policies in Israel, and particularly the National 
Mitigation Plan. Through a series of interviews with policymakers and analysis 
of parliamentary protocols, it suggests that a combination of motivational factors 
play a role in the formulation of climate policy. While a quest for external 
legitimacy was expected to play a dominant role, in fact it hadn’t; rather, 
considerations of internal legitimacy and identity-building seem to have played a 
role, in addition to motivations of promoting domestic co-benefits.  
Lastly, the thesis advances understanding on networking initiatives and the 
pathways through which they exercise their governance. Through an empirical 
analysis of GLOBE International, a previously unstudied Inter-parliamentary  
institute focused on climate change and sustainable development, the thesis 
provides insights into how networking organizations support, empower and 
inspire the actions of their participants, not least through emotional constructs. 
 
6.1.3 Methodological contributions 
The thesis also offers several contributions by applying a methodological 
approach and using methods differing from the ones prevailing in the relevant 
literatures, recognizing the shortcomings of those prevailing approaches and 
their limited ability to support the research questions (for a review of the 
literature which captures the methodological issues which are depicted below, 
see Table 1 in section 1.2 of this thesis): 
First, most of the studies on conditionality of policy diffusion are quantitative 
studies. By nature, they are thus only capable of capturing what is measurable. 
Notably, they struggle to capture policy processes and focus on policy outcomes. 
This is important when looking at processes which happen at the pre-legislative 
stage, at negative lessons (the decision not to adopt a policy drawing on others’ 
experience), or on policy reinvention (or adoption with change). This is 
acknowledged as a gap in the literature (Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2013, p. 
695) By employing a qualitative research design, this thesis is able to focus on 
the policy process rather on the policy outcome. A qualitative design is also 
better suited to offer insights into causal pathways resulting in the different 
policy diffusion mechanisms, and to unpack these differences.  
Second, there is limited research focusing on individual policymakers as the unit 
of analysis. This level of analysis has received comparatively limited attention in 
the policy diffusion literature (notable exceptions include Weyland, 2006; 
Sugiyama, 2008; Taylor & Tadlock, 2010). By taking a micro-level approach and 
bringing the attention to policymakers, whose motivations are pivotal to the 
research questions,  the thesis is able to engage with the motivational dynamics 
and themes which underpin decision making processes. This approach is 
facilitated by a unique set of over 60 elite interviews conducted with legislators, 
public servants and other prominent environmental leaders, which were 
accessed through the author’s personal network. The unmediated accounts 
provided by them have been able to shed light on previously unconsidered 
questions, and to provide valuable insights on the research questions.  
Third, most of the existing policy diffusion literature is situated in a federal 
setting, notably in the United States ((which is represented in 21 of 27 identified 
publications on attributes in the policy diffusion literature, see Table 1 in section 
1.2). This thesis diversifies the empirical offering to non-federal, non-
US/European geographical settings. It does so by examining case studies from 
Israel (Papers 2 and 4), as well as evidence from legislators from over 20 
countries, in the GLOBE case study (Paper 5).This offers a contribution towards 
the distinction between inter-federal and international diffusion patterns, which 
may differ in their motivational origins, as well as the diffusion mechanisms that 
are operationalised in each case.  
6.2 Key limitations and suggestions for future 
research 
6.2.1 Limitations 
While offering new theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions to 
the literature, this thesis has several methodological limitations, which should 
be acknowledged with care to allow building on its foundations when developing 
the ideas brought forth. Three main challenges are discussed below: 
Generalisability of case studies: Israel’s position in the international arena is 
not common. Its political circumstances raise the concern that findings regarding 
its policymakers’ motivations or problem-solving approach may not be 
generalizable to other countries. While this is a partly-justified concern, 
especially with regards to legitimacy seeking behaviour, findings suggest that 
external legitimacy was not the main motivation for engaging with climate 
policy. Furthermore, forthcoming research from Perkins and Sharman indicates, 
that similar motivational themes exist in less politically-charged geographies. 
Finally, most of the interviewees in the Israeli case studies were environmental 
policy officials and members of environmental NGOs. They are not engaged on a 
regular basis with broader policy agendas (for example, security or the 
Palestinian issue), and are therefore more likely to express motivations and 
behaviours which are similar to their counterparts in other countries. 
Interviews as a main research method:  in this thesis, the author sought to 
uncover underlying motivations, feelings and emotions, by way of interviewing 
key actors involved in environmental policy processes. At times, the answers 
could have been unflattering or revealing uncomfortable truths about decision 
making processes. There is a concern that interviewees would bend or ignore 
certain elements potentially reflecting negatively on them. In addition, in the 
Israeli case studies, interviewees were asked to discuss events that occurred a 
few years earlier, which raises the concern that their memory may fail them on 
some points. Nevertheless, the interviews featured self-critical and generally 
honest accounts, with different interviewees, at times from different institutions, 
corroborating each other’s factual information. The author’s knowledge of the 
events and political and context (as discussed below), aided in ensuring no large 
falsehoods were conveyed. The fact that interviewees knew that this was the 
situation seems to have contributed to their candid accounts. 
Positionality – as discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Section 1.1, the author had 
prior knowledge and involvement in the case studies explored in this thesis. This 
posed several risks: but was mitigated in a variety of ways, as described in 
Chapter 1 section 1.4.5. Among those were explicitly acknowledging the risk of 
positionality bias and respondent bias, purposefully open interview question 
design, and critical analysis. The latter element was carried out by several 
means, including joint work on one of the chapters, allowing the other researcher 
to play ‘devil’s advocate’ for some hypotheses, and by ensuring coding frames 
were not based on pre-conceived notions by employing another independent 
coder. Furthermore, the author’s positioning as an ‘insider’ mitigated risks of 
exaggeration and falsehoods in interviews, as well as allowing access to a large 
and unique sample of elite interviews, including prominent members of 
legislatures from numerous countries.    
6.2.2 Directions for additional research  
While the abovementioned limitations do not undermine the research as such, 
additional research could rectify the findings by bypassing some of them at least. 
While this doctoral thesis enjoyed only limited resources (mainly time and 
budget), which restricted its ability to draw on larger datasets, it suggests that 
potential advances could be made with regards to key themes emerging from it: 
Exploring other issue attributes in relation to the conceptual model 
portrayed in Paper 3: Currently, the thesis draws mainly from existing 
scholarship on attributes, and especially on those discussed in a policy diffusion 
context. Expanding the model hypotheses to include other attributes, for 
example urgency (an attribute which is difficult to disentangle from salience). 
Another promising direction is exploring assemblages of different attributes. 
While salience and complexity have been long-coupled, especially in their high-
salience/low-complexity variant, researchers should consider looking at other 
combinations: the combination of salience and fragility is one of those that might 
benefit from further attention, as the findings of paper 4 suggest.  
Testing the hypotheses in other issue areas: although the three case studies 
differ from each other in their attributes, they are all environmental issues. The 
caveat this poses is that environmental issues enjoy a certain status of good-
doing, mainly limiting the applicability of the fragility attribute. As one of the 
interviewees noted ‘who can say they were against a Clean Air Act?’ 
Furthermore, environmental policymakers may have a self-selection bias, 
driving them to engage in these issues. Investigating the hypotheses of the 
model in a non-environmental context will allow to refine it further, in order to 
increase its robustness.   
Testing the hypotheses in other geographies: as the model was empirically 
tested only in one country, future research can test the hypotheses in other, 
perhaps less politically-charged geographies than Israel, as well as in different 
political settings – states within a federal country, states operating within a 
supra-national setting etc.    
Investigating the motivational power of emotions: are the findings from 
Paper 5 extendable to other types of networks, or is climate change special? 
Would we expect to find the same emotional energies at work across policy 
areas? 
6.3 Potential policy lessons 
Finally, alongside contributions to the scholarship, the findings from this thesis 
and the questions it raises bring about several potential policy lessons:  
Are there circumstances under which we would expect to find the 
symbolic- rather than substantive learning? Findings suggest that under 
certain conditions, there may be a higher propensity for emulation-based 
diffusion, potentially leading to convergence around a limited set of policies 
which are considered appropriate, but are in fact sub-optimal in terms of 
performance. Bringing attention to this potential caveat in policymaking, may 
serve as additional input in the choice to adopt them, or alternatively encourage 
potential interventions.  
Are narratives used today in the policy literature mapped onto what 
really makes policymakers tick? There has never been a shortage in 
explanations why countries should act on climate change. Scientists, economists, 
sociologists and philosophers have been trying out various narratives which 
would propel action among countries. Testing those narratives against 
policymakers’ motivational constructs may advance the efficacy of the 
narratives.  
How can networks be purposefully designed in order to maximise their 
desired effect? Evidence from the GLOBE case study shows that specific 
elements of the network’s design and operation contributed to the heightened 
emotional energy which was reported; these include, for example, high-level key-
note speeches, the selection of members, and arranged seating at dinner. Taking 
elements as such into consideration may help other organisations enhance their 
governance capabilities.   
6.4 Concluding note 
In considering these contributions and limitations, this thesis argues that 
academic literature and policy-makers alike, as well as other actors in engaged 
in global governance mechanisms, need to turn their attention to policymakers’ 
motivations. These seem to encapsulate explanatory power underpinning policy 
diffusion processes, and unpacking them may also serve in better design of policy 
narratives and governance mechanisms.  
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